

# THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

VOLUME 3


JULY 1949

NUMBER 3

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*The Nile Basin*

(See page 260)

# The Middle East Journal

VOLUME 3

July 1949

NUMBER 3

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## PEACE AND REFUGEES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

*W. de St. Aubin*

*The alleviation of conditions of starvation and distress among Palestine Refugees is one of the minimum conditions for the success of the efforts of the United Nations to bring peace. United Nations General Assembly Resolution, November 19, 1948.*

**T**HE TRUTH of no other United Nations Resolution has been demonstrated more forcibly than this. It expressed the experience of those who had had prior contact with the problem of mediation in Palestine, and was destined to be evidenced again in the work of the Conciliation Commission

▼ W. DE ST. AUBIN has been overseas almost continuously since 1943, when he went to Europe to do emergency relief work for the American National Red Cross. In the spring of 1948 he was appointed Delegate of the League of Red Cross Societies to the Middle East, and shortly thereafter was attached to the staff of Count Bernadotte, United Nations Mediator for Palestine, as Special Consultant on Humanitarian Affairs. He served in this position under Count Bernadotte and later under Acting Mediator Ralph J. Bunche from June 1948 to January 1949, being Director of Field Operations for the UN's Disaster Relief Project from September on. Since his return from the Middle East he has been Supervisor of International Agency Relations for the American National Red Cross.

which was set up in December 1948 to assist in the negotiation of a permanent peace settlement.

The refugee problem began to hamper the efforts of Count Folke Bernadotte soon after his appointment on May 20, 1948, as Mediator for Palestine. In June he requested the League of Red Cross Societies to make an immediate survey of all humanitarian problems: as an outstanding Red Cross leader himself he was deeply concerned not only with their bearing on his mediation efforts but also with alleviating the human suffering created by the Palestine conflict.

A statement on the gravity of the situation was included in Count Bernadotte's report to the General Assembly in September. The Mediator's successor, Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, continued the investigation of the problem, and in October submitted an even fuller report, together with recommendations for United Nations assistance which he hoped would eliminate the problem as an obstacle to a settlement of the political issues. Instead of ebbing, however, the refugee problem has continued to swell, and the Palestine Conciliation Commission placed it at the head of its agenda. All attempts of the Commission, however, at its meetings in Lausanne in the spring of 1949, to make progress toward a permanent solution reached a deadlock because of the failure to arrive at an answer to this crucial problem. It is now more evident than ever that it is this legacy of the fighting in Palestine which stands foremost among the obstacles to peace.

#### *EARLY CONDITIONS*

It was during July and August 1948, while a representative of the League of Red Cross Societies in the Middle East, that I first surveyed the refugee problem on behalf of the Mediator. My inspections of camps, and my discussions with local officials, with representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and with the refugees themselves quickly revealed an appalling state of affairs. These trips in both Jewish and Arab Palestine, and in the neighboring countries of Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, and Egypt, clearly indicated that several hundred thousand unfortunate victims of the dispute were without sufficient food, medical care, or shelter, and were psychologically confused and



agitated. The local population, overwhelmed by the large influx, was also disturbed and confused, and unable to cope with the emergency. Today, after many months of effort and the expenditure of millions of dollars, physical suffering has been reduced, but the obstacles to peace and stability remain. The need for a permanent solution is as great as when the catastrophe first arose.

An establishment of the facts of a disaster is difficult at best, and in a period of civil collapse it is doubly so. But as accurately as could be determined, there appeared to be at the beginning of summer 1948 more than 250,000 men, women, and children made homeless by the spring's fighting in Palestine. They came from all walks of life, and were scattered among the neighboring countries of Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan, with a few thousands in Israel, Egypt, and Iraq. The first 4-weeks' truce between the belligerents ended on July 8, and was followed by a brief renewal of the fighting. Additional thousands then swelled the total of refugees and continued to do so for another six months, despite the re-establishment of truce conditions on July 18. Estimates of recent months, based on registration for relief distribution purposes, place the figure at approximately one million, distributed as follows:

Lebanon	130,000
Syria	85,000
Transjordan	95,000
Palestine	
North and East	400,000
Gaza Area	225,000
Israel	50,000
Iraq, Egypt, etc.	15,000

These refugees are Arabs, mostly Moslems but including some Christians, who had been living in the central and coastal areas of Palestine, and around Gaza. In the Nablus-Ramallah area it is believed that some local welfare cases are included in the refugee figures, but their situation, because of the heavy influx, is parallel to that of the refugees themselves. In addition to these totals are to be counted approximately 7,000 Jewish refugees from communal settlements who are being adequately cared for

by Jewish organizations in Israel. Perhaps another 25,000 Jews in the Jerusalem area have had to find new homes or shelter in Israeli-controlled territory.

The movement of refugees was sporadic and unorganized. In general, those from Galilee and the north coastal cities of Israel fled to Lebanon and Syria. Others sought the nearest Arab-controlled territory in Syria and Transjordan. Some sought relatives and friends. The professional, business, and former administrative people usually congregated in the larger cities of Beirut, Damascus, and Amman. While a few were able to carry personal effects and some money, flight was generally disorderly and with almost no possessions. Many went on foot, some by ship, cars, and trucks. In certain cases, entire villages kept more or less together.

The early reception of the refugees by the local communities in nearby countries was one of welcome. As the movement continued, however, and towns were overwhelmed — especially those that constituted points of entry — there developed an understandable resentment against the newcomers. Borders were later closed in an attempt to prevent further migration.

The early refugees were often sheltered in private homes or placed temporarily in public buildings: eventually schools, convents, and former army barracks were all put to use. In Damascus, a tent reception center holding about 500 persons was set up, which in the early days provided some medical check and orderly movement to other parts of the country. Nevertheless, even before the end of the summer, thousands were without shelter, merely camped under trees or at best lodged in caves and ancient ruins. It is estimated that more than 100,000 were without shelter in the Nablus-Ramallah section of Palestine alone in the fall and early winter of 1948, with many additional groups on the move seeking shelter or food. Rumors indicating better care in another location frequently gave rise to mass migrations. Following the military movements around Gaza in October and again in December, many more thousands found themselves, upon the onslaught of full winter, without any protection whatsoever.

#### *LOCAL RELIEF EFFORTS*

The question has often been asked as to what was done locally

to help provide for the unfortunate victims of the Palestine conflict, and especially as to what was done by the governments of the neighboring Arab countries to which the refugees hastily fled.

In every state voluntary contributions were offered, committees formed, and government funds and personnel made available for relief work. In Syria a government grant of 60 piasters per day was given to registered refugees over ten years of age and of 40 piasters to children under ten. Such medical services and other local assistance as could be provided were given without charge. In Lebanon a monthly grant of 10 kilos of flour or bread and 3 Lebanese pounds was authorized for each refugee. In some cases, food for camps was provided by a private contractor. It is estimated that with other costs included, Lebanon's expenditure on the refugees equalled 20 per cent of its national budget. Transjordan attempted to give 400 grams of bread per day to around 200,000 refugees located there and in the Palestine area under Arab Legion jurisdiction. The Arab League made a substantial grant of funds and forwarded blankets. In Egypt a special committee, in which the Red Cross participated, raised large sums of money and provided medical and hospital services, as well as the cost of maintaining a camp for 8,000 persons. In addition to direct donations, transport, warehousing, post facilities, and other costs in connection with the storing and distribution of supplies were provided by the authorities of each of the neighboring countries.

This official and semi-official expenditure was in addition to charitable services given locally. These were considerable, for with the breakdown of civic authority in areas under the military control of several armies, and with communications broken or rendered extremely difficult, much of the task fell directly on the local communities. Because their donations varied greatly, and were often in kind, accurate estimates of this aid are impossible. But in general it can be said without hesitation that an earnest effort was made by both the local populations and governments to assist the thousands of Palestine refugees who sought shelter in their lands, and that the cost has been a very heavy burden upon them.

*ASSISTANCE OF FOREIGN RELIEF AGENCIES*

Of considerable help throughout have been the voluntary efforts of foreign relief agencies. Count Folke Bernadotte, at the International Red Cross Conference at Stockholm in August 1948, appealed to all Red Cross societies for assistance. The total aid from this source has now reached a value of \$3 million, the American Red Cross assistance alone approximating \$1 million. Included among Red Cross gifts were first aid and medical supplies, medical equipment, ambulances, doctors and social workers, blankets, milk and other foods. These supplies were usually distributed through the local Red Cross or Red Crescent societies under the observation of experienced foreign Red Cross personnel. Supplementary help of many types came from church groups, such as the World Council of Churches and the Belgian Catholic Church; also from War Relief Services, the Young Men's Christian Association, the Near East Foundation, the American Middle East Relief, and other philanthropic organizations. These voluntary agencies have occasionally provided foods, blankets, and clothing. In addition, certain types of help such as the spraying of refugee camps with DDT by the Near East Foundation in Damascus, a special feeding program for 10,000 organized by the Danish Save the Children Union, and educational aid by the Young Men's Christian Association, were supplementary and beyond the plans of the co-operative United Nations project which eventually emerged. In New York a special committee of American voluntary agencies is seeking to provide such supplementary assistance on a co-ordinated basis.

*UNITED NATIONS DISASTER RELIEF PROJECT*

It was evident to the Mediator, however, that neither the efforts of the local governments and populace nor the supplementary donations and services of foreign relief agencies could in any sense cope with the problem. Resources, experience, and proper organization were all inadequate. In August 1948, therefore, he sent specific requests to 29 countries for donations on behalf of the refugees. Some 14 or 15 responded with food, tents, and medical supplies. To receive these supplies, allocate them,



and arrange for their transportation and distribution, Count Bernadotte set up a small disaster relief project.

I recall vividly the difficulties that faced us under this project even in such an apparently simple matter as the securing of tents. Recognizing as early as August the importance of providing temporary shelter for the refugees, the British Government sent several thousand tents to Beirut. Destined for eastern Palestine and the Jordan Valley, they had to be transported by truck through Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan without the normal documents. With the co-operation of the local authorities, and by persuading customs and government officials to waive regulations, the tents were finally unloaded at the Arab Legion post at Zerqa. But additional transportation had to be secured to take them to the Jordan Valley in the neighborhood of Shuna. There were at the time no United Nations funds or facilities for this type of operation, and it therefore took weeks to get this simple protection to thousands exposed to the elements. UNICEF milk stored in Beirut was badly needed in Jericho: arrangements were made to use United Nations planes when space was available. The milk was flown to Jericho, where funds collected from United Nations truce officials provided the necessary utensils. The American Red Cross and the American Junior Red Cross forwarded 35 tons of milk, and through the co-operation of the Lebanese Red Cross, a small center was set up for its preparation and distribution. Food was the major problem at this critical juncture: several thousand children had only bread for nourishment.

#### *UNITED NATIONS RELIEF*

This additional voluntary international assistance undertaken at the initiative of Count Bernadotte was for immediate relief only, and even when combined with other voluntary activity, still fell far short of providing the minimum help required. Therefore in November the Acting Mediator presented the United Nations with a plan based on surveys of its competent specialized agencies, indicating that approximately \$32 million was needed to sustain life and provide minimum care for 500,000 refugees to August 31, 1949. The General Assembly called on



certain member governments to provide this sum and appointed Stanton Griffis, American Ambassador to Egypt, as Director of Palestine Refugee Relief.

In the meantime, the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund, which at the appeal of the Mediator had begun late in the summer to provide supplies for children under 15, pregnant women, and the ill, had expanded its program of assistance until \$6.5 million was allocated or committed. Other aid was to come from such specialized United Nations agencies as World Health Organization, which made an early medical survey and is currently working out health programs; the Food and Agriculture Organization, which made estimates of food needs and costs; and the International Refugee Organization, which not only made purchases on behalf of the project but advanced it funds.

A regular allocation of food rations on an absolute minimum basis was possible only after the United Nations relief project got underway in January 1949. With controlled allocations of United Nations supplies, approximately 1300 calories per day are being provided for adults. The food furnished by this means consists of such items as flour, pulses, oils and fats, dates, sugar, and occasionally rice, fish, and meat. Supplementary foods are distributed through the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund for children, pregnant women, and the ill. At present, little food is being contributed locally.

All of the United Nations food is distributed under the general supervision of three humanitarian operating agencies. This work is based on an agreement between the United Nations' Director of Refugee Relief for Palestine and the League of Red Cross Societies operating in Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan; the International Committee of the Red Cross operating in Israel and north and central Palestine; and the American Friends Service Committee operating in the Gaza area. These agencies are autonomous and have their own supervisory and technical personnel. Neither the humanitarian agencies nor the United Nations is satisfied with the present ration and are seeking to improve the basic allowances as rapidly as possible. However, with local resources at the point of exhaustion, contributions of the UN member governments determine the amount of funds

available for this use, and only \$24 million of the projected \$32 million was actually in as of June 1949. At the present time the United Nations and the three operating agencies have agreed to continue activities beyond August 31 provided supplies are available.

### *THE PRESENT SITUATION*

The above programs indicate the situation at this time. It is expected, however, that at best, United Nations funds will be exhausted this fall, or early winter. What happens then?

The local governments cannot, as has already been shown, properly provide for this added burden, nor can voluntary contributions supply with reasonable regularity the basic needs of life for an additional million people. There is even question as to how long or even whether the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund can continue. The General Assembly next meets in September, and no doubt will consider the question. Even if it does so, however, there may be a serious lag in time before further plans are realized. It is estimated that almost \$2 million per month represents the absolute minimum needed to maintain the present low basic ration. Even if the \$8 million balance of United Nations funds pledged but not yet received is forthcoming, will it be possible to continue relief work after December 1949 at the latest? Then where will the money come from?

Another longer-term problem facing those concerned with the refugees is that of employment. Some of the camps are located far from communities in order to take advantage of the climate and available water, but where there is little or no work available. There is fear also on the part of the regular inhabitants that the employment of refugees will take away their own jobs. A large portion of the refugees have been away from their homes for approximately one year. Continued idleness, combined with substandard food and the lack of other necessities, has reduced morale to a very low point. The local communities are not equipped by experience or organization to deal with this complex problem, and it remains to be faced in its entirety.

In spite of efforts by the United Nations, by the governments,

and by the Red Cross and other voluntary agencies to maintain life on a minimum basis, serious human needs also still exist. As was to be expected, the first problem was food and the second shelter. It was so difficult to work out a solution to these two problems that little emphasis could be placed on medical care and clothing, which have now become the most critical needs. With an increased overcrowding in camps, the danger of epidemics is constant—typhoid, typhus, malaria, and dysentery. More medical and nursing personnel are needed, with clinics as well as additional nourishment to the ill. The need for clothing is increasing daily, especially for children. The efforts made thus far have been on too small a scale to affect the problem substantially. By fall, a large proportion of the refugees will probably be in rags.

The complicating local problems of transportation and communication continue to plague the humanitarian agencies, as well as local groups, in their efforts. It has been necessary for trucks to be leased or purchased by the United Nations for distribution of supplies. As long as armies remain in the area and international borders are closed, roundabout and often costly transportation cannot be avoided.

There still exists a critical emergency in the temporary care of hundreds of thousands of homeless refugees. But experienced workers in disaster know that there is no permanent solution for any refugee except to make him an *ex-refugee*. Repatriation or resettlement is therefore essential, not only for humanitarian reasons but to eliminate the danger of breeding a traditional hate, to provide an atmosphere for orderly negotiation. Peace would appear to be impossible until hope for the solution is restored. When conferences break down over this question and the attitude of those involved becomes increasingly desperate, objectivity ceases.

The problem is truly international. No one country can work it out alone—it will take the co-operation of the Arab states, Israel, and the United Nations. Perhaps if a plan could be developed for the re-establishment of a portion of these refugees in a place where they could again live a normal life, the tension would be reduced sufficiently to permit progress on the important

political problems obstructing the establishment of peace. Such a question as frontiers, for example, may require as a prerequisite the consideration of the eventual placement of the former Arab inhabitants of Palestine. But even if a partial or complete plan is worked out, the task will still require years to be fulfilled. The elementary problems of housing, employment, community facilities, and the planting and harvesting of crops alone all require time to be worked out.

Some permanent settlement ideas have indeed been put forth. Syria is experimentally moving 25,000 refugees to the northern part of the country, and there have been vague discussions of the development of the Jordan Valley. Others have proposed irrigation projects in the Tigris-Euphrates area of Iraq, or have suggested the Aqaba area of the Kingdom of Jordan as a place of settlement. Ideas for industrial development, and for pipeline construction and extension have also been advanced, but without exception they involve long-term financing, irrigation, or construction.

Nevertheless, there appear to be no insurmountable obstacles to the eventual elimination of the refugee problem in the Middle East; indeed the close co-operation required for its solution might prove to be a profitable experience for the countries involved. The central factor to remember is that while immediate emergency action for relief during the winter of 1949-1950 is essential to avoid a repetition of the experience of the previous year, some permanent solution — either repatriation or resettlement — must be found before peace can come to the Middle East.

# GEOGRAPHY AND POLITICS IN THE NILE VALLEY

Douglas D. Crary

(For a map of the Nile Basin, see facing p. 249.)

"UNITY of the Nile!" is the Egyptian slogan. "The Sudan question" is the British reference. The contrast expresses the conflict of interest today centered upon that political anomaly, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Egypt regards the Sudan<sup>1</sup> as essential to its survival chiefly in terms of the life-giving waters of the Nile. To Great Britain, it occupies a key position in the over-all strategy of empire defense. The Sudan, because of its geographical position, is the not-so-dead body over which two alien powers are waging a bitter struggle to gain or keep control.

This conflict has existed almost as long as the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan itself, but it has flared up with particular violence since the negotiations three years ago for the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The public comment on these discussions, as evidenced by the published data,<sup>2</sup> has been marked by claims, counterclaims, accusations, and denials. It has been largely on an emotional basis, and has failed to contribute much toward a realistic solution of the problem. Compromises for

<sup>1</sup> Throughout this paper the term "Sudan" refers to the political area of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and not to the geographical region lying between the tropical rain forest and the Sahara, which is also known as the Sudan.

<sup>2</sup> See especially "The Problem of Egyptian Treaty Revision," *Great Britain and the East, Middle East Issue*, 62 (April 1946), pp. 44-46; "Outlook for the Sudan," *Ibid.* 62 (Oct. 1946), p. 46.

▼ DOUGLAS D. CRARY is a member of the Department of Geography at the University of Michigan. In March 1948 he drove a pick-up truck the length of the Nile Valley from Alexandria to Khartoum, shipping by river steamer from Aswan to Wadi Halfa. The article here presented is developed from his observations and study at that time.



the sake of treaty revision were indeed offered by both sides until the question of the future of the Sudan was raised. But in this respect both Egypt and Great Britain stood firmly by their diametrically opposed convictions. As a consequence of failure to agree on this issue, the negotiations collapsed, leaving bitterness and suspicion in the minds of both parties.

Like the public comment, the official discussions between the governments of Egypt and Great Britain over the ultimate disposition of the Sudan seem to assume that only these two parties are involved. Superficial concern for the Sudanese people has been expressed by both Egypt and Great Britain. Both agreed during the exchange of notes pertaining to treaty revision that discussions regarding the Sudan would be "based on the interests and aspirations of the Sudanese people," but the substance of the conflict has not been altered thereby. The Sudanese people were not consulted as to their immediate or more distant interests and aspirations, although the British did offer to give them a chance to indicate their future desires. The Egyptians refused even to do this on the grounds that such an expression could be too easily dictated by the British, an attitude for which there seems to be some justification. At the present time the seven million Sudanese remain insignificant chiefly in the sense that they do not automatically possess the means of self-expression. But popular Sudanese support for one or the other of the two stronger forces will in the long run determine the economic and political status of the Sudan.

### EGYPT'S CASE<sup>3</sup>

According to the Egyptian point of view, the unity of the Nile Valley calls for the actual incorporation of the Sudan into the Egyptian state. The implication of expansionism is softened by the Egyptian guarantee to the Sudanese of a measure of self-government, but under Egyptian supervision; nevertheless, it is quite certain that the Sudan would become subordinate to Egyptian interests. There is basically nothing new in Egypt's demand for control of the Sudan. The present plans suggested by

<sup>3</sup> For a more complete statement of the Egyptian view, see Mohamed Awad, "Egypt, Great Britain, and the Sudan," *Middle East Journal*, I (1947), pp. 281-91.

Egypt are merely a modern expression of an age-old conviction. For four thousand years Egypt has looked toward the south, either in terms of safeguarding the annual Nile flood, or in terms of economic gain from gold, ivory, and slaves. In stressing its position in Africa today, Egypt is simply adhering to a national tradition.<sup>4</sup>

The Egyptian attitude toward the Sudan thus contains a definite quality of "manifest destiny." Many times in the past the two countries have been united politically, and when not so joined there has remained at least a cultural affinity. This relationship applies particularly to Egypt and the northern, desert portion of the Sudan. The Nile has provided the line of communication and Islam has been the catalyst. The several tribes along the river in the Northern Sudan claim varying amounts of Arab blood in the same way that the Upper Egyptians do. Actually, there is comparatively little Arab admixture in the riverine peoples of either Upper Egypt or the Sudan, the strongest elements of Arab blood being found in the desert nomads. Most of the stock in the valley area is Hamitic (from which Caucasian family came the ancient Egyptians) mixed with Negro, the proportion of Negro blood becoming greater as one travels south. The Southern Sudan is practically all Negro and for the most part pagan. But in the Northern Sudan and in Egypt the culture is Arab and Moslem. The agricultural system, the way of life, and the countless niceties of everyday speech are identical to both.

Beneath the feeling of "manifest destiny" which characterizes the Egyptian view on the Sudan lies a faint but clearly perceptible suggestion of fear. To all Egyptians the Nile is the source of life. There is the full realization that without it there would be no Egypt. There is also a consciousness of the desert, always visible beyond the fertile land, but unapproachable, mysterious, closing in. The psychological weight of the desert on the Egyptian mind is tremendous. If it were not for the Nile, his green fields would be barren waste. Nothing must interfere with the flow of the Nile. It thus becomes a matter of national security to have some degree of control over the upper reaches of the

<sup>4</sup> See Boris Gussman, "Egypt's Dilemma," *Contemporary Review*, 172 (1947), p. 147.

river. The Egyptians want and need a system of dams to regulate the annual flood, to bring water during low Nile, and to ensure their annual crops. Unfortunately there is a suitable location for only one reservoir in Egypt proper, that at Aswan. Other installations must be built beyond the frontier. To many Egyptians, those who control the Upper Nile therefore also control Egypt.

This dread of strangulation has a further physical basis in fact within Egypt itself. During the past several decades the change-over from the ancient basin system of irrigation to the modern perennial system in most of the country has caused a profound economic and social transformation. It has made possible an increase in agricultural production, both for home consumption and for sale abroad. Specialized export crops — cotton and onions — have placed Egypt in commercial relations with the rest of the world. But at the same time the increase in agricultural production is responsible for a startling increase in the population of the country, with which the increase in the production of food from a relatively fixed cultivable area has not been able to keep pace. Nor has industrialization in Egypt developed sufficiently to provide the necessary purchasing power to offset this condition. Land reform, as well as a certain amount of political reform, would no doubt be of great benefit, but meanwhile the standard of living for the farm population, already low, is declining even further.<sup>5</sup> The answer to this situation inevitably comes back to the Nile, the life blood of Egypt. The only means whereby the demand for greater agricultural production may be met lies in a more intensive use of the available land, which in turn depends upon a more effective utilization of the waters of the Nile. In these terms, according to some Egyptians, Egypt is fighting for its very life.

To support their point of view, the Egyptians claim to be able to help the Sudan economically at the same time that they help themselves. This, in fact, is the basis of the whole Egyptian approach. The Egyptians do not claim organic union, but a sort of dual monarchy system in which foreign affairs and Nile water for both countries would be supervised from Cairo, while in-

<sup>5</sup> See Wendell W. Cleland, *The Population Problem in Egypt* (Lancaster, Pa., 1936), pp. 69-111.

ternal Sudanese affairs would be managed from Khartoum by a Sudanese legislature and executive. This quasi dual-monarchy system, they believe, would at once preserve a large measure of Sudanese autonomy and ensure sensible economic co-operation.

The Egyptian plan would allow overpopulated Egypt to expand and relieve the Sudanese labor shortage. It would also stimulate the Sudanese to grow crops for their own use and for export to Egypt. (This is in direct opposition to the Sudan Plantation Syndicate, for example, which grows cotton to be processed in Lancashire.) These crops would be principally staples, such as sorghum, wheat, barley, and beans. Export crops would profit the Sudanese rather than the British. Here cotton is a particular bone of contention with the Egyptians, for they feel that their own climate and soil are better suited for cotton production than is that of the Sudan, and resent the competition from the south which benefits an alien power. In short, the Egyptians want a one-valley system based on co-operation rather than competition. They regard themselves as having Sudanese interests at heart and as being of the same blood. Their program, incidentally, also includes the development of the Negro Southern Sudan, clothing and educating it, and giving it proportional representation in any legislature that might be established. The South, of course, is totally foreign to Egyptian culture.

#### THE BRITISH POSITION

The British share of the administration of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan dates from the defeat of the Khalifa at Omdurman in 1898 by a joint Egyptian-British military force. This campaign into the Sudan was undertaken to protect the British position in Egypt as much as it was to guarantee the flow of Nile water. Its result was the establishment in 1899 of an Anglo-Egyptian condominium. Articles III and IV of the original Agreement, confirmed by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, reserved for the British the control of the administrative machinery, with the governor-general, an Englishman, possessing unlimited powers. Thus, from the outset the British have been in a position to assume complete authority over almost every phase of Sudanese



affairs, and they have unhesitatingly taken advantage of the opportunity. This situation is another sore point with the Egyptians, who hold that their rightful share of the administration of the Sudan, under a joint-rule status, has been usurped by the British. The latter, on the other hand, regard their position in the Sudan as something akin to a trusteeship, with the best interests of the Sudanese, the Egyptians, and themselves at heart. Being relatively secure in the Sudan by virtue of precedent and performance, the British position is therefore somewhat less complex than the Egyptian.

In contrast to the Egyptian claims of what they hope to do for the benefit of the Sudanese, the British point with justifiable pride to what they have already accomplished. There is no question but that the British have achieved much that the Egyptians would have been unable to, had they occupied the controlling position. The Sudanese are profiting, even if in a small way, by British experience in colonial administration, an attribute that the Egyptians totally lack. In all phases of administration, from public welfare to revenue, the British have raised the Sudan from its totally unorganized and hopeless condition under the Mahdi to one of moderately profitable security.

The economic development of the Sudan during the half century of British presence, as indicated by the export trade particularly, appears to favor the British. This development at the same time has brought considerable advantage to the Sudanese themselves, who have been carried along by the British program. The British have not put much money into the Sudan, so that none of the usual manifestations of good will are apparent, such as good roads and large schools. The British have, however, installed a number of government irrigation projects and have opened up much new land for agriculture. They have also greatly encouraged private irrigation schemes and co-operatives. But this is really only a beginning. If the present trend continues, one might be led to believe that it showed a genuine interest in improving the standard of living of the Sudanese; otherwise one might be tempted to regard it merely as an attempt to keep the people at a contented subsistence level. British officials along the line, it is significant to note, always speak of the nice, un-



spoiled character of the population, and of their simple happy ways.

As it is, the Sudan is playing its part in contributing to the economic welfare of Great Britain. The Sudan is relatively self-sufficient in foodstuffs, but exports industrial crops, notably cotton, which is sold in Great Britain. The only other important export commodity is gum arabic. The two chief sources of state income in the Sudan are the British-built Government Railways and the Gezira Irrigation Scheme. The railways, which also operate an extensive steamer service on the Nile and its principal tributaries, have consistently shown a profit. The Gezira Scheme is one of the largest developments of its kind in the world, with nearly a million acres producing cotton in a planned rotation system. The government's share in the proceeds of the Gezira Scheme is 40 per cent.

The Sudan is thus being exploited, to a certain degree, by the British. If the Egyptians should gain even nominal control and replace the British as the dominant power, it is reasonable to assume that they too would take economic advantage of the Sudan. The basic difference between British and Egyptian domination, however, lies in the ultimate regulation of the waters of the Nile. Egypt has great need of the Nile at home, and this need could conceivably increase. In possession of the Sudan, it would have both countries to provide for, and would be in a position to develop the resources of the Nile in terms of its own needs and at the expense of the Sudan. On the other hand, Great Britain, so far as utilization of Nile water is concerned, actually has only the Sudan to consider beyond the guarantees accorded Egyptian interests by the Nile Waters Agreement of 1929. Under the present circumstances, then, the Sudanese are actually in a more favorable position with the British in control than they would be with the Egyptians.

#### *SUDANESE ATTITUDES*

No one is exactly sure how the Sudanese stand politically. The various political parties range in opinion from a desire to stay under British influence and control to a desire to unite organically with Egypt. The best index to Sudanese politics, however,

is a study of the various religious groups and the political orientations of their leaders. The Islamic sects of the Sudan are very strong in that their adherents, less secular than the Egyptians, believe in them and their leaders sometimes to the point of fanaticism. The revolt of the Mahdi in 1881 and Gordon's death at Khartoum in 1885 at the hands of the Mahdi's Dervish followers attest to this fact. The leadership of the sects is hereditary because the leader usually claims descent from the Prophet, or from Ali or Osman or one of the Moslem greats. It is well to bear constantly in mind that these sects are fundamentally religious in character, and that their leaders are religious men of high caliber with a strong sense of responsibility toward their followers. But it is nevertheless true that the leaders play politics and can count on their followers for political support.

The largest pro-British sect in the Sudan is the Umma Party. It is often misrepresented by its opponents as desiring "complete independence." Complete independence for the Sudan at the present time is a more or less impossible aspiration, since a country is independent only to the extent that it is strong enough to withstand economic encroachment. The Sudan is not yet capable of standing alone without some means of outside support.

The leader of the Umma Party is al-Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi Pasha, the son of the famous Mahdi of the Dervish revolt. His opponents take pains to point out that his ascendancy could lead to a recurrence of Mahdist chaos. They regard him as a political tool of the British, and as having been elevated to his present wealth and popularity by the British. It is undoubtedly true that some of the favor which the British have bestowed upon him has had its effect, for his new-found wealth has afforded him greater opportunities for placing himself before the public. On the other hand, it is also true that his small but very strong nucleus of close followers south and west of Khartoum would follow him if he were in rags. At present it is estimated that he has approximately 1.5 million supporters.

The most important man in the Sudan, however, is al-Sayyid 'Ali al-Mirghani Pasha, leader of the Ashigga Party. It has been claimed that nine-tenths of the Sudanese follow him, but this is obviously an exaggeration. It is safe to assume, however, that a

majority of them adhere to his cause. He is anti-British and his followers have consistently boycotted what they call the puppet legislature, a sort of advisory council without power set up by the British in 1948 on an elected basis. Sheikh Mirghani does not favor organic union with Egypt, but does favor a dual monarchy. The British do not dare to offend him in any way because he is probably the most powerful man in the country, including the governor-general.

There are other political parties in the Sudan, but these might better be termed fronts, which align themselves in varying degrees with one or the other of the powerful two. They are more or less the legal representatives of the religious sects in the advisory legislature and elsewhere. It might be pointed out that the Umma and the Ashigga are themselves closely associated with the two most important sects in the Sudan.

A cross section of Sudanese political thought may be illustrated by an experience of the writer in one of the district seats in the Northern Province during his visit in 1948. It did not take him long to realize that this town was one of the political hotbeds of the Northern Sudan. From 1820 on, the Egyptians had sent many officials there who stayed on to live, and whose descendents today are very proud of their ancestry and their right to free expression. At a meeting of local government and professional men which the writer was privileged to attend every political leaning was represented. The government people (all Sudanese) tended to be pro-British or supporters of independence, while the professional men, such as the local doctor, the religious judge (*qadi*), a merchant, and others tended to be pro-Egyptian. As the discussion progressed and the politics waxed warmer, it was interesting to note that both sides inclined toward more and more extreme positions.

If the expression of attitudes at this gathering in a rather isolated community in the Northern Sudan is representative of public opinion among politically conscious Sudanese as a whole, it indicates a healthy basis for a two-party system of self-government: the Umma as the conservatives, and the Ashigga as the progressives. Yet in spite of their widely divergent political views, as expressed at this meeting, there was strong agreement

on one thing by both sides — that the tension in the Sudan was becoming unbearable and that something had to happen soon. They devoutly hope that a settlement between Egypt and Britain will be reached in the very near future, so that at least they will know where they stand.

The pro-British elements want to preserve the *status quo*, with a reservation for independence when the proper time comes. The nationalists want complete independence now. As regards unity with Egypt, or even a dual monarchy, both contend that they have absolutely no guarantee that Egypt would act any differently from Great Britain, and they doubt that it would act as well. The Sudanese would still be controlled by a foreign power or dominated by Egypt's numerical majority. Would this majority leave them with enough Nile water for their own Sudanese cultivation? Would the Sudan be expected to furnish raw materials for Egyptian industry and be a "potato garden" for Egypt? Would all the wealth of the Southern Sudan, when and if it were developed, gravitate to Cairo and leave the Sudanese in the position of poor and forgotten relations as far as education, construction of all kinds, and public health are concerned?

#### GEOGRAPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The answers to these questions and many others like them have their ultimate basis in the nature of the Nile Valley itself. Diverse geographical conditions within the area combined with the inevitable overlapping of the political and economic interests of Egypt, Great Britain, and the Sudan have created "the problem of the Nile." Its successful solution must necessarily take into account the inescapable geographic facts of the entire basin; and the political and economic interest of the parties concerned must be adapted to these facts. Egypt and Great Britain will never agree on the future of the Sudan until both fully recognize and comply with the geographic conditions of the Nile Valley. A brief account of the geography of the Nile Basin will serve to point out some of the physical and cultural factors involved.

The Nile River, the second longest in the world, drains over a million square miles, or approximately one-tenth of the African continent. Politically, the Nile Basin includes parts of the Bel-



gian Congo, Tanganyika Territory, Kenya Colony, and Ethiopia; nearly all of the Uganda Protectorate and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan; and the important part of Egypt. Within this vast area there is perhaps a greater variety of geographic features than in any other large river basin. Surface varies from nearly level swamp lands and flats to Ruwenzori, the third highest mountain in Africa, and the Ethiopian highlands; climate and vegetation range from tropical rain forest to dry desert types; densities of population vary from near zero per square mile to nearly 1,500 per square mile in the Nile Valley of Egypt; and peoples literally vary all the way from black to white.

Some order out of this seeming confusion of extremes may be obtained by combining the various interrelated geographic factors into regions. Three such geographic regions immediately become apparent in the Nile Basin. They are the tropical highlands, the transitional wet and dry savannas, and the desert. Each of these regions is relatively homogeneous, and is distinct from the others. Nile River water is the only geographic feature common to all three.

The tropical highlands region consists of the areas in which the headwaters of the Nile have their origin. It includes the lake plateau of Central Africa, which is the principal source region of the White Nile, and the Ethiopian massif, which is the source region of the Sobat, the Blue Nile, and the Atbara. In terms of surface conditions, the tropical highlands are distinguished by their elevations above sea level, although considerable local relief is found, especially in Ethiopia. Most of the lake plateau is over 4,000 feet above sea level, and Lake Tana, the source of the Blue Nile, is situated in rugged country in Ethiopia at an altitude of about 6,000 feet above sea level. The profiles of the rivers flowing off these highlands show rapid descents from the highlands to the broad plains to the north.

The tropical highlands are without question the most important of the three major geographic regions of the Nile Basin because they supply the water upon which the rest of the valley depends. The amount and distribution of rainfall in the tropical highlands region, and its relation to the streams draining it are thus of the utmost significance to the whole Nile Problem.



In the lake plateau area there is a total rainfall of about 50 inches, fairly evenly distributed throughout the year, but with the usual tropical equinoctial maxima. Lake Victoria, one of the chief sources of the White Nile, is located within the area of greatest rainfall concentration on the lake plateau. The Ethiopian massif likewise has a total annual rainfall of approximately 50 inches a year, but this occurs almost entirely during a summer rainy season with a July maximum. Stream flow and water supply are thus dependent upon these rainfall conditions. The White Nile from the lake plateau has a relatively uniform flow throughout the year, but, because much of its volume is lost by evaporation in the swamp land of the Southern Sudan, it contributes only about two-sevenths<sup>6</sup> of the total Nile supply. The White Nile is responsible chiefly for the maintenance of the flow of the lower Nile during the winter. The Blue Nile and the Atbara, on the other hand, flowing out of Ethiopia, come down in flood during the summer, bringing in their rapid run-off great quantities of water and silt. These streams are responsible for the annual Nile flood in Egypt in the late summer and for the deposition of alluvium in the Lower Nile valley. The Blue Nile contributes about four-sevenths and the Atbara about one-seventh<sup>7</sup> of the total Nile Supply, most of which passes through the valley during flood time and is consequently lost.

On the lake plateau the vegetation consists of dense tropical rain forest in the valleys and semi-deciduous forest and elephant grass in the uplands. Soils are mostly red loams. In the Ethiopian highlands these same conditions prevail, except that the forests are of a more temperate character.

The second major geographical region in the Nile Basin is the savanna, a broad transitional zone between the tropical highlands to the south and east and the desert to the north. The southern two-thirds of the Sudan lie in this region. It is differentiated principally on the basis of its climate-vegetation-soil complex, rather than its surface, which for the most part is a monotonous plain broken occasionally by low *jebels* and rocky

<sup>6</sup> H. E. Hurst, *A Short Account of the Nile Basin*, (Cairo: Ministry of Public Works, Physical Department Paper No. 45, 1944). p. 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

outcrops. The climate is the savanna type with winter drought and summer rain, and relatively high temperatures. The amount of rainfall as well as the length of the rainy season decrease rapidly from south to north as the desert is approached. Vegetation and soils reflect this climatic change. The sequence of vegetation in the savanna region, following the same order as the change of climate, begins in the south with a thin savanna forest marked by acacias and tall grass. This merges into a thorn forest and short grass association in the Central Sudan, which in turn disappears on the margin of the desert. Soils follow a similar pattern, consisting of chernozem types in the more humid south which change into chestnut brown types in the Central Sudan, and then into desert soils northward.

In the Southern Sudan and contained within the savanna region, but not a part of the established pattern, there is a vast area of swamp through which passes the White Nile and some of its tributaries. This area is known as the Sudd. It is a wide, poorly drained plain, perhaps an ancient lake bed, over which the waters of the Nile have spread out to form a huge evaporating basin. The vegetation consist of papyrus, reeds, and marsh grass, which block the channels and make not only the passage of steamers difficult but even that of the water itself. A high percentage of water derived from the lake plateau is therefore lost in the Sudd through evaporation and transpiration from the marsh plants.

The last of the major geographic regions of the Nile Basin is the desert itself. This includes the northern third of the Sudan and most of Egypt. It is practically rainless from Atbara to Cairo, its vegetation is scanty and xerophytic, and its soils are composed of sand, gravel, and chert. Almost all human activity is thus confined to the Nile bottom, where alluvium and water support life in teeming concentration.

Strong cultural differences are also displayed in the three major regions of the Nile Basin. Race, religion, language, and manner of living are the significant elements in which contrasts occur. In these terms the tropical highlands and the desert stand far apart. The savanna region in a cultural sense as well as the physical is transitional between the two.

On the lake plateau of the tropical highlands region the people are negro, with Hamitic, Nilotic, and Bantu types represented. They are polyglot and pagan. Their economy is primitive cattle raising, and their politics are practically non-existent. The situation in the Ethiopian highlands is roughly similar, except that the people themselves are chiefly Hamitic negroes who practice a primitive sort of Christianity.

Nilotic negroes are dominant in the southern part of the savanna region, but the Arab-Hamitic element becomes increasingly evident toward the north. There is likewise a change from south to north in language, from Nilotic dialects to Arabic, and in religion, from paganism to Islam. Cattle raising is the principal occupation in the south, whereas irrigated agriculture and nomadic grazing is characteristic of the north.

The principal cultural qualities of the desert region have already been indicated. The Semitic element becomes stronger in Egypt; the language is Arabic, the religion is Islam, and intensive irrigated agriculture is practiced in the Nile Valley. In contrast to the inhabitants of the other major regions, the peoples of the desert region have a considerable degree of sophistication and are politically conscious.

### CONCLUSIONS

From the foregoing geographic account of the Nile Basin come two basic truths. The first is that the Nile Basin is physically and culturally disunited. The second is that the problem of the Nile is a much larger issue than the conflict between Egypt and Great Britain over the future of the Sudan.

Egypt's demand for a "unity of the Nile" rests on a most insecure factual foundation. The phrase is a political catchword, and can have only a political connotation, if any. The concept is an outgrowth of the rivalries and jealousies between Egypt and Great Britain in regard to the Sudan, and fails to take into account the nature of the Nile Valley itself. Geographically, there is no unity in the Nile Basin, as has already been shown. The only continuity in a geographic sense is the flow of Nile water, which is by itself insufficient grounds for organic union or even

a dual monarchy of Egypt and the Sudan. Yet it is the Nile that lies at the very root of the problem.

In regard to the positions that Egypt and the Sudan occupy in the Nile Basin there are four basic factors to be considered: the locational, the economic, the demographic, and the strategic.<sup>8</sup> All of these are essentially geographic, and all bear a close relationship to each other. Jules Cambon wrote, "The geographical position of a nation, indeed, is the principal factor conditioning its foreign policy — the principal reason why it must have a foreign policy at all."<sup>9</sup>

The geographical position of Egypt is most unfortunate, being the lower course of the river upon which the country depends for its very existence. Egypt also has other locational problems involving Great Britain and the Suez Canal. The Sudan occupies the middle course of the Nile, and, like Egypt, depends upon it for much of its economic well-being. Both depend upon the headwaters of the Nile which lie in areas beyond the political control of either. Difficulties between Egypt and Great Britain over the control of Nile water in the Sudan are thus based on a half truth. The Sudan, of course, has the advantage of lying between Egypt and the sources of the Nile, but Egyptian control of the Sudan alone still will not solve the water problem.

In terms of the economic factor, the Sudan is partially complementary to Egypt. Both produce the same things, to be sure, but the yet undeveloped Southern Sudan is capable of producing commodities needed by Egypt. As Egypt becomes somewhat more industrialized it will be able to supply manufactured goods to the Sudan. A reciprocal trade is possible which will benefit both Egypt and the Sudan, and which will go far in establishing true unity of the Nile Valley. The productive capacity of the Sudan, however, must be developed and its political integrity must be preserved if it is eventually to attain any sort of national status capable of maintaining economic independence.

Demographically, there is again only a partial basis for union between Egypt and the Sudan. As has been pointed out, only the

<sup>8</sup> See Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emery, *The Great Powers in World Politics* (New York, 1939), p. 43 ff.

<sup>9</sup> Jules Cambon, "The Permanent Bases of French Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, VIII (1930), p. 173, quoted by Simonds and Emery, *op. cit.*



northern third of the country has a population sufficiently similar to that of Egypt to allow amalgamation without disrupting the lives of too many people. But the joining of a fraction of the Sudan to Egypt, even though the mass of politically conscious Sudanese live in the northern third, is a far cry from answering the problem of the Nile.

The strategic factor pertains primarily to the position of Great Britain in the Sudan. The area itself is an important link in the currently developing East African base of operations, as well as in the principal north-south east-west air routes of Africa. The British Empire is retrenching itself in the postwar world, and is looking to its defensive positions. The Sudan gives to Great Britain a foothold in a most important part of the African continent. Air bases in the Sudan are conveniently located in terms of the Suez Canal. Hence the release of the Sudan by the British at the present time to either Egypt or Sudanese nationalists is not in keeping with British strategy.

That the problem of the Nile goes beyond the differences of opinion between Egypt and Great Britain in regard to the Sudan is manifest by the international character of the Nile Basin. Egypt's case is based on the need for water, a perfectly sound and valid argument; Great Britain's case is based on strategic location in Northeast Africa. Both are inextricably bound to the Nile, and both depend on its extraterritorial sources. If Egypt desires union with the Sudan to ensure adequate control of Nile water to protect itself, Egypt by the same token should also have a hand in the affairs of the Belgian Congo, Uganda, Tanganyika, Kenya, and Ethiopia. This is obviously impossible.

Uganda, Tanganyika, and Kenya are British dependencies, and as such Great Britain exercises some control over the source regions of the Nile. But these areas, with the Belgian Congo, are less important than Ethiopia, as they encompass the headwaters of the White Nile, whereas Ethiopia is the place of origin of the Sobat, the Blue Nile, and the Atbara. These latter rivers are of much greater significance to Egypt than the White Nile, as they are the primary cause of the annual Nile flood.

With proper control measures in the headwaters of the Nile River there is no reason why both Egypt and the Sudan should



not have adequate reserves for long periods of time. Today, reserve supplies to ensure against low flood years are held at Aswan, in Egypt, and at Jebel Awliya on the White Nile and Sennar on the Blue Nile, both in the Sudan. Most of the water which is lost to Egypt passes out to the Mediterranean with the flood. It therefore seems reasonable that more adequate storage facilities be installed on the Blue Nile. The Lake Tana project seems to be one of the most worthy, but this requires the complete co-operation of Ethiopia. Additional water is lost by evaporation in the Sudd. Thus it seems logical that canalization of the region to provide a more rapid run-off and reduce evaporation would be of considerable benefit to Egypt. This is, indeed, being contemplated in the Jonglei Canal Diversion Scheme. Other measures to increase storage facilities and to hold back the flood are reservoirs on Lake Albert, which will require the co-operation of the Belgians, and a number of dams at favorable sites in the Nile Valley proper. All of these are of greatest concern to Egypt, and the completion of any one would go far toward easing the tension between Egypt and Great Britain in the Sudan.

# THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN EGYPT

*William J. Handley*

**R**ECENT YEARS have witnessed an increasing interest among the governments of the Middle East in the general status of workers, both agricultural and industrial.<sup>1</sup> Questions of labor and social policy, once of extremely subordinate concern, are today being given a high priority in Cairo, Ankara, Tehran, and the other capitals of the area. One important reason for this aroused interest is the stimulation Middle Eastern governments have derived from participation in such international organizations as the ILO, UNESCO, and FAO,<sup>2</sup> as was well evidenced by the ILO Conference held at Istanbul in November 1947, where a number of far-reaching resolutions on labor policy were adopted. Of equal or perhaps even greater importance is the realization that further procrastination in the matter of social reform can only be made at the risk of serious popular unrest, with possibly ruinous consequences to the existing social order. Above all, as a motive for reform, is the fear of communism, so often virulent under conditions of social disorder and poverty.

At the same time, this very fear of communism has made the governing class wary of proceeding too boldly. For example, in the matter of workers' organizations there is considerable governmental reluctance to permit unrestricted freedom of association

<sup>1</sup> The scope of this article is, in general, limited to industrial workers.

<sup>2</sup> i.e., International Labor Office; United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; Food and Agricultural Organization.

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for fear of communist penetration and eventual communist control of strategic economic units. But on the other hand repression, or even serious restriction of trade union activities, plays right into the hands of those who, themselves with nothing personal at stake and willing to take risks — including those of vilification and even imprisonment — advocate extremist techniques. Clouding a bold approach to the dilemma thus posed, is the deepening fear of insecurity in personal as well as in political affairs, the awful feeling that time is running short, that no matter what is done it will not suffice against the mass appeal of communism. This is a state of mind which quite often leads to desperate measures, including the suppression of all liberal tendencies, or oppositely and sometimes concurrently, to actions calculated to hoodwink the masses, such as the promise of wide social reform despite the uneasy knowledge that these promises will not and cannot be kept.

The social, cultural, and religious walls which provided comfortable insulation from modern political ideas are crumbling rapidly, and not solely as a result of the work of the followers of Marx and Lenin. The Atlantic Charter, the Cairo and Tehran declarations, the impact of the radio, the presence of American and British soldiers, the OWI<sup>3</sup> and its successor organizations, the pronouncements of the Allied leaders, even Hollywood, appear to have contributed as much — and probably more — than the communists to the increased appetite for social reform now evident among the common people of the Middle East.

Under these conditions, attempts by the workers of the Middle East to create institutions — trade unions, for example — for the promotion of their own economic betterment take on added significance. Of equal importance is the political orientation, if any, of these institutions, and finally the measures that the governments and ruling classes are taking to meet the rising demands of the workers.

Of all the labor movements of the Middle East, that in Iran has attracted the widest attention, largely because of its close association with the Soviet-oriented Tudeh Party. Here we find a clear-cut and ideologically consistent program of political

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Office of War Information.

action advanced by a militant, well-organized left-wing group.<sup>4</sup> The direction which the labor movement in Iran has taken is not generally characteristic, however, of the Arab world, where political action by the workers as such has been opportunistic, casual, and largely unimportant. This is not to say that the Arab labor movements themselves are unimportant, but rather that their significance does not so readily strike the eye. Because of the prominent position Egypt holds among the Arab states, the movement there perhaps deserves one's prior attention.

#### *TRADE UNION LEGISLATION AND DEVELOPMENT*

In 1942 the Egyptian Government of Nahas Pasha enacted a law on trade unions. This law was the first legal instrument laid down by Egypt enabling workers to organize themselves in protection of their interests and to bargain collectively with their employers. Previous to the passage of this law trade unions had in fact existed, and in the early 1930's a federation of trade unions had flourished. However, following a number of strikes, some of which were interpreted as being of political motivation, this federation was abolished and until the Trade Union Act was passed in 1942, organized labor activity was limited and to some extent underground.

With the passage of the Act, a large number of trade unions sprang into existence. As of December 31, 1947, the last date for which figures are available, there were 441 active unions with a total membership of 91,604. Though this number may appear high, it actually represents a decline both as to number and total membership from November 30, 1945, when there had been 489 trade unions with 139,546 members. The main reason for this rather sharp decrease of 48 unions and 47,942 members in three years was that many of the unions registered in 1945 turned out on investigation by the Egyptian Labor Office to be "paper unions" having fewer than the minimum of 50 members required by the Act. Others were dissolved because of their failure to maintain proper accounts and records.

Of the 91,604 workers who on December 31, 1947, were mem-

<sup>4</sup> A subsequent article covering labor developments in Iran will be published in a later issue of the *Journal*.

bers of trade unions, 32,000, or more than one-third, were located in the textile industry. This is not too surprising since the textile industry is Egypt's largest; it has also been the scene of most of the industrial disturbances of the last few years. Several other industries, such as exploitation of salines, minerals, fuel, and transportation, have a high percentage of trade union organization. The proportion among all industries, however, is only 19.5 per cent; and taking industry and commerce as a whole, the figure is probably well below 10 per cent.

As is apparent from these statistics, total membership is relatively small in comparison with the large number of unions. This disparity is even more striking when it is remembered that two of these unions, namely those at al-Mahallah al-Kubra and at the Filature Nationale in Alexandria, comprise about 30,000 workers. Thus most of the other trade unions barely manage to exceed the minimum of 50 workers as required by law. We can be sure, however, that this membership is fairly accurate and represents dues paying members, since the Egyptian Government takes great pains in scrutinizing the trade unions' accounts and books.

The principal reason for this large number of unions and correspondingly small number of workers is the fact that the 1942 Act prohibits a general federation of labor. Craft workers and workers from similar industries may in theory create federations, but as yet the enabling regulation for this kind of action has not been promulgated and it has apparently been the practice of the government to withhold permission for the time being. At present, therefore, Egyptian trade unions correspond in all cases to what would be called locals in the United States. There are indications, however, that some of the transport workers may be given the opportunity in the near future to group themselves into a federation. An informal federation of chauffeurs unions is already in the making. It is noteworthy that at the moment there are 82 separate trade unions in the transport industry with a total membership of 16,460.

Although Egyptian workers now have the right to organize, their freedom in trade union matters is, from the Western viewpoint, considerably restricted. According to the law, trade unions



may be formed only with the approval of the government and only under certain conditions. Their financial reports and the minutes of their meetings must be made available to government officials. Meetings can be held only if notice has been given to the competent authorities, who may withhold permission "if the meeting is contrary to public policy." Trade unions are not permitted to "busy themselves with political or religious questions." Specifically prohibited from forming trade unions are government workers, agricultural workers, authorized representatives of employers, and hospital nurses. The government is permitted to dissolve trade unions in the event of violations of the provisions of the law, and some important unions, including those at Shubra al-Khayma, have been so dissolved.

The restrictive nature of the Trade Union Act is a cause of some embarrassment to the Egyptian Government in view of the resolutions and conventions adopted by the ILO, of which Egypt is a member, on the subject of freedom of association. Officials in the government feel that on this question the thinking of the ILO is far too liberal for countries which, like Egypt, are in an early stage of industrialization. They feel that Egyptian workers have not as yet demonstrated sufficient independence and maturity to be entrusted with complete freedom. They also point out that the Trade Union Act does in fact confer a large number of benefits on Egyptian workers; for example, an employer cannot legally dismiss or discipline a worker for holding a trade union office or for carrying out a decision of the union, nor can he compel him to join or not to join a union. The governmental authorities concerned also feel that complete abolition of restrictions would lead to a situation where communists, with their well-known discipline, energy, and techniques, could conceivably get control of the trade union movement. This may well be a legitimate fear, but it can only be hoped that the Egyptian Government will gradually find a way to relax some of its restrictions in order that the trade union movement might have a chance to assume greater responsibility.

At present, the trade union movement as a whole is weak. There are no conspicuous and able leaders, and there are unlikely to be any until the movement has become more cohesive. Present

leaders, such as they are, tend to be more concerned with advancing their personal political and economic fortunes than in promoting the over-all well-being of the workers. A unified and federated labor movement would tend to reduce the number of wildcat, irresponsible, and poorly planned strikes now so characteristic of Egyptian labor relations. It would also improve the collective bargaining powers and techniques of workers and at the same time benefit the employers, since they would feel that contractual obligations agreed to by workers under these conditions would be assumed with greater responsibility than at present.

One promising aspect of the present structure of the Egyptian trade union movement should be noted. If and when federations are permitted, their component parts will probably be genuine, representative locals. This is all to the good, since it would mean that trade union growth was coming from the grass roots. Too often in the Middle East, and in other countries as well where the trade union idea is new, attempts are made to superimpose a trade union movement overnight from above, thus establishing a wholly synthetic and transparent type of organization. Moreover, because of its local character the Egyptian trade union movement will tend to exercise economic rather than political power. As it exists today, the movement is not in great danger of being harnessed to a particular political ideology, and in this way differs from trade union movements in some of the other countries of the Middle East, where political gains are sometimes sought at the expense of economic progress. The Egyptian pattern, incidentally, corresponds to the initial development of American trade unionism, where in all cases the locals came first and the federations came later.

There is, to be sure, the Egyptian Labor Party, which, as its title suggests, claims to represent the political aspirations of Egyptian workers. But although active in the 1930's and again very recently, the Labor Party has not as yet shown itself to be an important force in Egypt. The composition of the leadership of the party is drawn to a large extent from upper class Egyptian society, and its head and founder is a member of the royal family. In the 1944 elections even the few candidates running under the sponsorship of the Egyptian Labor Party were unsuccessful.

However, one service which is being performed by the Party should be mentioned, namely the aid that some of its representatives give workers in preparing material to be used in collective bargaining discussions and before conciliation and arbitration boards.

### *RISE AND FALL OF THE WORKERS' CONGRESS*

Although the Trade Union Act prohibits general federations, there has been one conspicuous attempt by a group of trade unionists to thwart both the spirit and the letter of the law. Early in 1946 an organization calling itself the Workers' Committee of National Liberation, and later simply the Workers' Congress, began to identify itself with national issues and to collaborate with student political groups. Along with a call for the evacuation of British troops, the Congress demanded higher wages, better working conditions, and a reorganized labor administration.

At the core of the Workers' Congress was a group of left wingers who, although members of relatively unimportant unions, had gone to Paris in September 1945 to attend the WFTU Conference.<sup>5</sup> This group was undoubtedly the main-spring behind the labor disturbances at Shubra al-Khayma, on the outskirts of Cairo, that began in September 1945 and continued until 1948. At the time of the anti-British strikes of February 21 and March 4, 1946, the Congress also included in its ranks many conservative elements, notably the Tramways Union Syndicate headed by a sheikh who was associated with the Moslem Brotherhood. There is no doubt that the effectiveness of the strikes was due to the decision of the Tramways and other transport workers to co-operate. Shortly thereafter, however, the Tramways Union and other fairly conservative groups broke away from the Congress, leaving only the Shubra workers as its main support. When the government, by dealing strongly with Shubra labor leaders, was able to bring the troubles to an end, to abolish the trade unions concerned and arrest many of their leaders, little or no

<sup>5</sup> The WFTU (World Federation of Trade Unions) has claimed that certain labor organizations in Egypt are affiliated with it, but participation by these organizations has been very limited, and the Egyptian membership claimed by the WFTU is greatly exaggerated.

effective strength was left in the Congress. On June 25, 1946, it failed completely in its attempt to call a general strike. With all its important leaders arrested, many on charges of communist activity, the Congress as such disappeared from the Egyptian labor picture.

Early in the summer of 1947 there were signs that some of the members of the defunct Workers' Congress concentrated in the Shubra area were reforming themselves and were taking advantage of the tense situation caused by Britain's and Egypt's dispute over the Sudan and the evacuation of British troops. They sought to identify themselves with various Egyptian nationalistic and patriotic front organizations, such as the Democratic Movement for National Liberation. They thus in some ways paralleled the Congress policy in 1946, when it participated in demonstrations ostensibly for nationalistic reasons but more probably in order to promote confusion and industrial unrest.

The serious strikes that occurred at al-Mahallah al-Kubra in September and October 1947 were due in large part to the activities of this group, for although conditions seemed favorable for the successful carrying out of these strikes (growing dissatisfaction of workers over wages, working conditions, and the allegedly unrepresentative character of the trade union at al-Mahallah), it is unlikely that strikes would have taken place at that time without this agitation. Following stern measures by the government, the activities of this group have again died down. To lessen the chances of a recurrence, the government set up a textile wage committee to investigate working conditions in the industry. As a result of its recommendations, working conditions, both at Shubra and at al-Mahallah al-Kubra, have apparently improved considerably, thus creating a less favorable atmosphere for agitation and disruption.

#### *STRIKES AND ARBITRATION*

Political agitation, so evident in the activity of the Workers' Congress, was but one of the causes of the unprecedented number of strikes to take place in Egypt since the end of the war. Unsatisfactory working conditions; the high cost of living; emotional tension brought about by acute nationalistic questions; the suc-



cess of a number of political demonstrations, seeming to indicate that the time was ripe for strikes aimed at economic improvement; a general let-down in discipline and morale following the war; and the fear of job insecurity and unemployment were all factors in the situation.

The main locale of these strikes, as already indicated, was Shubra al-Khayma, an industrial sector on the outskirts of Cairo where some 15 factories, mostly textile, are located and where between 10 and 15,000 workers are employed. Overcrowded, and with its factories generally providing substandard working conditions, it is understandable why this section has been the scene of so much trouble. It is literally true to say that from 1945 to the spring of 1948 there was hardly a day when there was not some kind of work stoppage in Shubra al-Khayma.<sup>6</sup> In 1946, when matters seemed to be getting unusually serious, Shubra was virtually an armed camp with road blocks and heavily-armed soldiers very much in evidence.

As mentioned above, September and October 1947 saw serious strikes at al-Mahallah al-Kubra, Egypt's greatest textile center, halfway between Cairo and Alexandria. Their economic reason was probably fear that a large number of workers would be laid off as a result of the reported acquisition by the company of new machinery. This fear of employment security is deeply rooted, and was undoubtedly inflamed by dissident groups who came over from Shubra al-Khayma.

A number of strikes at the Filature Nationale in Alexandria, the second most important textile factory in Egypt, have likewise occurred in recent years. Government workers have also used the strike weapon in an effort to force their employer, the government, to grant better wages, working conditions, and employment security. In nearly all cases these strikes were dealt with in fairly severe fashion by the government. Strike leaders were frequently arrested and workers suspected of subversive and disruptive activities were dismissed. Theoretically, the Ministry of Social Affairs, through its Labor Office, is supposed to take a leading part in the settlement of industrial strikes. However, the govern-

<sup>6</sup> Martial law was instituted in Egypt in May 1948 in connection with the Palestine crisis. Since then all strikes, of course, have been prohibited.



ment seems generally reluctant to take chances on a long drawn out conciliation process, and the tendency has been to treat most strikes as if they were seditious. Under such circumstances it becomes the duty of the Ministry of Interior, through its Department of Public Security — in other words the police — to maintain order; hence, the frequent arrests.

Since strikes in Egypt tend to get out of hand rather quickly, and to be accompanied by violence and sabotage, the government justifies its firm action on its responsibility to protect lives and property. Government officials feel that when Egyptian trade unions achieve a greater sense of responsibility — and this will require time, patience, and considerable education — it is likely that industrial strikes will appear to be less a matter of public security than is the case at present.

In 1948 a Bill on Conciliation and Arbitration was finally enacted after being under consideration for a number of years. Briefly, this bill provides for compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes in the event that the dispute occurs in an industry considered vital to the national welfare, such as public utilities and transportation. For nonessential industries, the law requires a 15-day period of strike notice to the Ministry of Social Affairs. If at the end of the 15-day period, the Ministry of Social Affairs fails to enter into the dispute as part of the conciliation process, a strike may then presumably take place. Once, however, the Ministry of Social Affairs has undertaken to conciliate the dispute no strike may take place until the dispute runs through the conciliation machinery.

Prior to the promulgation of this law, disputes, when they occurred in industries considered to be vital to the national welfare, were brought before conciliation and arbitration boards under the provision of a martial law decreed in 1942.<sup>7</sup> Because of the reinstitution of martial law in May 1948 in connection with the Palestine crisis, no real opportunity has arisen to test the new law, but there is little optimism that the legislative machinery provided will materially improve the picture.

<sup>7</sup> A few conciliation and arbitration awards have attracted considerable attention, particularly those involving the Suez Canal and foreign oil companies.

*COLLECTIVE BARGAINING*

Although the bill which the government has prepared on collective agreements has still not been enacted, some Egyptian workers, through their unions, have already succeeded in winning such agreements from their employers. Admittedly, these contracts are limited both as to number and substance, but they do indicate that some progress has been made in making Egyptian employers conscious of the need to accord considerations to their workers.

By and large, the advantage still lies with the employer in bargaining techniques. Because of lack of preparation, inadequate leadership, and poor knowledge of the labor market, Egyptian trade unions, with very few exceptions, are unable to present their case in an orderly, effective fashion. For this reason union demands are often fantastic, bearing little relation to existing conditions and to what the employer is likely to concede. For example, wage increases of 100 per cent or more are asked, with no figures on cost of living, productivity, general wage rates in like or similar industries being produced by the workers as background for their demands.

In any event, for the time being there is likely to be less emphasis on collective agreements between workers and management in Egypt, or in any other country in the Middle East, than is the case in the United States. This is due to the fact that many of the questions which are dealt with in collective agreements in the United States are covered by labor legislation in the Middle Eastern countries. In Egypt, for example, the Individual Labor Contract Law of 1944, which covers nearly all commercial and industrial workers and is by all accounts one of the best pieces of Egyptian labor legislation, provides for numerous matters which in the United States are left to the collective bargaining process. It contains specific provisions regarding annual leave — daily-paid workers receive 7 days and monthly-paid workers 15 days a year. Sick leave provisions are also included. If a worker is discharged, he must be paid an indemnity, the amount depending upon whether he is a daily-paid or a monthly-paid worker and upon the length of time he has been employed. The payment of dismissal indemnities is not mandatory, however,

in the event the dismissal is for a specified and verified cause. The law also provides for a period of notice before dismissal can be made; if this notice period is not observed, payment of wages in lieu thereof is required.

#### *EXTENSION OF LABOR LEGISLATION*

In addition to the Trade Union Act (1942) and the Individual Labor Contract Law (1944) already mentioned, a number of other important pieces of legislation are on the books. Hours of work in commercial and industrial enterprises are set at 54 a week. Overtime may only be performed on 15 days a year and then only in cases of severe emergency or special conditions, such as inventory taking. The purpose of limiting overtime is, of course, to spread the work, and was conceived as an anti-unemployment device. When performed, it is at the rate of time and a quarter. In 1936 a bill on accident compensation was enacted, which in 1944 was supplemented by a law requiring compulsory accident insurance. A bill on occupational diseases is now under consideration. The employment of children and women is also regulated by law.

In the field of social legislation, mention should be made of the Social Insurance Bill which has been under consideration for the past several years. In February 1947 members of the ILO studied the Egyptian Government's proposed insurance scheme, made certain recommendations, and outlined a possible course of action. These recommendations and a proposed scale of benefits have now been adopted by the Egyptian Council of Ministers. In brief, the scheme will provide long-term cash benefits in the form of old-age, invalidity, and survivors pensions, and medical and short term cash benefits for temporary incapacity and maternity. At least for the time being, unemployment benefits will not be provided and only urban workers are to be covered. Benefit and contribution rates will be uniform and will not vary with the earnings of the insured individual. The retirement ages for men and women are 65 and 55 respectively. Sickness benefits will not be provided during the initial phases of the scheme. When this scheme is put into effect, and this should not be too

far in the future, it will represent a striking advance in social reform in Egypt.

As yet no general minimum wage legislation has been enacted in Egypt, although proposals have been under consideration from time to time. Generally speaking, wages of Egyptian industrial workers during the war and postwar years have kept up with the increased cost of living, which is roughly 267 per cent above that of the prewar period. These wage increases were due partly to concessions made voluntarily by employers and partly to mandatory cost of living allowances. An unskilled worker in an Egyptian textile factory now makes about 20 piastres (80¢) a day and a skilled worker up to about 50 piastres (\$2) a day. Top wages are paid to skilled machinists, a few highly-skilled workers of this kind making in the neighborhood of L.E. 1 (\$4) a day. But although wages are still probably in line with the cost of living, reduced employment undoubtedly has caused a decline in take-home pay per family unit.

#### *PROBLEMS OF POPULATION AND EMPLOYMENT*

One of the gravest problems facing Egypt is the effective use of its manpower resources. Heavily overpopulated, and with arable land at a premium, Egypt has looked to industrialization as an outlet for excess labor. Industrial establishments in Egypt, however, are generally small in size, according to a 1942 census employing only about 300,000 industrial workers in some 100,000 establishments. Although an estimated 1.5 million workers are employed in transportation, commerce, and industry, Egypt remains a predominantly rural country, a total of approximately 12.5 million (families included) out of a population of 20 million being engaged in agriculture and occupations related to it.<sup>8</sup> It is generally acknowledged that there now exist at least 2 million surplus agricultural workers, and that as a result those employed in agriculture work fewer than 160 days a year and annually receive money wages estimated at about L.E. 20 (\$80) maximum.

In addition to the problem of underemployment in the rural

<sup>8</sup> Approximately 5.5 million workers, male and female, are directly engaged in agriculture.



areas, the Egyptian Government has had to concern itself, since the war, with the problem of unemployment in and around the big cities resulting from the discharge of perhaps 400,000 workers when United States and British military operations ceased. In an attempt to combat unemployment of this kind, it developed a Five-Year Plan consisting mainly of public works projects. Implementation of this plan began in 1946, and went ahead rapidly in 1947 and 1948. The carrying out of the plan, together with an unforeseen expansion in the building industry and the employment resulting from Egypt's military undertakings of the past year, have succeeded in blunting the impact of what once threatened to become a serious problem. Unemployment still exists, of course, but there is no way of arriving at accurate statistics. The employment exchanges which were set up a few years ago do not offer unemployment insurance, and workers, therefore, do not take the trouble to register; hence, the figures given by these offices are admittedly inaccurate. An outside estimate as to total unemployment of *industrial* workers may be somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000, which in terms of a population of about 2 million is not unmanageable.

The problems of overpopulation, underemployment, and unemployment, together with a rising tide of nationalism and a feeling that Egypt should act independently and without foreign interference, prompted the Egyptian Government in 1947 to pass a law regulating the affairs of all limited joint stock companies, and in particular the minimum percentages of Egyptians who must be employed in such companies. According to this Company Law, the number of Egyptian white-collar employees of a joint stock company must not be less than 75 per cent of the total number of its employees of this type, and their total salaries and allowances must not be less than 65 per cent of the total amount of salaries and allowances paid by the company. Similarly, at least 90 per cent of the laborers must be Egyptian, and their total wages cannot be less than 80 per cent of the amount of wages paid by the company. The companies that come under this law have been given three years from July 1947 to regularize themselves in accordance with its requirements. Still to be settled before the law can be humanely and justly implemented is the



nationality status of thousands of "twilight" Egyptians, mostly of Italian, Greek, and Armenian background. The Egyptian Government is also taking a much more rigid and critical position in the matter of granting visas to foreigners coming to Egypt to work, requiring conclusive evidence that no Egyptian is qualified to fill the job for which the foreigner is being employed. Also in some cases the granting of the visa is conditional upon agreement with the foreign worker that a number of Egyptians will be apprenticed to him.

### *CURRENT TRENDS*

Although employers at first tended to look upon trade union activity as being only slightly better than communism, and therefore bitterly opposed the enactment of the Trade Union Act, the situation has eased considerably. Company unions are, however, not infrequent, and the Egyptian Government to some extent encourages employers to grant them material aid. One should not, however, assume from this that the trade union representative in a company-supported union will in all cases adopt a servile or even a conciliatory attitude toward his employer. Even the best of company unions in Egypt sometimes act unruly.

A number of companies have instituted remarkable social programs. The experiment now being conducted at al-Mahallah al-Kubra by the Société Misr may lead to outstanding accomplishments worthy of being considered even outside the boundary of Egypt. Hospitals, schools, living quarters, canteens, recreational facilities — to name but a few of the more important — are some of the projects now being developed there. At Shubra al-Khayma a significant program is being carried out by the owner of the biggest glass factory in Egypt. It is noteworthy that labor trouble at this factory, despite the nearly chronic condition of industrial disturbances in other factories of this area, has been negligible.

To be highly commended is the Egyptian Government's action in setting up the Higher Labor Advisory Council under the chairmanship of the Minister of Social Affairs. The Council, which is tripartite in composition and includes representatives of the government, the employers, and workers, advises the

government on labor and social matters. Drafts of new labor bills and projects are now being cleared through the Council. A special subcommittee of the Council has spent much of the past year working on the proposed Social Insurance Scheme referred to earlier.

Summing up, one can see that the Egyptian industrial worker has had his status improved to an appreciable extent during recent years. He can no longer be ignored by his government, by employers, or by the general public. His trade unions, although still weak, contain the promise of increased strength and responsibility. His government has enacted a number of laws calculated to meet some of his most fundamental needs and demands. Many of these laws could stand more thorough enforcement, but improvement along this line is taking place. Although as yet he has no vehicle for exercising direct political pressure on the government, one has the feeling that the government is no longer insensitive to his aspirations, and that the future may well see the development of political institutions tailored to his particular needs and aims.

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# PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFGHANISTAN


*Peter G. Franck*

## 1. The Impact of World Conditions

**E**VER SINCE the Mongol invaders under Genghiz Khan and Timur destroyed the flourishing industrial and agricultural establishments of Afghanistan in the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, the country has depended on a primitive agricultural economy as the principal means of livelihood. Grains, fruit and truck crops, and stock raising have provided most of the requirements of domestic consumption as well as the principal export commodities: furs, skins, fruits, wool, cotton, nuts.

The need for a broad economic development program, indicated by the low productivity in agriculture and the low average income of the Afghan people, has long been recognized by the government. This realization was heightened in the prewar decade and the early postwar years, when a serious unbalance in the country's economic structure made itself felt. The governments of Nadir Shah (1929-1933) and his son, Muhammad Zahir Shah (the present ruler), have made active efforts to achieve a new balance in the economy through modernization of irrigation installations, introduction of new agricultural techniques, soil reclamation, and the expansion of the transportation facilities and industrial enterprises. The business community

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*The Kingdom of Afghanistan*

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has shared in these efforts by helping to modernize the currency system and by establishing a banking organization on the Western pattern.

World War II interrupted promising new projects planned by the government and business groups. It also produced a rise in prices which has persisted. Another problem raised by the war, and one which seems to have become chronic, is that of holding imports within the limits of the available foreign exchange. Still further factors hindering progress in economic development include an excessive concentration of exports in a few agricultural crops on which imports of all capital goods and durable consumer goods depend; the backwardness of agriculture, on which is superimposed a tradition-bound nomadic economic order; soil exhaustion; an inadequate supply of fuel and power; and finally a marked propensity among merchants and businessmen for quick turnover and high-unit profit ventures, which results in the diversion of funds into real estate and commodity speculation instead of into investments more essential to a progressive economy.

In resuming imports of capital and consumer goods, and of the services of engineers and contractors after the war, Afghanistan drew on its wartime earnings of exchange, but was faced with a worldwide shortage of manufactured articles and its corollary of price inflation. The bulk of equipment and supplies had to be obtained in exchange for dollars since Afghanistan's former supply sources, Germany and Western Europe, could not even meet their own needs. For a while during 1946 and the first part of 1947, export shipments remained at high levels. But the partition of India in August 1947 and a sharp fall in export prices caused a substantial drop in Afghanistan's foreign exchange reserves toward the end of the year. Severe restrictions on the use of dollar exchange had to be imposed.

At the present time, trade statistics continue to show a slight favorable balance but conceal the drain which other items in Afghanistan's international accounts impose upon its external assets. Most important of these are payments to a large American contractor, Morrison-Knudsen, Inc., for all sorts of construction and survey projects. The semi-luxury character of some of

Afghanistan's exports and the slow revival of such traditional export markets as England and Central Europe make a real improvement of Afghanistan's international financial position difficult. Far more than a trade balance at the present level of exports is needed if any room is to be found for the continued import of capital equipment and technical services for the development of the Afghan economy: hence Afghanistan's current search for assistance by means of long-term credit."

Actually Afghanistan could be a much larger producer of exportable products than it has been. Use of fertilizer and of modern agricultural methods and implements, the reclamation of land through irrigation, the application of scientific livestock breeding methods, and the improvement of transportation could be combined to increase output, eliminate waste, improve marketability, and raise the standard of living generally. Exploitation of mineral resources, only in its early stages so far, would materially aid economic development, even to the extent of achieving a new balance between external earnings and requirements at a higher level of national income.

Foremost among the important problems to be solved if these goals are to be reached is the relationship between Afghanistan's international balance payments position and its program of economic development: how can such a program help to solve the foreign exchange difficulty and how can it be carried out in the face of limited exchange resources? No less important is the bearing that internal financial resources and financial stability have on the development program. Consideration must also be given to the needs of the various interdependent sectors of Afghanistan's economy, for the fulfillment of the program depends on each sector's maximum contribution to increased productivity and higher incomes for the people. Finally, certain social and political factors which have contributed to the economic difficulties must not be forgotten, although their analysis lies outside the scope of this study.

#### FOREIGN TRADE BALANCE

Ninety per cent of the Afghan people are engaged in agricultural pursuits. Afghanistan's living standard has been de-

terminated by the country's agricultural output and the markets for it. Substantial surpluses of fresh and dried fruits, nuts, and above all nonprocessed animal products have been consistently produced, with the bulk of them exported. Cotton surpluses also have occasionally been available for limited export. Production of essential foodstuffs, primarily cereals, has generally been just enough for domestic requirements, except during droughts, when it has fallen short. Hence exports are limited to the products listed in Table I.

Afghanistan's economic life depends on foreign trade in three fundamental respects. In the first place, exports provide virtually the only market for two important agricultural products: animal skins and fruits. An interruption in the flow of these products causes a substantial drop in income and employment in important agricultural sectors of the economy: because of the absence of any significant domestic market for skins (especially karakul) or alternative uses for labor and land devoted to fruit-growing, no other income-producing activity can be substituted in an emergency. The extent of dependency on foreign markets for the sale of skins and fruits can be judged by the export figures given above in Table I. Karakul skins alone accounted for nearly half the 1939 exports while fruits and nuts made up another quarter. In 1947 the proportions were 40 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively.

*Table I: CHIEF AFGHAN AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS, 1947 (a)*  
(In thousands of Afghanis) (b)

Karakul (lamb) skins	310,468
Other skins	5,481
Wool	51,708
Cotton (1946)	29,628
Dried fruits and nuts	217,412
Fresh fruits	42,927
Medicinal herbs	17,000
Total agricultural exports	674,655
Total exports	759,000
Per cent of agricultural exports to total exports	88%

(a) Source: Ministry of National Economy of Afghanistan

(b) One afghani = \$0.77.

In the second place, export surpluses are an important source of capital. Economies in which are produced only enough goods to meet the people's basic requirements, with no resources available for the enhancement of productive capacity, tend to stagnate. The procurement of equipment and plants to produce more goods requires capital which the government or the community or both must provide. In Afghanistan the export surplus substitutes for the ordinary sources of funds of the capitalistic type. The profits from export activities have provided the liquid funds which investors, including Banke Millie, need to promote new productive enterprises. It was primarily the karakul traders and the wool, cotton, fruit and nut exporters who helped launch the banks and supplied them with funds to start the *shirkats* (joint stock companies). In this way exports not only provide current income for a large part of the population but also enable the economy to expand its productive capacity.

In the third place, exports provide Afghanistan with its only foreign exchange. Except for a small amount of transit trade to and from the Soviet Union and Iran, there are no services which earn "invisible" foreign exchange.<sup>1</sup> Since all modern consumer durable goods, petroleum products, steel and non-ferrous metal supplies, all transportation equipment, and machinery have to be imported, the level of exports is one of the important determinants of the country's standard of living.

#### FLUCTUATION OF EXPORTS

This heavy dependence on foreign markets for the sale of a few agricultural products has disturbing implications both for the traders and the government. Of greatest importance is the direct bearing that the value of exports has on the country's economic development. The past record reveals a mixed trend. Prewar values fluctuated widely, on account of both price and volume variations. Shifts in demand and increasing competition, especially in the case of a luxury product like fur skins, have made stabilization of export values a difficult task. The forces governing the demand for these products are all set in

<sup>1</sup> Before the partition of India, nomadic Afghan merchants engaged in extensive money lending and thus imported some capital earnings.



motion abroad. Business depressions start in the industrialized countries which either buy Afghan products or, by importing jute and cotton from India and Pakistan, affect these countries' power to do so. The result has been that both Afghan skins and agricultural exports have been at the mercy of the business cycle characteristic of the advanced capitalistic economies. (See Table II.)

The trend in karakul exports during the last prewar recession may serve as an illustration. Shipments from Afghanistan steadily increased from 1,135,000 skins in the depression year of 1933 to 1,770,000 in 1937. During 1938 they dropped to 912,000 and then recovered during the war boom to 2,584,000 (1940). But the rise was of short duration, since submarine warfare and dislocation of transportation through India caused arrivals in the United States to drop drastically in 1943.

Since the latter part of the war the United States has become virtually the only market for Afghan skins, pending the restoration of Europe's purchasing power. Thus the position of Afghan fur skins in the New York market is a mirror of Afghan export trade. There the end of the war gave rise to intensive competition among Afghan, Russian, and South-West African skins. At the end of 1948 this brought the selling price of Afghan skins down to the lowest level since 1945. As Table III shows, the narrowing of the gap between the declared unit value of the

Table II: AFGHAN FOREIGN TRADE, 1939-1948 (a)  
(in millions of dollars)

Afghan Year (b)	Exports (fob)	Imports (cif)	Balance
1939	34.2	27.7	6.6
1940	41.0	32.8	8.2
1941	37.0	42.7	-5.7
1942	17.4	26.5	-9.1
1943	35.5	23.7	11.8
1944	44.2	25.6	18.6
1945	56.5	48.2	8.3
1946	60.0	53.0	7.0
1947	54.2	50.0	4.2
1948 (estimate)	55.0	53.0	2.0

(a) Source: Ministry of National Economy of Afghanistan.

(b) e.g. 1939 = March 21, 1939, to March 20, 1940.

African and the Afghan skin is as marked as the drop in Afghan prices: the 1944 difference was \$5.88, while the 1948 difference was down to less than one half, or \$2.15. Except for 1947, the year traffic across India was interrupted, the trend was consistent. If South-West African skins continue to improve so greatly as to displace Afghan skins in the American market, Afghanistan's economy will be severely disrupted. For this reason, the government and the karakul merchants are being urged to take strong measures to maintain the quality and value lead they have enjoyed for many years against severe competition.

Another cloud temporarily hangs over the fruit market in India and Pakistan, which is almost as important to Afghanistan as the fur market in New York. Afghanistan has long enjoyed freedom from tariffs there. With the establishment of the two states as sovereign national entities, the well-established principle of nondiscriminatory imports (at least as far as trade with non-Empire countries such as Afghanistan is concerned) is likely to lead to the imposition of drastic tariffs on Afghan fruits, and as a result to the lowering of exports.

*Table III: IMPORTS OF KARAKUL UNDRESSED SKINS  
INTO THE U.S., 1944-1948 (a)*

Year	Afghan	Russian	S.W. African
1944			
No. of skins imported	1,823,900	1,173,700	1,850,900
Declared value	\$10.88	\$8.03	\$5.00
1945			
No. of skins imported	2,739,400	1,741,450	2,492,400
Declared value	\$11.57	\$10.03	\$6.19
1946			
No. of skins imported	3,030,300	2,339,200	2,207,850
Declared value	\$11.20	\$11.44	\$8.17
1947			
No. of skins imported	174,400	1,971,847	2,003,600
Declared value	\$10.00	\$9.10	\$5.95
1948			
No. of skins imported	3,437,800	1,501,700	2,059,300
Declared value	\$9.63	\$9.33	\$7.48

Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, Reports No. FT 110 for calendar years 1944-1948 (based on U.S. customs offices returns).

Nevertheless, the long-run outlook for fruit exports to India and Pakistan is good since Afghan fruits and nuts supplement the deficient diets of the subcontinent's inhabitants. Moreover, as economic development projects in India and Pakistan take shape, the purchasing power of the peoples there is sure to increase and to be reflected in higher imports from Afghanistan, provided transport facilities can be sufficiently improved and other trade barriers reduced. The latter remedy depends on Afghanistan's either joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (signed by 23 nations at Geneva in October 1947 and now provisionally in effect among 22 of them), or ratifying the Charter for an International Trade Organization, signed by Afghanistan and 51 other nations at Havana in March 1948. Both international instruments oblige signatory powers to negotiate among themselves the reduction or elimination of tariffs, margins of preferences, and other trade barriers. Although invited to participate in the Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Afghan Government so far has made no move in that direction. The ratification of the Havana Charter will depend on United States Government ratification.

Because of the one-sided character of Afghanistan's exports, protection against violent shifts in world markets is especially important to it. One of the milder antidotes adopted by the government has been that of staggering exports, especially of perishable products, in order to secure reasonably stable returns for their producers.<sup>2</sup> The government has not, however, entered into international commodity agreements to control the volume and prices of its export products in concert with other governments, nor have karakul merchants expressed sympathy with the idea of an international fur-skin cartel.

Another protection against the uncertainties and vagaries of the world economy has been international barter agreements with countries or firms which would match Afghanistan's exports of raw fibers, skins, and agricultural products with shipments of manufactured iron and steel supplies, petroleum,

<sup>2</sup> When this type of export control was discussed at the UN Conference on Trade and Employment at Havana in January, 1948, the Afghan Delegation obtained a favorable interpretation of the applicable provision of the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization. See UN (ECOSOC) Document E Conf. 2/ C.3/37.

synthetic and cotton piece goods, glassware, chemicals and medicines. Before the war Afghanistan had such agreements with Germany, the Soviet Union,<sup>3</sup> and on a smaller scale with the United Kingdom, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. The war either postponed or ended these agreements; only the barter deal with the Soviet Union was renewed, in 1947 and 1948.

Stabilizing the value of Afghan exports appears to depend on several factors, some of which are within the realm of practicable remedies by the government or the business community. The maintenance of the karakul markets is partly a matter of improving quality and productivity, but also partly a matter of stability of income in the export markets. The recovery and expansion of the fruit and nut market will depend on the restoration of freer international commerce and improvement of storage, packing and grading facilities as well as of transportation. In appraising the chances of such improvement, the geographical pattern of Afghanistan's foreign trade is significant.

#### *GEOGRAPHICAL SHIFT IN TRADE*

Trade with all countries was changed considerably by the war. The interruption of Afghanistan's trade with Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Italy resulted in serious internal dislocations, for these countries and India had supplied the bulk of its imports. Germany also contributed a good share to the country's "invisible" imports of professors, doctors, technicians, and engineers. Prewar trade with the United States was insignificant. The principal prewar export markets were the United Kingdom, through whose Hudson Bay Company practically the whole world was supplied with karakul skins. Afghan cotton, carpets, wool, and skins (for leather) found ready prewar markets in Central Europe, the United Kingdom, and India.

The difficulties in the way of restoring this trade pattern are substantial. For one, London merchants have lost their controlling share in the karakul market to New York houses which

<sup>3</sup> The merchandise exchange with Germany was to reach a value of 200 million afghanis each way, and that with the Soviet Union, 164 million afghanis.



continue to absorb practically all Afghanistan's output. Secondly, Europe's still slow recovery and the inconvertibility of its currencies prevent it from being the market it used to be. Afghanistan on a small scale is again importing woolen piece goods, hardware, instruments, drugs, and medicines from the United Kingdom; but on the whole, Europe still does not provide more than five per cent of Afghanistan's imports. Nevertheless, trade with Europe, especially exports, might yet return to former levels because wool and skins are useful raw materials for Europe's industries and Afghanistan's dollar earnings are an attractive source of payment to dollar-short European economies.

With the re-establishment of British export industry the United Kingdom will also work for a fair share in Afghan imports, since British goods tend to be cheaper than American and enjoy considerable prestige in Afghanistan. In so readjusting the geographical structure of its imports, Afghanistan will contribute to the restoration of a multilateral trading and payments system. For the time being, however, Europe is itself short of the very articles Afghanistan needs.

In spite of continued shortages, India and Pakistan have become Afghanistan's most important source of supply, providing about 75 per cent of all Afghan imports other than capital goods: chemicals, dying materials, cotton and silk piece goods, instruments, drugs, tea, sugar, and building materials. Even when other countries start competing again, these imports may well retain their Afghan markets if the quality continues to improve and prices remain competitive.

If Afghan exports could establish themselves more firmly in these markets than at present, and if raw cotton and minerals could be added to the fruits and nuts on a permanent basis, a great part of the present trade deficit with these countries could be met by commodities instead of by dollars, which now must be transferred at the rate of \$15 million a year. The dollars so saved would then become available for capital goods and technical services which cannot be secured from India or Pakistan.

The most spectacular postwar change is the growth of Afghan-American trade, pictured in Table IV. In addition to karakul skins the United States buys pistachio nuts and coarse wool. From

the United States, Afghanistan now imports rayon cloth, cotton and woollen piece goods, glassware, cutlery, and large quantities of machinery, millwork, and instruments. Some of these imports are part of a long-term construction contract with the American firm of Morrison-Knudsen, Inc., which has built up a large organization in Afghanistan. In addition, American teachers, engineers, and technicians figure largely in Afghan "invisible" imports.

This heavy reliance on American supplies of materials, implements, and personnel required for the country's economic advancement should cause no difficulties so long as the New York karakul market absorbs about 2.5 million skins a year. Should the high quality segment of that market, however, continue to be sensitive to fluctuations in income and employment and should the United States be unable to cope effectively with cyclical down-swings in investment and income, fur sales will not be stabilized. To the problem created by excessive concentration of exports on a few agricultural crops will thus be added the dangers inherent in the concentration on a few markets.

It is therefore evident that Afghanistan's balance of trade will benefit not only from a liberalizing of the existing rules governing the international payment and trade system, but also from national as well as international efforts to restore Western Europe to its prewar economic position and finally from measures taken to stabilize employment in the large industrialized economies.

*Table IV: GROWTH OF AFGHAN-AMERICAN TRADE, 1942-1948 (a)*

	Exports to U.S. (thousands of dollars)	Imports from U.S. (thousands of dollars)
1942	8,171	110
1943	10,091	97
1944	20,709	416
1945	33,412	843
1946	35,538	4,001
1947	2,992	6,678
1948	34,508	4,307

(a) Source: U.S. Bureau of Census, Reports No. 120 and 420 for calendar years 1942-1948 (based on U.S. customs offices reports).

Note: The drop in 1947 exports reflects the interruption of shipments during the Indian partition disturbances. Afghan import figures, as reported by U.S. customs offices for that year, could not reflect that disruption.

Afghanistan's own contribution must be a program of diversifying and increasing the volume of its exports and developing efficient domestic production of several fabricated products and fuel, the imports of which now weigh heavily on its international balance of payments. Thus, the attainment of the goals set by the national development program in the various sectors of the economy is closely linked to the long-run increase in the foreign exchange available for expenditures more essential to the country's future welfare than are consumption goods.

### *PROBLEMS OF TRANSIT*

Afghanistan's most immediate and acute trade difficulty is its lack of direct access to the sea. All external trade has to go across Pakistan and sometimes India. Karachi's inadequate harbor facilities must often be supplemented by those of Bombay, 500 miles further away from the Peshawar railhead. Overland transportation facilities between the Afghan border and Karachi are badly overtaxed; roads are narrow and long, and the railroads slow and continuously in need of repair. Traffic on both is handicapped by shortages of coal, gasoline, and spare parts.

Efforts have been made to remedy the worst problem facing Afghanistan's transit trade. The Afghan-Anglo Trade Convention of 1923, providing that certain goods in transit across India to Afghanistan were not subject to the usual customs regulations, freed government goods required for public service from duties and other formalities. Goods imported for commercial purposes, however, were subject to duty and a series of bureaucratic requirements, although refunds were made in the case of goods transported over the regular routes. By means of this stipulation the Government of India apparently sought protection against shippers who might profit from disposing of their goods in India instead of sending them on to Afghanistan as planned. But this protective device, continued by the dominion governments of Pakistan and India, means that three to six months may elapse before the customs authorities refund the duties on transit goods. A similar regulation has been enacted in connection with goods leaving Afghanistan.

Bilateral negotiations between the three governments have thus

far been fruitless. However, at the UN Conference on Trade and Employment the governments of Pakistan and India agreed to empower the future International Trade Organization to promote agreements on measures aimed at improving the conditions of transit traffic.<sup>4</sup> So important did the Government of Afghanistan consider the transit problem that without these provisions it would probably not have signed the Final Act of the Conference.

No predictions can be made about the extent to which the Government of Afghanistan may want to avail itself of the powers granted to the future I.T.O. But there has been some talk about obtaining for Afghan merchants a foreign trade zone in Karachi over which Pakistani jurisdiction would be limited. This arrangement would make possible storage, assembly, disassembly, sorting, grading, and repacking without customs interference. Reconsignment, inspection by prospective buyers, and other conveniences would contribute to the port's earnings. Initiation of negotiations on this project depends upon the political climate, technical economic advantages having little value in an atmosphere of tension and distrust.

The chances of eventually reaching a satisfactory solution are good. Both countries stand to gain from an intensification of trade relations. The constructive attitude of Pakistan authorities is evidenced by the protection they continue to extend to the seasonal nomads from Afghanistan.<sup>5</sup> But a movement toward greater integration into Pakistan of the frontier tribes, which appear historically, culturally and racially related to the Afghans, has marred relations between the two neighbors.

#### *INTERNATIONAL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS*

Since the national development program involves heavy ex-

<sup>4</sup> Article 33 of the proposed I.T.O. Charter in response to the urging of the Afghan delegation, lists the "equitable use of facilities required for such transit" as a special objective of the organization. Furthermore, assembly and disassembly of vehicles and mobile machinery in transit is to be permitted in the transit country provided that such operations serve the convenience of transport. See Interpretative Note and Article 33, Annex P, "Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization."

<sup>5</sup> These seasonal nomads migrate annually to warmer regions in Pakistan where they exercise limited grazing rights, and work as laborers or entrepreneurs. At the end of the cold season they return to Afghanistan, enjoying a unique freedom of international migration based on age-old custom.



penditures abroad for equipment, supplies and the services of engineers and technicians, it is necessary to consider the country's international accounts. In addition to imports and exports, these ordinarily include capital credits and debits and such "invisible" payments and receipts as expenditures for Afghan embassies, tourists, and students abroad and receipts from foreigners residing in or passing through Afghanistan. An appraisal of international assets and liabilities is also necessary.

The most important account — exports and imports — has shown a favorable balance for several years. As a result, by 1947 the country's reserve of foreign exchange was built up to a level of \$50 million above that of the last prewar year (*See Table II*). But the export surplus has dwindled gradually to an estimated \$2 million in 1948.

Since 1946, payments for foreign experts, technicians, and teachers, and above all for the services of the American engineering firm, Morrison-Knudsen Inc., have absorbed ever increasing sums of foreign exchange earned from export surpluses. The current rate of annual expenditures for the first three runs close to \$4 million, while the Morrison-Knudsen account totalled \$12.5 million in the two years ending March 20, 1949. Much of the last (possibly \$6 million) represents investment outlays in heavy machinery and tools which will not be amortized for several years. Expenditures by foreigners in Afghanistan, probably amounting to not more than \$2.5 million, are a small offset against the foreign exchange expenditures. On balance, then, for the last several years outgoing payments for goods and services have exceeded payments received. For the twelve months ending March 21, 1948, this deficit was officially estimated at \$12.5 million.

The most serious aspect of this change in Afghanistan's international payment position is the urgency of the demand for imports, long pent-up during the war, and the increase in import prices relative to the prices received for exports. In addition, the government is nationally and internationally committed to continue its exchange expenditures in connection with the national development program, although once the initial investment cost has been met its annual rate will be lower than in the past

two years. Nevertheless, the demand for foreign exchange, if left unchecked, will exceed the available supply.

For the last two years this strain on the international payments position has been evident in the quotations for foreign exchange. The dollar rate in 1945 and 1946 fluctuated narrowly around 13 afghanis to the dollar. Since 1947, when the official rate was changed to 14 afghanis to the dollar, there has been a growing gap between the official and the free rate, the latter having reached 27 afghanis to the dollar late in 1948.

To meet the deficit in its international accounts, Afghanistan has been able to rely on its dollar and gold reserve, which for several years has been substantially above the amount of currency backing legally required. During the year ending March 1948 the reduction in dollar reserves amounted to \$12.5 million, the gold reserve held abroad having remained untouched. There are sound political and psychological reasons<sup>6</sup> for conserving a substantial part of these reserves, and the government is reluctant to meet further deficits by converting them into dollars. In 1947 this necessitated the adoption of foreign exchange controls of a rather liberal type. Exporters of karakul to dollar countries are required to sell 80 per cent of their proceeds at the official rate to the government bank which allocates these dollars to essential imports and other foreign expenditures. The remaining 20 per cent are free to the extent that exporters must either import goods or resell the exchange on the free market to others, provided they use the exchange for imports. The obvious purpose of the regulations is to prevent the accumulation of private reserves abroad which are not essential to the welfare of the country. Proceeds from exports to other areas remain at the disposal of the exporters.

A review of immediate prospects indicates that the maintenance of firm controls will be necessary even if exports to the United States should remain at high levels, since without such

<sup>6</sup> Even though the gold, silver and exchange reserves exceed 75% of the circulating currency (compared with the 50% required by law) the government cannot ignore the relatively recent date of the introduction of paper money, 1935. As long as the average Afghan and especially the conservative businessman consider the currency backing as the principal determinant of the money's value, the government has little leeway for liquidating part of the backing.

controls commitments for imports from the United States would exceed the exchange supply and delay payments due abroad — a postwar ailment from which Afghanistan's trade with the rest of the world has not yet suffered.

The question may be raised whether and to what extent Da Afghanistan Bank (the government bank) should make use of its power to devalue the afghani in order to improve the balance of payments. It has done so twice in the last five years, but these adjustments did not exceed 10 per cent of the existing rate, in spite of a considerably greater spread between the official and free market quotations. Apparently the bank does not wish to resort to devaluation merely to correct the current deficit, but has its sights on a long-term equilibrium price of foreign exchange. So far there has been no clear evidence that Afghan export sales are being held up by rigidly high costs in relation to prices obtainable in world markets. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the lower prices of Afghan products resulting from an adjustment in the exchange rate could boost foreign sales more than proportionately. Under such circumstances, a devaluation would primarily increase the prices of imports, add to the inflationary pressure on the domestic price level, and probably worsen the international balance of payments.

The long-run remedy lies in a change of the structure of export and import trade. In the meantime, however, funds must be made available to support the foreign expenditures for equipment and services required for implementing the national development program.

#### *FOREIGN EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS AND NEED FOR CAPITAL IMPORTS*

The balance of international accounts for the year ending March 1948 (*See Table V*) may serve as a basis for determining the country's ability to pay from current income for the external services and supplies required under the joint government-business development program. The latter envisages a five-year outlay in foreign exchange of about \$77 million, five per cent of which would be absorbed by materials and services from Pakistan and India; the balance, from United States or European

sources. Although actually the outlays will not be evenly spread over the five years, it may be assumed that the exchange required annually for foreign contractors' services and equipment would average \$15 million. Moreover, incomes of individuals and of business enterprises will tend to rise as activities connected with the five-year program increase. This will result in a greater demand for imported consumer goods. Increments in the consumption of petroleum products, spare parts, tools, and building materials will also call for an increase in imports. Although the government may not want to give free rein to such an intensified demand for foreign exchange, it will have to recognize the essentiality of some of these needs. A conservative official estimate puts the tolerable increase in imports at \$33 million for the five-year period. This estimate is based on some expected savings of exchange resulting from a gradual increase in the production of domestic substitutes for part of the sugar, soap, vegetable oil, and cement now imported.

On the receipts side, the five-year program is expected to result in additional exportable cotton, starting in the first year, and increasing gradually to some 1,500 tons<sup>7</sup> in the fifth year. For five years combined this would bring in additional exchange of about \$31 million, compared to \$33 million of new imports expected during the same period. Insignificant variations in "invisible" imports and exports would cancel each other out.

<sup>7</sup> In the last ten years cotton exports have varied between 2500 and 8500 tons annually. They stopped in 1947 when a drought compelled farmers to concentrate on food crops.

*Table V: APPROXIMATE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF AFGHANISTAN*

Year ending March 20, 1948  
(in millions of dollars)

Receipts		Payments	
Merchandise exports, adjusted declared value	51.6	Merchandise imports, adjusted declared value	55.0
Invisible exports	2.3	Foreign contractors services	7.4
Decrease in foreign exchange reserves	12.5	Other invisible imports	4.0
Total	66.4	Total	66.4



In comparing prospective increases in international income with that of the year ending March 1948, it is important to realize that if the 1947 excess of exports over imports keeps up, the Afghan economy will have more than enough external purchasing power to pay for the miscellaneous "invisible" imports without which it cannot maintain its missions and students abroad and hire foreign teachers, advisers, etc. How much more belongs in the realm of conjecture. However, the government must estimate this "surplus income" because upon its amount will depend the feasibility of the five-year program and the amount of foreign assistance that will be needed to meet its costs.

The government and the business community appear determined to contribute the maximum to the exchange needs from this surplus income and, if possible, from savings accumulated in monetary reserves and hard currency balances. But in view of the uncertainties surrounding the karakul and fruit exports, not more than the equivalent of \$27 to \$29 million can be safely made available. The balance of the exchange needs, or about \$50 million, will have to come either from foreign creditors or from a liquidation of privately held foreign assets.

The chances of obtaining exchange from the latter source are slim, the amount of these assets apparently not being officially established. Since exchange control is new to Afghanistan, measures to locate, let alone repatriate, private assets held abroad would probably prove ineffective. Moreover, since the government so far has offered no incentive for repatriation (except the free market exchange rate), any large-scale return must depend on the civic spirit of the individual holders. At any rate, the amount involved is estimated to be of minor significance.

Consequently, foreign capital is needed to supplement Afghanistan's limited foreign currency. Without such assistance and the advanced techniques and entrepreneurial know-how which foreign capital, especially from the United States, would bring, the country's development will be seriously retarded.

While there are no legal barriers to private foreign investment (except in the case of minerals, the rights to which are reserved to the nation), there are several reasons why little hope exists for floating a private international loan in the near future. In the



first place, there are still certain groups in Afghanistan opposed, for political or ideological reasons, to private investment from abroad. In the second place, the government appears justifiably opposed to long-term credit arrangements between private Afghan firms and foreign credit institutions so long as Afghan capitalist enterprises lack experience and familiarity with the routines of international finance. In the third place, about half of the planned projects are public works (irrigation installations, power stations, telecommunications, roads, mining), yet they are so closely intertwined with the private projects that the financing of all of them through a government-negotiated loan appears to be the most practicable approach.

Therefore the Ministry of National Economy has been exploring the possibilities of a \$50 million loan from the U.S. Export-Import Bank to be disbursed over the five-year period 1949-1953 and to be repaid over 15 years. Under the Bank's loan policy, such a loan would be divided on a project basis and would be closely linked to the project contracts being negotiated with Morrison-Knudsen, Inc. Judging from the Bank's past record of loans to Middle East countries (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Israel),<sup>8</sup> the chances of some assistance seems good. Generally speaking, Afghanistan would not offer any greater financial risk than most of these countries and substantially less than two of them.

A review of Afghanistan's borrowing record is pertinent in this connection. Only one of the previous credits obtained abroad was of a long-term nature, the rest being of the commercial loan type: an arrangement with Czechoslovakia in 1937 for the purchase of arms and industrial machinery involved both private Afghan firms and the government. The amount borrowed over a maximum period of five years reached the equivalent of \$1 million. By 1947 the loan was repaid.

The 1937 British Government loan made the equivalent of \$2 million available to Afghanistan, with repayment obligations to run over five years. The war prevented full utilization of this

<sup>8</sup> As of December 31, 1948 the Export-Import Bank had disbursed \$27 million to these countries. Existing authorizations permit further disbursements of about \$29 million. This compares with total disbursements to all countries of \$2,846 million and total additional disbursements available under existing authorizations of \$395 million.

loan, and by 1943 all outstanding obligations had been met. The postwar British loan, again an intergovernmental agreement, involved a \$5 million credit line. Because of the consequences of India's partition, most of the credit has not been used. Repayments of the small advance, against which some shipments were made in 1946 and 1947, will run until 1957 and are payable in rupees.

Of the greatest potential economic significance were the German loans negotiated in 1937 and 1939. By tying repayment obligations of advances (which were to reach the equivalent of \$12.4 million) to the delivery in Karachi of purchased machinery and tools, the Afghan Government protected itself against possible encroachments upon its financial independence. When the war interrupted German-Afghan trade, only one-third of the credit had been used and only one-half of all merchandise ordered had arrived in Karachi. All payments for it were settled in 1943.

In all these credit arrangements, as in the commodity barter agreements with other countries, including the Soviet Union, the Afghan Government displayed a strictly businesslike attitude and today offers a field for investment free from international mortgages and commitments.

Should the immediate exchange problem be solved (i.e. the external financing of the five-year program), there will remain the long-run exchange problem arising from the volatile and unpredictable behavior of receipts for exports in relation to the fixed character of the liabilities, such as imports of essential foods, industrial raw materials, and petroleum products.<sup>9</sup>

But this long-run problem will be substantially solved once the capital goods and engineering services have been acquired through the hoped-for credit and have increased productive capacity either to replace products now imported or to increase and diversify exports.<sup>10</sup> As the Afghan economy becomes more diversified, even the essentially uncontrollable factors which

<sup>9</sup> If a loan from the United States were arranged, interest and amortization payments would add to the rigid character of foreign expenditures.

<sup>10</sup> The long-term contribution the loan will thus make to the balance of payments has been estimated at 40 cents a year for every dollar lent, once the projects have come to full fruition.

have influenced Afghan export values in the past (i.e. over-all prosperity in the United States and Europe's purchasing power), will lose part of their dominant character and thus enable Afghanistan to secure a greater degree of financial stability.

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Part II of *Problems of Economic Development in Afghanistan*, to appear in a forthcoming issue of the *Journal*, will evaluate Afghanistan's development programs against the background of the international economic problems already set forth.

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# DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY

MARCH 1 — MAY 31, 1949

FOLLOWING the successful conclusion in February of the UN-sponsored armistice talks between Israel and Egypt, similar negotiations were initiated between Israel and the Arab states of Lebanon and Transjordan (henceforth to be known as Jordan). Discussions with the former were conducted at Ras al-Naqurah, on the Mediterranean coast north of Acre; with the latter at the island of Rhodes where the Egyptians had previously met with the Israeli representatives. An armistice with Lebanon was concluded without undue difficulty on March 24; that with Jordan was complicated by the Arab Legion's occupation of the Old City of Jerusalem and the central portion of eastern Palestine, and for a few days early in March by a movement of Israeli armed forces in the direction of the Gulf of Aqaba. An agreement was finally arrived at, however, on April 3.

UN attempts to work out armistice agreements between Israel and the two remaining Arab states to take an active part in the Palestine fighting — Iraq and Syria — failed to meet with equal success. Iraq, sharing no frontier with Israel, declared its unwillingness to enter negotiations, and talks with Syria were interrupted by General Za'im's coup d'état at the end of March.

## Conciliation Commission Faces Stalemate

A progressively intractable attitude among the Arab states and Israel was reflected in the inability of the UN Conciliation Commission

to make any appreciable progress toward working out the basis of a permanent peace treaty with representatives of both sides through its meetings at Lausanne. The chief points at issue were three: the boundaries of Israel; the future status of Jerusalem; and the fate of the Arab refugees from Palestine. The borders of Israel were tentatively set by the armistice agreements, but the tactics of the Israelis both during the discussion of those agreements and during the Conciliation Commission meetings did nothing to allay Arab fears of Israeli territorial expansion. As to the status of Jerusalem, representatives of the Arab states formally declared, early in May, their willingness to accede to an international regime in keeping with the December 4, 1948, resolution of the UN General Assembly. Israeli spokesmen, however, would go no further than to suggest their willingness to discuss an international regime over the Holy Places of Jerusalem; in contrast to this concession was Israel's evident intention of eventually establishing Jerusalem as its capital. But it was the problem of the refugees that assumed the largest proportions. The Arab representatives refused to proceed to a discussion of peace terms before Israel had committed itself to the repatriation of a significant portion of its former Arab inhabitants. This Israel was unprepared to do in any specific terms, and in view of the large numbers of prospective Jewish immigrants to Israel there appeared little likelihood that it would ever voluntarily do so. When the UN admitted



Israel to membership on May 11 without requiring a prior commitment on any one of these points—all of which lay within the framework of the General Assembly resolution of December 4—the Arab opposition perceptibly stiffened and all immediate hope for a final settlement was gone. All that one could point to as an advance toward peace was the tacit but unformalized recognition by the Arab states of the existence of Israel.

### Palestine Refugees

There was no immediate or easy solution for the problem posed by the refugees. Carried through the winter by the relief efforts of the local governments, private agencies, and the organizations working in association with the United Nations, the larger part of the refugees were beginning to realize that return to their former homes would be long delayed or even impossible. Small numbers succeeded in slipping back to Israel, and still others were absorbed by the surrounding Arab communities in which they found themselves. But by far the majority were faced with the problem of rehabilitating themselves in foreign lands. In the meantime no plans had been evolved for such a rehabilitation and the available funds for relief were due to be exhausted by early fall.

Israel, faced with its own problem of population absorption and eager to develop a predominantly Jewish state, had no desire to allow them to return. Of the Arab states, Syria, Iraq, and to a lesser extent Jordan, possessed areas for resettlement that might be developed at considerable cost, but did not possess the necessary financial resources; nor did they feel that a solution to the problem was entirely their responsibility. Moreover, the refugee problem was too powerful a weapon in the hands of either side for it to escape manipulation as a political bargaining point. The continued prolongation of the problem not only lowered the morale of the refugees themselves, but seriously reduced the prospect of eventual amity between Israel and its neighbors, and implanted a dangerous irritant in the Arab body politic. It likewise raised for the UN an explosive issue that would in all probability confront the General Assembly at its September session.

Aware of the dangers inherent in the situation, American representatives unofficially explored the Arab reaction to the possibility of U. S. technical and capital assistance in developmental schemes which would both provide the means for a resettlement of the refugees and indirectly forward President Truman's Point Four program. The rawness of Arab feeling was at once apparent: offers of American assistance were suspect until demonstrated to be genuine. The greatest fear appeared to be that any American plan for a development of the Arab world would in reality be slanted toward the development of Israel as an industrial heart upon which predominantly agricultural Arab states would be semi-dependent. Arab doubts were not assuaged by the bill for the creation of a Near East Survey Commission which was introduced into the U. S. Congress on May 18: in proposing the bill its sponsors made specific reference to "the presence of Israel in the Near East . . . as a bridgehead of democracy and as an industrial workshop built on democratic foundations [which] can furnish the nucleus for technical and skilled manpower making an ambitious program for the development of the whole region practicable."

### Syria's Coup d'État

Direct evidence of a restlessness and impatience in the Arab states was to be seen in General Za'im's coup d'état in Syria at the end of March. Indications of malaise had previously appeared in December 1948, when the Jamil Mardam Bey Cabinet was forced to resign after three days of rioting, and two weeks elapsed before a new government could be formed. The roots of the trouble lay deep in the background of Syrian politics. The first generation of political leaders, to which both Prime Minister Mardam Bey and President Shukri al-Quwwatli belonged, had received their nationalist schooling and experience in the days of the Ottoman Empire and the French Mandate. Its bent, therefore, was toward the removal of a foreign incubus rather than toward the positive construction of a state. Moreover, the state which they did inherit in 1945 was not the state for which they had worked: still with them was the dream of Arab, or at least Fertile Crescent, unity. Nor



was Syria reconciled to the cession of the Sanjak of Alexandretta to Turkey, negotiated by the French in 1939; nor to its financial dependence upon France, an unwelcome legacy of the Mandate. The Syrian Government had neither the desire nor the prestige to cut its losses as Turkey had done in 1923, and start afresh with the resources it had at hand.

This political outlook was popular in Syria, but the government leaders failed to couple it in practice with a constructive program of domestic development. As a result, when Syria was unable to make any progress toward regaining the Sanjak of Alexandretta (now become the Turkish Province of Hatay), or to maintain successfully a completely independent currency, or to free its assets blocked in France, or to assume a leading role in Arab unity, or to wage war successfully in Palestine, there was little left on which the government could claim the loyalty of the people.

The ease with which General Za'im's predominantly negative coup d'état was effected attested the shallow roots of Syria's political institutions, including its political "parties." It was not to be interpreted, however, as a repudiation of a desire for democratic government; but rather as a reaction to the pseudo-democracy that had been practised — as a growing conviction that what a young state demands is good government rather than democratic government, and that unfortunately the two are not in every circumstance synonymous. At the time of the coup, General Za'im was Chief of Staff of the Syrian Army, on whose backing he could, for the moment, count because he promised to overcome the drastic cut in and slowness of its pay. He had, however, no background of national reputation or power over the popular mind. Nor had he any ready-made plan for the establishment of the good government that it was the declared intention of his coup to set up, nor an organized group either within the army or among

the political leaders to lend him support. Gradually, however, he began to attract confidence, and by the end of May his regime appeared to be firmly established. He exhibited a determination to block the reappearance of the political factions which had formerly ebbed and flowed around the ousted political leaders. The previous assembly was abolished, but a committee appointed to prepare a revised constitution was ready with its draft. Only after legal government had been reconstituted could the net effect of the coup be evaluated.

### Status of Problems before the UN

The United Nations made little progress in the solution of the three Middle Eastern problems before it: a peace settlement for Palestine; a plebiscite for Kashmir; and a settlement for the Italian Colonies. As already noted, the Lausanne meetings being held by the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission seemed to be foundering. The Commission for India and Pakistan still had not uncovered a basis for procedure acceptable to the two dominions, and the government of Jammu and Kashmir. The Italian Colonies brought to the General Assembly all the political barnacles it had accreted during the previous two years. Ethiopia, Great Britain, France, and Italy wished to share in their administration, but according to differing schemes of apportionment; the United States, the Soviet Union, and Egypt each had strong opinions as to what constituted both an appropriate and an inappropriate settlement; and the inhabitants themselves — primarily the Libyans — were divided on all questions except their common desire for independence. An involved compromise devised by Italy and Great Britain which attempted to reconcile at least partially all these conflicting claims was narrowly defeated in the General Assembly, largely through the opposition of the Soviet Union and the Arab states.

# Chronology<sup>1</sup>

## Afghanistan

1949

*April 2:* The Afghan chargé d'affaires in Karachi was recalled following accusations by the Kabul radio that Pakistan was engaged in aggression against Afghan tribes on the Afghan-Pakistan border.

*April 20:* The U. S. Senate approved the nomination of Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr., as Ambassador to Afghanistan.

## Cyprus

1949

*May 23:* The Nationalist Party scored a victory in elections in 8 of the 12 city administrations. The leftists remained in control of Limassol, Famagusta, and two other industrial towns.

## Egypt

(See also Palestine Problem)

1949

*Mar. 6:* Foreign Minister Ahmad Muhammad Khashaba Pasha told the press that Egypt wanted "to settle her relations with Britain and establish [them] on a firm foundation of loyal cooperation." He also stated that a proposed Mediterranean pact was "worthy of serious consideration."

*Mar. 7:* H. E. Mamduh Riad Bey, Egyptian Minister of Commerce and Industry, announced that an agreement with the Suez Canal Company had been initialed by the Egyptian Government. The agreement provided that 9 out of every 10 administrative posts and 4 out of every 5 technical posts in the Company be held by Egyptians; that the number of Egyptian directors on the Company's board of 32 be raised from 2 to 7; and that Egypt receive 7% of the Company profits, or not less than LE 35,000 a year. The agreement also stipulated that the Company would undertake to deepen the canal at its own ex-

pense, to build a 10-kilometer-long by-pass canal from Ferdan to Kantara, to cancel sums owing it on an outstanding loan made to the municipality of Port Said, to contribute £45,000 to the municipality of Ismailia, and to provide fishing port facilities at Port Said and land for workers' quarters.

*Mar. 13:* The Egyptian Government informed the U. S. Department of State that Egypt did not wish to conclude an agreement providing for use of war surplus material funds to bring researchers, scholars, and specialists to Egypt under the Fulbright Act unless the operation was controlled by a board of 4 Egyptians and 4 Americans, under joint chairmanship, and with the privilege of review and cancellation by either the U. S. Secretary of State or the Egyptian Minister of Education.

*Mar. 18:* Prime Minister Ibrahim Abd al-Hadi Pasha and Foreign Minister Ahmad Muhammad Khashaba Pasha met with British Ambassador Sir Ronald Campbell for what was reported to be the first of a series of negotiations leading to a resolution of the differences between Egypt and Great Britain.

*Mar. 28:* Princess Fawzia, sister of King Farouk and former Empress of Iran, married Ismail Shirine Bey, wealthy Egyptian diplomat, in Cairo.

*Mar. 31:* Great Britain and Egypt concluded a financial and commercial agreement under which Britain, while reducing the number of dollars available to Egypt, would increase exports—particularly of heavy capital goods—to make up Egypt's loss.

*Apr. 23:* Egypt recognized the Government of Gen. Za'im in Syria.

*May 3:* The Chamber of Deputies approved a government proposal to extend martial law for another year.

*May 8:* The Cabinet allotted LE 1.5 million for aid to Palestine Arab refugees in Egypt during the next ten months.

*May 19:* British Foreign Secretary Bevin announced an Anglo-Egyptian agreement for harnessing the Nile which called for the construction of two dams at Owens Falls on the White Nile at the outlet of Lake Victoria in Uganda. These dams were to be the first installment in a vast program for the development of electric power and control of the Nile flood waters.

<sup>1</sup> In general, items in the Chronology are drawn from the *New York Times* unless otherwise indicated. Nongeographical subheadings will be found beginning on page 329.

May 25: The Egyptian press reported that Egypt would spend \$120 million in the next three years to train and equip an armored force, to which 400 planes would be attached.

## Eritrea

1949  
Mar. 28: Unidentified gunmen shot and fatally wounded Abd al-Kadir Kabire, President of the Eritrean Moslem League, in an Asmara street.

## India

(See also Kashmir Problem)

1949  
Mar. 2: Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, Governor of the United Provinces, died in Lucknow. B. B. Malik, Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court, was appointed Acting Governor. (*Government of India Information Service [GIIS]*, Mar. 3.)

Mar. 3: It was announced that Dr. Sita Ram, President of the United Provinces Legislative Council (Upper House), had been appointed Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan, succeeding Sri Prakasa. (*GIIS*, Mar. 3.)

Mar. 5: Prime Minister Nehru withdrew from Parliament a bill to outlaw strikes in essential industries; his explanation was that there had been widespread misunderstanding of the bill, and that the labor situation had improved since it was introduced.

Mar. 7: The Parliament voted that about 50% of its total estimated revenue for 1949-50 (rupees equivalent to \$562 million) should be spent for defense services.

Trade talks between India and Switzerland began in Bern. (*GIIS*, Mar. 7.)

Mar. 17: A report of the Indian States' Ministry presented to Parliament proposals for the unification of judicial, legislative, administrative, fiscal, and revenue systems of the states either merged with adjoining Indian territory or integrated into unions; for the approximation of the administrative and political set-up of the states to that of the Indian provinces; and for readjustment of the constitutional and fiscal relationship of the states with the center so as to bring it, so far as may be practicable, in accord with the provincial level. (*GIIS*, Mar. 21.)

Mar. 21: Elected officials of the French colonies in South India met at Pondichéry, under French auspices, and voted unanimously that

a referendum be held December 11 to decide whether the colonies should join the Indian Union or remain French possessions. Councilors stated that if the colonies voted to join India, they must have a guarantee of a 30-year transitional period of "complete autonomy."

Mar. 23: Prime Minister Nehru held conversations with Anthony Eden, Britain's wartime Foreign Secretary, in New Delhi regarding India's future relationship with the Commonwealth.

Mar. 24: The External Affairs Ministry announced that Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Ambassador to Moscow, would succeed Sir Benegal Rama Rau as Ambassador to the United States.

Mar. 27: Patrick Gordon Walker, British Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, arrived in India to continue discussions on India's future relationship with the Commonwealth.

Mar. 28: The Parliament passed without debate a bill abolishing discriminations in favor of Europeans and Americans in the criminal law of India; principal privileges had been special treatment in prison, the right to demand a jury composed of their own nationals, and protection against sentences of whipping or transportation to penal colonies.

Mar. 29: The Indian Government nominated Devadas Gandhi to serve on the UN Sub-commission on Freedom of Information and of the Press.

India and Czechoslovakia signed a trade agreement under which the former would provide mainly raw jute, manganese ore, oilseeds and oils, mica, tea, and palmyra fibre in return for capital goods and technical personnel.

Apr. 1: The customs union between India and the 5 French Indian colonies was abrogated. A permit system would take the place of the former unrestricted travel between India and the French possessions.

Apr. 6: Prime Minister Nehru told Parliament that foreign private investment capital would be welcome in India, subject only to the restrictions and regulations which apply to Indian capital.

Apr. 12: Two new irrigation projects were approved by the Government of India for irrigation and electric power: the Ganga barrage scheme in West Bengal, and a scheme to develop the possibilities of power production provided by the Sabarmati River in the Central Provinces.

Apr. 15: The Central Government of India was forced to intervene in East Punjab when the

Provincial Cabinet collapsed because of political factionalism.

The New Delhi Government took over the administration of Vindhya Pradesh when charges of wholesale corruption among union Ministers forced their resignation en masse.

**Apr. 20:** British Commonwealth prime ministers met in London to formulate arrangements whereby India might remain a member of the Commonwealth while becoming a republic.

**Apr. 22:** India and Poland signed a one-year trade agreement under which India would export raw jute, raw cotton, cow hides, ground-nuts and ground-nut oil, black pepper, and tea. In return Poland would send India lithopone, coal tar dyes, newsprint, construction steel, machine tools, electrical implements and motors, cables, large transformers and raw film.

**Apr. 28:** The governments of the British Commonwealth declared India's continued membership in the Commonwealth at the close of the Prime Ministers' Conference in London.

Eight persons were killed and several injured in a 2-day riot in Calcutta which began when hundreds of women protested against the treatment of communist prisoners in a hunger strike in Calcutta's jail. Students and communist sympathizers battled with the police on the second day.

**May 5:** Mrs. Shrimati Vijayalakshmi Pandit, newly appointed Ambassador to the U. S., arrived in New York. (*GIIS*, May 5.)

**May 10:** India concluded a trade agreement with Switzerland under which it would export oil and oilseeds, jute, manganese ore, coffee, tea, mica, spices and carpets in exchange for heavy electrical equipment, medical apparatus, textiles, chemical dyes, and pharmaceuticals.

**May 19:** The Government of India declared through its representative at the UN Security Council that it could never recognize the independence of any of the princely states within its borders.

## Iran

1949

**Mar. 2:** Dr. Morteza Yazdi, former Minister of Health, Dr. Husayn Jowdat, Tudeh youth leader, and Dr. Nureddin Kianuri, a leader of the Tudeh Workers Union, were among 14 members of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party on trial charged with having spread Marxism and engaged in activities against the Iranian monarchy.

**Mar. 5:** The Majlis (Parliament) passed a press law suppressing any newspaper and bringing to court within 24 hours any writer that provoked the populace to rise against the government. The law provided for censorship of newspapers that libeled the Shah, his family, heads of foreign states, the Prime Minister, members of his Cabinet, the speaker of the Majlis, and judges.

**Mar. 14:** Ambassador to the U. S. Husayn Akhavan Rast handed U. S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson a copy of a memorandum to the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran in which the Iranian Government protested the Soviet Union's antagonistic radio and press campaign against Iran. Among the Soviet allegations was one stating that "American advisers intend to transform Iran into a military base to be used against the Soviet Union."

**Mar. 21:** The Voice of America broadcast the first in a series of daily programs in Persian for transmittal to Iran.

**Mar. 22:** A detachment of 50 Soviet troops reportedly killed 1 Iranian soldier and wounded and captured 2 others at Naftliye in the Gurgan district south of the Atrai River in Iran.

**Mar. 23:** U. S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson denounced as "false and demonstrably untrue" Soviet press and radio charges that Iran was being converted into an American military base. He asserted, however, that continuing U. S. interest in the security of Middle Eastern countries, particularly Greece, Turkey, and Iran, had in no wise been lessened by the negotiations for the North Atlantic Pact.

**Mar. 28:** The Iranian Foreign Office protested to the Soviet Government against the Soviet attack on Iranian troops in the Gurgan area on March 22.

First shipments of U. S. surplus arms, part of a \$26 million deal to provide Iran with more than 50 planes, some light tanks, and other items for the maintenance of internal security, were reported delivered to Persian Gulf ports.

**Apr. 4:** A Russian regiment supported by tanks and armored cars was reported to have made a foray into Azerbaijan Province, attacking an Iranian army post.

**Apr. 5:** A Foreign Office spokesman announced that there had been three clashes between Russian and Iranian frontier troops in the previous three months, and that Iranian protests had been fruitless.

**Apr. 7-13:** The Soviet consulates at Rezaiyeh



Ardebil, Maku, and Tabriz closed their doors.

*Apr. 18:* Nadir Arastah, Minister for Roads, was appointed Ambassador to Moscow replacing Hamid Sayah.

*Apr. 22:* Military courts sentenced twenty members of the leftist Tudeh Party to terms of from one to ten years in prison for activities against the monarchy.

*May 9:* The Constituent Assembly altered the Constitution to give the Shah the power to dissolve Parliament, although prohibiting the use of this power twice on the same issue.

*May 10:* Russian troops occupy three Iranian border posts, a military source announced.

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi confirmed the projected 7-year plan for the economic development of Iran. Organized under the direction of U. S. technicians, the plan was designed to overhaul and develop the entire agriculture and industry of the country.

*May 14:* Negotiations between the Iranian Government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for a revision of the company's concession were broken off temporarily.

*May 15:* Foreign Minister Ali Asghar Hikmat announced that Iran formally demanded payment from the Soviet Union of more than 12 tons of gold, more than \$9 million in United States currency, and about \$11 million in Iranian rials owed since World War II.

*May 17:* It was reported that Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was preparing to give control of the gendarmerie back to the Ministry of War.

*May 24:* The government submitted to the Majlis a bill claiming for Iran the sub-surface oil deposits of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. (*N. Y. Journal of Commerce*, May 25.)

## Iraq

(See also Palestine Problem)

1949

*Apr. 17:* Iraq recognized the government of General Za'im in Syria.

## Israel

(See also Palestine Problem)

1949

*Mar. 1:* China announced its recognition of the State of Israel.

*Mar. 2:* Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion assembled a four-party coalition government, with Mapai in possession of 7 portfolios:

David Ben-Gurion — Prime Minister, Defense

Moshe Sharett — Foreign Affairs

Golda Myerson — Labor and Social Insurance

Bernard Joseph — Supply

Zolman Shazar — Education & Culture

Eliezer Kaplan — Finance

David Remez — Communications

Rabbi Judah Fishman — Religions

Rabbi Yitshaq Meir Levin — Social Welfare

Moshe Shapiro — Interior, Immigration

Behor Shitrit — Police

Felix Rosenblueth — Justice

The posts of ministers of health, commerce, agriculture, and housing remained unfilled in the hope that Mapam and the General Zionists would join the government.

*Mar. 4:* The UN Security Council voted 9-1 to admit Israel to the United Nations. Egypt voted against the admission, and Great Britain abstained.

*Mar. 10:* The Assembly (Knesset) accepted Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's cabinet in a 73-45 vote of confidence.

*Mar. 15:* The British resumed management of Consolidated Oil Refineries, Ltd., in Haifa. The refinery plant and machinery were to be overhauled and repaired, and production to be resumed within six weeks.

*Mar. 16:* Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett arrived in the U. S. on his first official visit.

*Mar. 17:* The Knesset ratified the loan of \$100 million granted by the U. S. Export-Import Bank on Jan. 19. The only dissenters were 3 communists.

*Mar. 22:* Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion assigned supplementary portfolios in the Cabinet as follows:

Eliezer Kaplan — Trade and Industry

Bernard Joseph — Agriculture

Moshe Shapiro — Health

*Mar. 28:* James G. MacDonald, U. S. Ambassador to Israel, presented his credentials to President Chaim Weizmann in Tel Aviv.

Turkey granted Israel *de facto* recognition.

*Apr. 26:* Bernard Joseph, Minister of Supply and Rationing, presented to the Knesset an austerity plan which included food rationing, introduced utility goods, guaranteed supply of all essentials, and limited importation of luxury articles. At the same meeting Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion told of the 4-year plan intended to double Israel's population and at the same time find room and employment for immigrants.



**Apr. 29:** A 4-man Israeli delegation headed by David Horowitz, Under-Secretary for Finance, arrived in London to negotiate for the resumption of trade and financial relations between Great Britain and Israel.

**May 11:** The UN General Assembly admitted Israel to membership in the United Nations by a vote of 37 to 12, with 9 abstentions.

**May 14:** South Africa granted *de jure* recognition to Israel.

**May 16:** Israel joined the International Labor Organization. (*N. Y. Daily Mirror*, May 17.)

**May 17:** The Hebrew University-Hadassah Medical School opened in temporary quarters.

**May 18:** Canada's *de facto* recognition of Israel was made full recognition.

**May 20:** France granted Israel *de jure* recognition.

**May 21:** Poland and Israel signed a trade agreement for a \$20 million exchange of goods in the next year.

**May 30:** A financial arrangement was signed between Israel and Great Britain which would enable Israel to spend nearly \$28 million in the sterling area during the next six months on its immigration and colonization program. This amount represented approximately one quarter of the wartime accumulation of sterling held by Israel's account in London and frozen since February 1948, when Palestine was suspended from the sterling area.

## Italian Colonies

1949

**Mar. 29:** Italian Foreign Minister Count Carlo Sforza, at a conference with U. S. Secretary of State Acheson, appealed for U. S. support of Italy's plan for regaining control of its African colonies.

**Apr. 6:** U. S. delegate John Foster Dulles proposed that the UN General Assembly assign UN trusteeships over Cyrenaica to Great Britain, over Italian Somaliland to Italy, and over Eastern Eritrea to Ethiopia.

**Apr. 7:** Jean Chauvel, French representative in the UN General Assembly's Political Committee, urged that part of Eritrea be ceded to Ethiopia, but proposed that the remainder of Eritrea, together with Italian Somaliland and all of Libya, should be returned to Italy under a UN trusteeship.

**Apr. 11:** Count Sforza urged the Political Com-

mittee of the UN General Assembly to recommend a "fair compromise" that would return Italian Somaliland, Eritrea, and Tripolitania to Italy under a UN trusteeship.

**Apr. 18:** Pakistan and India gave their general endorsement to a Soviet proposal that the UN General Assembly establish a collective UN trusteeship over the former Italian colonies in Africa instead of handing them over to individual countries for administration.

**Apr. 21:** Andrei A. Gromyko, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, urged acceptance of the Soviet proposal for a UN trusteeship.

**Apr. 27:** Dr. Muhammad Fuad Shukri, representing the National Council for the Liberation of Libya, told the UN General Assembly's Political Committee that the people of Libya were determined to resist the return of Italian rule, and that they must have complete independence.

**May 3:** Hector McNeil, head of the British delegation to the General Assembly, introduced a resolution calling for the independence of Libya in 1959, with Cyrenaica to be administered in the meantime by Great Britain under a UN trusteeship.

**May 9:** Britain and Italy agreed on a plan to award Italy a UN trusteeship over its prewar African territory of Somaliland, beginning immediately, and over Tripolitania in 1951.

**May 13:** The Political Committee of the UN General Assembly approved a resolution based on the Anglo-Italian agreement for the disposition of the former Italian Colonies. British administration of Cyrenaica and French administration of the Fezzan would continue until all of Libya became independent in 1959; Italy would take over the administration of Tripolitania in 1951 for the remainder of the period of trusteeship.

**May 14:** Groups of Arabs in Libya demonstrated against the UN action regarding the disposition of Italy's prewar colonies. A state of emergency was proclaimed and a nightly curfew enforced.

**May 17:** Arab officials in Tripolitania deserted their posts in accordance with the civil disobedience policy proclaimed by their leaders against the agreement between British Foreign Secretary Bevin and Italian Foreign Minister Count Carlo Sforza.

**May 18:** The UN General Assembly postponed a decision on the disposition of the Italian Colonies in Africa until its fourth regular session, which was to convene on Sept. 20.

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## Jordan

(See also Palestine Problem)

1949

*Mar. 19:* The published list of appropriations for foreign and imperial services, 1949-50, confirmed that Great Britain would subsidize the Arab Legion to the amount of £3.5 million, or £1 million more than the previous year.

*Apr. 25:* The Wadi al-Arab irrigation project was inaugurated by King Abdallah in Shuna, in the northern part of the Kingdom near the Jordan River. According to Abbas Abu Risheh, Deputy Director of the Department of Agriculture, the project would eventually provide land for 10,000 additional families.

*Apr. 26:* The criminal court sentenced three Palestinians to death on a charge of having attempted to assassinate King Abdallah on March 26th. Sentences of life imprisonment were imposed in absentia on two Syrians and two other Palestinians.

Foreign correspondents were officially informed that the correct name of the state was the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

*Apr. 27:* Syrian troops were reported digging in opposite the Jordanian frontier. About 3,000 Jordanian Arab legionnaires were encamped on their side of the border at Ramtha.

*May 3:* The resignation of the Jordanian Cabinet was officially announced.

*May 7:* The new Cabinet was announced as follows:

Tawfiq Abu al-Huda Pasha — Prime Minister

\*Ruhi Bey Abd al-Hadi — Foreign Affairs

\*Musa al-Nasir — Communications

Fawzi al-Mulqi — National Defense

Sulayman al-Sukkar — Finance, Economy

Sa'id al-Mufti — Interior

Falah Madadhah — Justice

\*Khulusi al-Khayri — Agriculture, Commerce

Shaykh Muhammad al-Shanqiti — Education, chief Qadi

(\*Palestinians)

## Kashmir Problem

1949

*Mar. 3:* Lt. Gen. Maurice Delvois, military adviser to the UN Commission for India and Pakistan, reported that 6,000 to 8,000 tribesmen had been withdrawing from the forward areas of Kashmir to the Northwest Frontier

Province. He also reported that two battalions of regular Pakistan troops and some Indian Air Force units had been withdrawn.

*Mar. 12:* Indian and Pakistan leaders agreed on a provisional truce line.

*Mar. 21:* U. S. Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was appointed Plebiscite Administrator in Kashmir.

*Apr. 14:* Pakistan troops opened fire with light machine guns and rifles on Indian troops at Chor Kunjian village. Pakistan troops on the same day occupied Kopra village one mile east of Chor Kunjian. (GIIS, Apr. 18.)

*Apr. 15:* The UN Kashmir Commission presented both dominions with its proposals for a truce agreement.

*Apr. 16:* Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, pro-India prime minister of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, declared that his government would refuse to accept Admiral Nimitz as Plebiscite Administrator until a truce had been signed between India and Pakistan.

*Apr. 20:* The Government of India sent a formal note of protest to the UN Kashmir Commission at Rawalpindi against violations of the ceasefire agreement by Pakistan troops in Jammu and Kashmir. (GIIS, Apr. 25.)

*May 18:* India gave its formal sealed reply to the final terms of the UN's Kashmir Commission for a truce agreement in Jammu and Kashmir to the Commission's chairman Alfredo Lozano.

## Lebanon

(See also Palestine Problem)

1949

*Mar. 17:* The government suppressed all newspapers with a circulation of less than 1,500, as well as 62 political newspapers which failed to post a security bond.

*Mar. 21:* A Tripoli court sentenced Mustafa al-Ariss, Lebanese communist labor union leader, to one month's imprisonment for a communist speech.

The newspaper *L'Orient* was suppressed for attacking the government.

*Apr. 4:* General Za'im, chief of state in Syria, sent a note to the Lebanese Government protesting the attitude of the Lebanese press toward the new Syrian regime.

*Apr. 16:* Foreign Minister Hamid Franjiyah went to Damascus to discuss economic and financial agreements with Syrian Prime Minister General Husni Za'im.

*Apr. 23:* More freedom for the press was de-

manded in the name of foreign correspondents in Lebanon at a luncheon given for Foreign Minister Hamid Franjiyah by the Association of Foreign Correspondents.

Lebanon recognized the government of General Za'im in Syria.

*Apr. 24:* Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh went to Damascus to confer with Prime Minister Husni Za'im on general co-ordination of policy.

*May 18:* Prime Minister Za'im closed the Syrian frontier to all food shipments to Lebanon in order to force the Lebanese to release a Syrian captain and 3 soldiers arrested in Lebanon on May 10 for the murder of Kamil al-Husayn, a Palestinian Arab accused of selling land to the Jews.

*May 24:* The Lebanese-Syrian frontier was reopened.

## Pakistan

(See also Kashmir Problem)

1949

*Mar. 3:* It was announced that Dr. Sita Ram, President of the United Provinces Legislative Council (Upper House) had been appointed Indian High Commissioner in Pakistan, succeeding Sri Prakasa. (*Government of India Information Service [GIIS]*, Mar. 3.)

*Apr. 25:* The first direct radio-telegraph link between Pakistan and the United States was opened.

*Apr. 28-30:* The first All-Pakistan Economic Conference was held in Lahore under the presidency of Mr. Zahid Husain, Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan.

## Palestine Problem

1949

*Mar. 1:* Lebanese and Israeli delegations conferred at Ras al-Naqrurah on a proposed armistice agreement submitted by the UN.

An Israeli delegation headed by Lt. Col. Moshe Dayan arrived at Rhodes to start armistice talks with Transjordan.

The UN Conciliation Commission invited Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia to a conference at Beirut, beginning March 21 "to discuss the problem of Arab refugees and possibly other questions concerning peaceful settlement in the Holy Land."

*Mar. 4:* Armistice talks between Israel and Leb-

anon were postponed. Jordan-Israel talks began at Rhodes.

*Mar. 5:* Virtually all of the Arabs (approximately 2,400) in the Faluja pocket decided to evacuate.

*Mar. 7:* Lebanese-Israeli talks were resumed.

*Mar. 9:* The Jordan Defense Ministry reported that Israeli armored forces were moving toward the Gulf of Aqaba (one column from Beersheba, and another from positions south of the Dead Sea.)

*Mar. 10:* Jordan charged Israel with massing troops on the Iraqi front near Qalqilya, Tulkarm, Jenin, and Beisan.

*Mar. 11:* Israel and Jordan signed a "complete and enduring" cease-fire agreement, independent of armistice, for forces on both sides of a line running from just east of Bayt Nabala to the Gulf of Aqaba.

Israel was reported to have occupied the 5-mile Elath coastal area at the southern end of Palestine after a minor clash with Jordan troops near Aqaba.

*Mar. 13:* Acting UN Mediator for Palestine Dr. Ralph J. Bunche stated that the Israeli military activity near the Gulf of Aqaba was a breach of the truce.

*Mar. 14:* Great Britain warned the Israeli Government that if its forces on the Gulf of Aqaba crossed into Jordanian territory, British troops at Aqaba would be forced to resist.

*Mar. 16:* Israel and Jordan agreed on armistice lines in the Jerusalem area.

*Mar. 17:* Jordan set up civil administration in all Palestine areas under its military control. District commissioners were assigned to the Jerusalem, Hebron, and Ramallah areas, and a civilian commissioner was appointed for the Nablus-Jenin-Tulkarm triangle in the north.

The U. S. House of Representatives passed and sent to the White House for signature a bill authorizing a \$16 million contribution to be advanced immediately to the UN for aid to Palestine refugees.

*Mar. 20:* The Government of Jordan formally requested military assistance from Great Britain to defend its southern territory against Israeli incursions. Units were sought to help patrol the Jordan-Palestine frontier as far north as the southern shores of the Dead Sea.

An Israeli unit was reported to have entered Jordan north of Ayn Gharandal.

*Mar. 21:* Dr. Bunche announced that Syria and Israel had accepted an invitation to negotiate an armistice.

The UN Conciliation Commission held its first meeting in Beirut with the representatives



Boundaries of Israeli occupied territory according to armistice agreements.

of Arab states. Arab League members representing Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan were present.

**Mar. 22:** The Israeli delegation to the UN charged today that the recent arrival of British troops in the Aqaba area of Jordan violated a Security Council resolution adopted May 29, 1948.

**Mar. 23:** An armistice agreement between Israel and Lebanon was signed at Ras al-Naqrurah.

**Mar. 24:** Representatives of 13 groups of Pal-

estinian Arabs testified before the UN Conciliation Commission in Beirut that the majority of the Arab refugees wished to return to their former homes and to live in peace with their neighbors.

**Mar. 29:** Israeli and Jordanian delegates accepted armistice terms today and returned to their capitals for final approval of the draft.

Lord Henderson, British Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated before the House of Lords that the British Government was ready to co-operate as far as possible in finding an effective solution to the Arab refugee problem; he said that resettlement and rehabilitation could be successfully accomplished only by large-scale development projects in Arab countries, and that these would demand foreign financial aid.

**Apr. 1:** The Gaza "Government of Palestine" denounced what it called Israeli atrocities against Arab inhabitants of Haifa. A cablegram to the Security Council charged that the Israelis had forcibly deported Arabs from Haifa, transported them over the Lebanese border, and then "opened fire on them, killing and wounding many."

Walter Eytan, director of the Israeli Foreign Office, charged Egypt with failing to carry out two points of the Israeli-Egyptian armistice agreement.

**Apr. 3:** A general armistice agreement between Israel and Jordan was signed after 33 days of negotiations.

**Apr. 4:** The UN Conciliation Commission announced that it was reporting to Secretary General Trygve Lie its plans to "continue and expand" exchanges of views with all governments concerned in the Palestine question at some neutral place "in the near future."

**Apr. 5:** Acting UN Mediator Dr. Ralph J. Bunche held a conference with the UN Conciliation Commission. The Commission announced the "successful" close of its discussion with the Arab governments and said that all Arab League states except Iraq had approved its suggestion to continue "the exchange of views" soon "in a neutral place."

Armistice negotiations between Syria and Israel opened, but the Israeli delegates refused to deal with representatives of Syria's new military regime.

**Apr. 6:** General Za'im reported that about 60 Israeli soldiers had penetrated 300 meters into Syria north of Lake Hulah.

**Apr. 7:** Israeli authorities promised to withdraw "immediately" from the position seized in



Syrian territory, Acting UN Mediator Dr. Ralph J. Bunche reported.

*Apr. 8:* The Syrian-Israeli negotiations for armistice were postponed because of delay of the Israelis in withdrawing from Syria.

*Apr. 11:* An \$8 million check for the relief of Arab and Jewish refugees in Palestine was presented to Secretary General Trygve Lie of the UN by Warren Austin of the United States. This payment was the first part of a \$16,000,000 contribution authorized by Congress.

*Apr. 13:* Israel and Syria signed a cease-fire agreement.

*Apr. 15:* Pope Pius XII appealed to leaders of Catholic nations which are members of the UN to ask that the Israeli Government guarantee the "internationalization of Jerusalem and all other sacred places."

*Apr. 21:* The UN Conciliation Commission reported that the Israeli Government had repeated its refusal to accept the internationalization of Jerusalem. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, however, told the Commission's delegates that Israel accepted without reservation international control of the Holy Places in the city of Jerusalem.

*Apr. 22:* The Israeli Army turned over to the Arab Legion about 350 Arab prisoners of war who had been held in Israeli camps.

*Apr. 23:* President Chaim Weizmann stated in a speech in New York City that Israel would ensure the safety of the Holy Places in Jerusalem and encourage the fullest international control for their immunity and protection.

The Jordan-Israeli armistice committee awarded 19 square miles of land north and south of Jerusalem to the Arabs. The Israelis received a village as counter-balance. The territory awarded the Arabs included the villages of Bayt-Iksa, Qatannah, and Battir. Israel acquired the village of Walajah.

*Apr. 26:* Three of the four delegations expected from the Arab states arrived in Lausanne to discuss with the UN Conciliation Commission the refugee and other Palestine problems.

*Apr. 27:* The UN Conciliation Commission opened discussions with Israeli, Egyptian, and Lebanese delegations.

*Apr. 30:* The Iraqi Government announced its refusal to enter upon any negotiations with Israel until the plight of the Arab refugees was relieved. No Iraqi delegation would be sent to Lausanne to confer with the UN Conciliation Commission.

*May 1:* Local fighting between Arab and Israeli forces broke out south of the city of Tel Aviv.

Air alarms were sounded throughout the city and the streets were cleared for more than three hours.

*May 5:* Aubrey S. Eban, Israeli representative to the UN declared that Israel intended to co-operate fully in the establishment of some type of international regime for Jerusalem. Mr. Eban also guaranteed that his country would contribute to a solution of the refugee problem.

*May 7:* In a demonstration of protest against Jordan's cession to Israel of a strip of farmland under the terms of the armistice agreement signed at Rhodes, Palestinians hurled stones at the Government House in Nablus. King Abdallah's Arab Legion fired shots over the heads of the demonstrators in an attempt to restore order.

*May 8:* The Israeli Government submitted the draft of a preamble to a peace treaty to the UN Conciliation Commission for transmission to the Arab states.

*May 9:* States signatory to the Geneva Tariff Agreement of 1947 decided that the terms of the Agreement would no longer apply to Palestine.

*May 12:* A new outbreak of clashes between the Arab Legion and the Palestinian Arab population was reported in the Jenin area, where further lands were to be turned over to the Israeli authorities under the terms of the Jordan-Israel armistice.

*May 20:* Israel presented to the UN Conciliation Commission its terms for a permanent frontier settlement with its Arab neighbors.

*May 23:* The Arab states renewed their demand to the UN Conciliation Commission that the Arab refugees be permitted to return to their homes.

*May 28:* The Israeli-Arab conference at Lausanne was reported to be at a standstill. The Arabs refused to discuss a peace settlement until arrangements had been made for the return of the estimated 800,000 Palestinian Arab refugees. The Israelis would not take back the refugees until a definite settlement of Israel's frontiers was made with the Arab states.

## Saudi Arabia

1949

*Mar. 4:* Sheikh Asad al-Faqih, Minister to the U. S., presented his letters of credence to President Truman as first Ambassador of Saudi Arabia.



J. Paul Getty, President of Pacific Western Oil Corporation, announced that his company had obtained an oil concession covering the Saudi-Arabian undivided half-interest in the 2,200-square mile Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian neutral zone. Royalty and other payments would be made in U. S. currency, reportedly at the rate of 55¢ per barrel.

Mar. 15: The agreement between Saudi Arabia and the U. S. concerning U. S. rights to use of the Dhahran airfield was extended temporarily pending final negotiation.

Apr. 23: Saudi Arabia recognized the government of Gen. Za'im in Syria.

## Syria

(See also Palestine Problem)

1949

Mar. 11: The Syrian Government formally announced an agreement to grant a 70-year, 2,100-square mile oil concession to James W. MenHall, Syrian-born independent American operator. The agreement, which stipulated that Mr. MenHall must keep no less than three wildcat rigs operating continuously, one in the southern portion of his concession, provided that the Syrian Government would put up \$50,000,000 and independent oil companies in the U. S. furnish an equivalent amount. Mr. MenHall made no cash down payment, but there would be a standard royalty of 1/8th of production, with option for the Syrian Government to accept the market value or a minimum 34¢ a bbl. gross production, whichever might be the larger. In addition to development rights, the Government gave Mr. MenHall guarantees that the 5 new pipelines planned by other companies to cross Syrian territory would be required to make available up to 30% of their capacity as common carriers for Syrian oil in case he obtained production convenient to such lines. (Press Release, *Oil Forum*, Mar. 11.)

Mar. 27: Strikes and demonstrations broke out in the Syrian port city of Latakia protesting the Government's decision to enter armistice negotiations with the Israelis and against meetings regarding peace in Palestine.

Mar. 30-31: Brig. Gen. Husni Za'im, Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army, assumed complete control of Syria in a bloodless coup d'état. President Shukri al-Quwwatli, Prime Minister Khalid al-Azm and several members of Parliament were arrested; the frontiers

were sealed; and scheduled talks with UN officials Brig. Gen. William E. Riley and Henri Vigier on peace with Israel were postponed. Gen. Za'im stated the coup was engineered by "patriotic Syrians for the good of the country," and for "better, more democratic, uncorrupt government." Previous foreign engagements would not be interfered with, and the move had "no foreign implication whatsoever."

Apr. 1: Gen. Za'im announced that he intended to restore civil government as soon as possible, but that if his efforts to form a cabinet failed he would proclaim military rule; parliament had been dissolved, and he had formed a "provisional administrative government" with himself temporarily at its head.

Apr. 2: Gen. Za'im announced the dissolution of the Syrian Chamber and the formation of a commission to draft a new constitution guaranteeing the aspirations of the people and the restoration of their rights. (*London Times*, Apr. 3.)

Apr. 4: Chief of State Gen. Husni Za'im assumed personal responsibility for implementing the government's powers to abolish the license of any newspaper or other periodical considered inimical to the national interest or security, or menacing to Syria's foreign relations.

Gen. Za'im sent a note to the Lebanese Government protesting the attitude of the Lebanese press toward the new regime.

Apr. 7: The resignation of President Shukri al-Quwwatli and Prime Minister Khalid al-Azm was announced by Chief of State Husni Za'im at a press conference in Damascus.

Apr. 14: Prime Minister Khalid al-Azm was released after 14 days of confinement. Gen. Za'im announced that a "constitutional" cabinet would be formed in preparation for a return to democratic government.

Apr. 17: Iraq recognized the Za'im Government. Turkey indicated its *de facto* recognition.

The Cabinet was announced as follows:

Gen. Husni Za'im — Prime Minister,  
Interior, Defense

Adil Arslan — Deputy Prime Minister,  
Foreign Affairs

Khalil Mardam Bey — Education

Hasan Jabbarah — Finance

Asad Kurani — Justice, Public Works

Nuri al-Ilish — Agriculture, National  
Economy

**Apr. 18:** Nadir Arasteh, former Minister of Communications, was named Ambassador to Moscow, replacing Hamid Sayah.

**Apr. 21:** Gen. Za'im visited King Farouk of Egypt.

**Apr. 23:** Egypt, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia recognized the government of Gen. Za'im.

**Apr. 24:** Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh of Lebanon went to Damascus to confer with Prime Minister Husni Za'im on general co-ordination of policy.

**Apr. 26:** Prime Minister Za'im ordered Syria's border with the Kingdom of Jordan closed in reaction to King Abdallah's statements regarding a Greater Syria incorporating Jordan, Arab Palestine, Syria, and perhaps Iraq.

**Apr. 27:** The U. S., Great Britain, and France accorded diplomatic recognition to the government of Gen. Za'im.

The border with Jordan was reopened, but Syrian troops were reported opposite the Jordanian frontier. About 3,000 Jordanian Arab legionnaires were encamped on their side of the border at Ramtha.

**May 3:** The government lifted restrictions regarding business, property, and travel imposed on Jews a year before. A government official stated that Prime Minister Za'im considered all citizens to be of "complete equality in rights and liabilities."

**May 16:** The Syrian Government ratified an agreement with TAPline under which the company would build and operate the pipeline from Saudi-Arabia across Syria to Lebanon.

**May 18:** Prime Minister Za'im closed the Syrian frontier to all food shipments to Lebanon in order to force the Lebanese to release a Syrian captain and three soldiers arrested in Lebanon on May 10 for the murder of Kamil al-Husayn, a Palestinian Arab accused of selling land to the Jews.

**May 24:** The Syrian-Lebanese frontier was reopened.

**May 26:** Edmond Homsy was appointed Syrian Minister to London.

**May 29:** Prime Minister Husni Za'im signed a decree abolishing all political parties in Syria, saying that they would be reinstated when he had succeeded in establishing a "democratic" regime.

## Transjordan

(See Jordan)

## Turkey

1949

**Mar. 16:** Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak stated before Parliament that Turkey would not be included in the North Atlantic Pact and that the anticipated Mediterranean pact was still far from realization. Government and opposition parties in Parliament expressed "solidarity with and faith in the Anglo-Saxon bloc."

**Mar. 17:** Nine instructors and civilian experts of the U. S. military aid mission to Turkey resigned following the State Department's reduction of their allowances.

**Mar. 23:** U. S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson asserted that the continuing interest of the U. S. in the security of the nations of the Middle East, particularly Greece, Turkey, and Iran, had in no wise been lessened by the negotiations on the North Atlantic Treaty.

**Mar. 28:** Turkey granted *de facto* recognition to the State of Israel.

**Apr. 17:** Turkey indicated *de facto* recognition of the government of Gen. Za'im in Syria.

**Apr. 25:** Turkish and Bulgarian border patrols exchanged fire in the Edirne area.

**May 4:** The first consignment of Marshall Plan goods for Turkey was unloaded at Istanbul in the presence of Turkish and U. S. officials.

**May 12:** It was announced that a recent action of the National Assembly permitted the return of members of the deposed Ottoman Dynasty to Turkey for limited periods of time. Persons once married to princesses of the royal house of Osman might return provided their wives were now dead.

**May 14:** Turkey and Hungary signed a commercial agreement providing for the disposition of Turkish assets in Hungary. (N. Y. *Herald Tribune*, May 15.)

**May 26-27:** Fifteen thousand students and labor syndicate members in Ankara demonstrated against Greece over an international football match decision in Athens.

**May 28:** The Turkish Ambassador to Greece, Ruken Unaydin, called on the Greek Foreign Office for the second time to give assurance that there would be no repetition of the anti-Greek demonstrations in Turkey.

## Yemen

1949

**Mar. 5:** It was reported that British Royal Air Force planes blew up Arab forts along the border with the Aden Protectorate following

revolt of tribesmen in Yemen. Sayf al-Islam Ahmad, Imam of Yemen, was said to have crushed the revolt and beheaded 33 rebel leaders of the Rasasi tribes. Some tribesmen fled into British territory.

*Mar. 18:* Imam Sayf al-Islam Ahmad forbade Yemenite Jews to leave Yemen for Aden, threatening severe punishment for disobedience. The action was taken at the request of Great Britain.

## Petroleum

1949

*Mar. 4:* J. Paul Getty, President of Pacific Western Oil Corporation, announced that his company had obtained an oil concession covering the Saudi Arabian undivided half-interest in the 2,200-square mile Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian neutral zone. Royalty and other payments would be made in U. S. currency, reportedly at the rate of 55¢ per barrel.

*Mar. 11:* Paul G. Hoffman, Economic Co-operation Administrator, named a group of consultants to investigate and analyze factors that should be considered in determining competitive prices on shipments of Middle East oil financed by ECA. (*Foreign Commerce Weekly*, March 28, p. 11.)

The Syrian Government announced its agreement to grant a 70-year, 2,100-square mile oil concession to James W. MenHall, Syrian-born independent American operator. The agreement, which stipulated that Mr. MenHall must keep no less than three wild-

cat rigs operating continuously, one in the southern portion of his concession, provided that the Syrian Government would put up \$50,000,000, and independent oil companies in the U. S. furnish an equivalent amount. Mr. MenHall made no cash down payment, but there would be a standard royalty of 1/8th of production, with option for the Syrian Government to accept the market value or a minimum of 34¢ a bbl. gross production, whichever might be the larger. In addition to development rights, the Government gave Mr. MenHall guarantees that the 5 new pipelines planned by other companies to cross Syrian territory would be required to make available up to 30% of their capacity as common carriers for Syrian oil in case he obtained production convenient to such lines. (Press Release, *Oil Forum*, Mar. 11.)

*Mar. 15:* Consolidated Oil Refineries, Ltd. in Haifa went back under British management. Repair and overhaul of refinery plant and machinery began, with production scheduled to begin in six weeks.

# DOCUMENTS

## British Jurisdiction in the States of the Persian Gulf

Herbert J. Liebesny

THE EXPANSION of American enterprise in the sheikhdoms and sultanates of the Persian Gulf coast that are under British protection has raised for the United States a number of problems which until quite recently were of no immediate concern to its Government or people. Among them are the numerous questions involved in the jurisdiction over Americans, criminal as well as civil, in countries whose legal standards, especially as to criminal punishment, necessarily differ considerably from our own. It is therefore of practical interest to note that Great Britain has recently enacted a set of Orders in Council for the principalities in the Persian Gulf dealing with British criminal and civil jurisdiction over British subjects and, except in the case of Muscat, also over other non-Moslem foreigners.<sup>1</sup>

This assertion of British jurisdiction in the British-protected states of the Persian Gulf is nothing new. The present Orders in Council in fact replace Orders previously enacted.<sup>2</sup> However, the Orders which came into operation on April 12, 1949, have certain new features and tend to consolidate and perhaps systematize this British jurisdiction. The primary formal reason for their enactment was the coming into force of the Indian Independence Act on August 14, 1947, and the

<sup>1</sup> All these Orders were made on March 29, 1949, laid before Parliament on March 30, 1949, and came into operation on April 12, 1949. They were published as Statutory Instruments as follows: Bahrein, 1949, No. 592; Kuwait, No. 593; Muscat, No. 594; Qatar, No. 595; Trucial States, No. 596.

<sup>2</sup> For the old Orders, see Herbert J. Liebesny, "International Relations of Arabia: The Dependent Areas," *Middle East Journal*, I (1947), pp. 164-65.

necessity thereby created to sever the ties which before that date had linked the British courts in the Persian Gulf states to the Bombay courts and the Governor-General of India. In an explanatory note attached to each of the new Orders in Council the British Government succinctly stated the reasons for them, as well as the major changes made.

As an example, the text of the Note attached to the Bahrein Order is here given in full:

1. This Order-in-Council relating to Bahrein should be read with the Orders relating to Kuwait, Qatar, Muscat and the Trucial States which were made at the same time as this Order.

2. In the territory of all these States, by agreement with their rulers, His Majesty exercises jurisdiction over certain persons and property. The extent of this jurisdiction varies slightly in the different States. This jurisdiction has been exercised under Order-in-Council made for each State or the Trucial States group under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890.

3. The Orders were *mutatis mutandis* the same for each State or group of States and have a certain unity arising from the fact that the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf is His Majesty's Principal Representative and is also the Chief Judge of the Superior Court in each State or group of States.

4. Prior to 14th August, 1947, the Governor-General of India exercised a number of powers under these Orders-in-Council, and the Indian Codes were the foundation of the law applied in these territories. After the entry into force of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, it was decided that the Orders must be amended to



transfer elsewhere all powers hitherto exercised by the Governor-General of India, and this is one of the principal objects to be achieved by the present Order and similar ones made for other Persian Gulf States.

5. At the same time it was decided to make certain minor changes in the constitution of the Courts set up under the Orders and in particular to provide:—

(i) for a professional legal judge to sit in the Superior Court as assistant judge to the Political Resident;

(ii) for a suitable Court of Appeal on which professional judges would sit, chosen *ad hoc* from a panel consisting of the Judges of the High Courts of Cyprus and Kenya and members of the Bar of England, Scotland and Northern Ireland of not less than 9 years' standing.

6. Finally it was desired to provide that a case occurring in any one of the States could, when desirable, be transferred for trial in any other and that persons sentenced to imprisonment by the court in any one of the States could be removed to serve this sentence in any other of the States.

The notes attached to the other Orders are identical in all essential points.

The new Orders follow the old in extending geographically to the territories of the respective sheikhdom or sultanate, including the territorial waters, and all islands and islets being the possessions of the respective ruler, together with their territorial waters. As to persons subject to these Orders, the groups have remained essentially the same, varying slightly in the different principalities. Submitted everywhere to the British jurisdiction are, of course, British subjects in the sense of the British Nationality Act, 1948. In Kuwait, Qatar, and the Trucial States this jurisdiction extends also to non-Moslem foreigners without qualification. In Muscat, however, no jurisdiction is exercised over foreigners at all, and in Bahrein the jurisdiction concerning foreigners is restricted to those "with respect to whom the Sheikh of Bahrein has agreed with His Majesty for, or consented to, the exercise of jurisdiction by His Majesty." In Bahrein and Kuwait, furthermore, local subjects are submitted to British jurisdiction if they are "registered in the Political Agency as being in the regular service of British sub-

jects or foreigners." All cases in this latter category are, however, to be dealt with by a special procedure outlined in the respective Orders and applicable to so-called mixed cases, that is, cases involving local subjects and foreigners.

The courts established by the new Orders, which replace the former system of British courts in the area, are: the Court of the Political Agent, the Chief Court, and the Full Court. The Court of the Political Agent has jurisdiction in criminal matters of a District Magistrate and Sessions Judge, and in civil matters of a District or Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the District. The Chief Court has jurisdiction of a High Court of Judicature in criminal matters, and of a Court of Appeal for the Court of the Political Agent in civil matters. The Chief Court is composed of the Political Resident and the Assistant Judge, each of whom can sit alone. The Full Court hears appeals from the Chief Court in civil and criminal matters, and is composed of not more than three and not less than two members nominated by the Political Resident from among the following: the Political Resident, the Assistant Judge, any Judge of the High Court of Kenya, any Judge of the High Court of Cyprus, and any member of the bar of England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland of not less than 9 years' standing. From the Full Court cases can be appealed to the Privy Council in London by leave of the Full Court or of the Privy Council.

One of the important new features of these Orders in Council is the establishment of the office of Assistant Judge. This Assistant Judge occupies a much higher judicial position than the former Judicial Assistant to the Political Agent, an office eliminated by the new Orders. The Assistant Judge is to be appointed by order of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and must have held judicial office under the Crown or be a member of the Bar of England, Scotland, or Northern Ireland of at least 9 years' standing. This new office of Assistant Judge thus provides the British Chief Court in the Persian Gulf with a member who, by the terms of the statutes, must have had considerable legal experience. Should the Assistant Judge rather than the Political Resident be the one to sit in the Chief Court as



a rule, it would mean that jurisdiction in more important criminal matters and appellate jurisdiction in civil matters will, for the most part, be in the hands of a well-trained British jurist rather than a political officer who may or may not have a thorough legal training and legal experience. The composition of the Full Court likewise appears to ensure hearing of the cases by trained jurists. These new features compensate for the elimination of the right to appeal to the High Court in Bombay which was provided for by the old Orders and which, of course, is no longer feasible.

Mixed cases, that is, cases in which a local subject and a person to whom these Orders in Council apply are parties, are heard in Kuwait and Muscat by the Political Agent; in Bahrein, Qatar, and the Trucial States such cases are referred to a Joint Court, although in Bahrein the Political Agent can hear these cases if the Sheikh agrees. The Joint Court is a court composed of the Political Agent and an official appointed by the respective Sheikh. Where Joint Courts exist they can hear all cases to which a local subject and a foreigner are parties. In Kuwait and Muscat, mixed cases are restricted to those in which the local subject is the plaintiff.

In Bahrein there are two further courts, whose members are selected jointly by the Political Agent and the Sheikh of Bahrein. These are the Majlis al-Urf, a local civil court composed of four members; and the Salifah Court, which deals with local diving and marine matters, especially pearling, and which consists of one or more judges with special knowledge in these fields.

An important new feature of the Orders in Council is the provision that the jurisdiction of the Chief Court in civil and criminal matters can be exercised by the Court for any of the principalities within any of the Persian Gulf states under British control. This means that a case originating in Bahrein might be

tried in Kuwait or Qatar, or vice versa. In the same category belong the provisions that warrants issued in one principality shall constitute sufficient authority to detain a person in any of the other states. Also, prisoners convicted in one state may be sent for imprisonment into any of the other states. From a practical point of view, all these provisions will facilitate the administration of justice. Whether they are likely to cause hardship in individual cases remains to be seen. It is also an interesting question whether these new links being forged in the judicial fields may be taken as heralding closer bonds in the political field, with the possible ultimate goal of uniting these various small states in a federation under British protection.

The law to be applied by these courts is, as heretofore, the law of India, various important acts and codes being specifically enumerated in the schedule to these Orders. However, because of the change in circumstances, all Indian enactments shall be applied in the form they had on August 14, 1947. The Political Resident has retained his powers to make Regulations (so-called King's Regulations) for the peace, order, and good government of persons subject to these Orders and for other specified purposes.

While providing for certain important changes, the new Orders in Council reaffirm rather than radically alter the British judicial position in the principalities of the Persian Gulf under British protection. The pattern followed is still that of providing for extra-territorial jurisdiction by British courts which, in most cases, extends to British subjects as well as to foreigners. How far and how long these old established patterns can be and will be maintained under modern conditions, which bring an ever-increasing number of Europeans and Americans into the Persian Gulf on long-term assignments, only the future can tell.

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# ECONOMIC REVIEW

## Turkey: Problems and Progress

*Peter G. Franck*

RECENT developments in Turkey have once more pushed its economic affairs to the forefront of news from the Middle East. These developments have centered around continuing financial strains; a re-orientation of the national economic program toward agriculture; the stepping up of American aid; an improvement in the foreign trade picture; and favorable negotiations for an international loan.

### DEFICIT AND NEW TAX LAW

The Hasan Saka Cabinet fell in January 1949 over a disagreement with the National Assembly concerning the need for greater economy in the budget and for a revision of the outmoded tax law. The new Gunaltay Government on February 28 obtained approval for expenditures during 1949 of LT 1,372 million (\$490 million), which is only 2½% more than the revised 1948 expenditures. The estimated deficit, however, will be 20% greater than last year's, i.e. LT 120 million.

With the present tax laws unlikely to yield higher revenues than in 1948, and the public and business community still unwilling or unable to lend the government additional funds, it is expected that Central Bank credit will again be relied upon to bridge the budgetary gap. The continuation of inflationary financing methods fits into the trend of a creeping increase in prices and circulating currency. The cost of living index, which stood at 341 in January 1948 and at 352 in October 1948 (1937 = 100), rose to 365 in January 1949.

The new deficit focused the attention of the government and the Assembly upon the an-

tiquated taxing methods operative under the existing income tax law. Although wages, salaries, business, and professional income are subject to a graduated tax rate, an inequitably heavy share of the burden falls on wages and salaries. This comes about as a result of the tax base which, in the case of professional and business income, is the annual rental paid for the business premises rather than the actual earnings. The new legislation, which has been before the National Assembly for some time and has a fair chance of being passed before the fall, substitutes income levels for rentals, but still exempts landed property. Nevertheless, the proposed law, to be effective in 1951, promises to yield higher revenues and to be better adapted to the paying ability of the taxpayer than the one now in force.

### ECONOMIC PROGRAM

The military exigencies of the tense international situation impede the prompt realization of Turkey's economic aspirations. Yet progress is evident as the new means of external financing make themselves felt.

The five-year goals in agriculture were given highest priority by the new government of Semsettin Gunaltay, which followed that of Hasan Saka in January 1949. The targets call for an increase in the production of cereals, fats, oils, and meat of between 25% and 40% over the 1948 rate in order to supply more foodstuff for domestic consumption, more exportable products, and more raw materials for processing industries. Major government-sponsored and/or financed activities are calculated to result in an improvement in yield per *man* through mechanization and other modern techniques, and per *acre* through in-

crease in cultivated area by means of irrigation and other reclamation methods.

It is in the former domain that the recent months witnessed marked progress. The first allotment under the 1948 Marshall Plan aid was earmarked for the procurement of such agricultural machinery as tractors, tractor-drawn plows, reaper-threshers, and cultivators. By March 1949 \$11.5 million had been set aside for this purpose. A formal ceremony on May 4 marked the arrival of the first load of reaper-threshers from the U.S., and further arrivals were expected throughout the spring. Steps were being taken to channel the new implements to those farms which could use them most effectively, with small farms sharing the benefits through co-operatives.

These were encouraging signs, answering the widespread criticism in the U.S. that Turkey had too long neglected its agricultural problem, on the solution of which 80% of its people depend for their livelihood.<sup>1</sup>

In the field of mining (coal, iron ore, chrome), including allied power and transportation facilities, there has been similar progress. In April 1949, Marshall Plan aid authorities in Washington cleared procurement authorizations for nearly \$26 million worth of American equipment and machinery. Thus the way was paved for acquiring vitally needed modern extraction and transport equipment which would allow mineral development projects to pass from the blueprint stage to final programming.

#### FLOW OF AMERICAN AID

The foreign currency expenditures needed during the current year to acquire the above machinery and tools would have exceeded Turkey's normal dollar earnings from exports unless imports were pared below the socially tolerable level. The amount these earnings were supplemented by the Marshall Plan and other aid programs was revealed this spring when the Economic Cooperation Administration released its study of Turkey's international financial position, and the U.S. Department of Commerce for the first time published international debt-service "projections" for all countries which had obtained postwar credits

from the United States Government.<sup>2</sup> After a slow start, gross aid allotments under the Marshall Plan amounted to \$44.8 million as of March 31, 1949, with \$4.9 million additional aid having been proposed for the period April-June 1949. Together with previous loans from the American Export-Import Bank, and the surplus-property credits extended by the U.S. Government, Turkey's share in dollar aid (exclusive of military and relief aid) had passed the \$70 million mark as of March 31, 1949.

Two aspects of this aid flow deserve emphasis. In the first place, all but \$6.8 million had taken the form of loans. Turkey was thus one of the few countries which so far had not received any outright grants from the United States.<sup>3</sup> No doubt this was proof that U.S. financial circles had confidence in the Turkish Government and its financial resources. At the same time, voices within the U.S. Government warned that the mounting debt-service burden was expected to reach \$4 million during 1949. When added to the annual debt-service burden of about \$15 million owed in other currencies or commodities, the magnitude of payments of interest and amortization on account of foreign debts appears sizeable. The historic problem of Turkey's ability to satisfy foreign creditors' claims once more began to raise its disturbing head.

The second important aspect of the dollar aid program concerned the aforementioned \$6.8 million, which was granted on condition that Turkey in turn accord a nonreimbursable "drawing right" of the equivalent amount to Western European countries. Turkey did extend these credits to Western Germany, Greece, and Austria in order to bolster its exports to areas where it had had important markets before the war. In April it was estimated that such credits might reach \$28 million during 1949. Turkey in turn obtained drawing rights of about \$17 million from Belgium, Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom to cover its expected import deficits with these countries. The decision of the Turkish Government (first made tentatively in October 1948 and then finally in March 1949)

<sup>2</sup> See bibliographical note, p. 336.

<sup>3</sup> The others were Ireland, Iceland, Belgium, and Sweden.

<sup>1</sup> See Max W. Thornburg, "Turkey: Aid for What?" *Fortune*, Oct. 1947, p. 106ff.

thus to participate in the intra-European payments systems helped to prepare the way for the restoration of multilateral trade between Turkey and Europe and a lessened dependence on U.S. assistance.

Turkey, in granting such credits, in effect exchanges its export surplus with certain European countries for an import surplus with the dollar area financed by the Marshall Plan. At the same time, in drawing upon credits it receives from other European countries, Turkey enables these other countries to obtain "conditional aid" which otherwise would not be forthcoming. On balance, therefore, the larger the net credits extended to other European countries by Turkey, the smaller net aid received by Turkey under the Marshall Plan. Consequently, if the inter-European credits can be extended and made convertible, the dependence on American aid will be lessened. Thus, for the year ending March 31, 1949, the gross aid received by Turkey was reduced from \$44.8 million to \$38 million as a result of credits extended by Turkey to other participant countries. The aid proposed for April-June 1949 (\$4.9 million) will probably all be conditional upon Turkey's extending equivalent credits to other countries participating in the Marshall Plan.

This relation between Turkey's European trade agreements and lessened dependence on U.S. aid was overlooked by the United States Senate Committee on Finance when, during hearings in February and March 1949, it pointed to the restrictive character of the twelve bilateral agreements which Turkey had concluded in the postwar years, six of them in the first five months of 1949.

#### PROSPECT FOR ADDITIONAL LOANS

In connection with Turkey's \$730 million investment program, to extend over the five years 1948-1953, the possibilities of additional dollar credits have reached the stage of active negotiations. On the one hand the U.S. Export-Import Bank has earmarked some \$22 million for Turkey as the balance of credits previously authorized but not yet disbursed. Almost half of this sum, however, was not to be available after June 1949. The difficulty in utilizing this balance lay in singling out appropriate

projects and programing procurement in such a way as to satisfy the conditions set by the Export-Import Bank.

On the other hand, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has had a dollar loan of its own under consideration, the amount of which the Turkish Government first wished to have set at close to \$100 million. Between January and March 1949 a three-man mission of the Bank made an economic survey and on-the-spot investigation of the various industrial, hydroelectric, agricultural, and transportation projects which the Turkish Government had singled out for financing by the International Bank. The Bank itself, apparently impressed by the soundness of some of the projects, announced on April 25 that it was willing to make a moderate loan to Turkey in the near future. The size of the loan will in all probability depend on an appraisal of Turkey's over-all debtor position. Final arrangements will require time and a high degree of co-ordination, especially in the light of the Turkish Government's concurrent commitments toward other foreign creditors. Turkey seems to appreciate the problem, since a Minister of State was appointed in January to co-ordinate foreign aid, and in February an Inter-Ministerial Committee was organized to co-ordinate economic planning.

#### IMPROVEMENT IN TURKEY'S TRADE BALANCE

The considerable amount of extraordinary assistance notwithstanding, Turkey's trade balance showed noticeable improvement during November, December, January, and February, 1948-1949. The percentage of imports paid for by exports shows the following trend:

January-February 1948	50%
Average for 1948	71%
January-February 1949	81%

Part of this favorable development was undoubtedly due to the nearly \$10 million aid granted under the Marshall Plan to Western Germany, Austria, and Greece for procurement of Turkish tobacco, textiles, fats and oils, fruits and other agricultural products. But sales to the United Kingdom and the United States also increased over comparable periods a year earlier, and Washington estimates anticipate further increases for 1949-1950. Some



of the factors behind this slow return to Turkey's former favorable trade balance seem to be permanent. Consequently, the Marshall Plan administration was able to forecast a reduction of the current trade deficit from \$37 million to \$26 million by 1950. To no small extent, however, this optimistic outlook was anchored to the hope that certain institutional obstacles in Turkey to the investment of local and foreign private capital and to economic development in general would be removed.

#### NEW FREEDOM FOR PRIVATE ENTERPRISE?

Probably the most important factor determining the rate of economic development in Turkey and trade with the outside world is the government's control over investment in mining and large areas of manufacturing, as well as over exports and imports. Recently, perhaps in response to growing domestic criticism and inquiring visits by Marshall Plan and International Bank missions, the need for a clear line of demarcation between spheres of private and state economic operations has been much discussed. Declarations by various Ministers, including one by the Minister of National Economy before the Assembly, have emphasized the government's interest in opening a wider area to private business enterprise. Some actions have in fact followed: fourteen textile plants, until now operated by the state-controlled Sümer Bank, were to become partly independent by June 1, 1949. Agricultural machinery and tools, recently imported under the Marshall Plan, are to be resold to private firms which will distribute them to farmers on long-term credit. Similar signs of encouragement were extended to foreign business enterprises. Although ruling out exclusive con-

cessions in such areas as oil or chrome, Article 31 of Decree No. 13 of May 1947, now receiving wide publicity in official announcements, leaves the way open for joint enterprises in which foreign capital (through loans or direct investment) can participate on an equal footing with domestic capital. Profits and repayments of capital are transferable under guarantees which the Ministry of Finance is authorized to negotiate for enterprises considered useful for the development of the country. Renewed emphasis which Cemil Barlas, Minister of Commerce and Economy, placed in March on opportunities for foreign capital, coincided with the preparation of arrangements in the United States to facilitate capital exports to underdeveloped areas.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

### Recent Books on International Relations

*Harry N. Howard*

A GENERATION ago the Middle East, or Near East as it was then generally termed, was relatively well served by studies on international relations. The pattern of diplomatic progression in the nineteenth century was clear, although the problems posed were numerous and knotty. The Ottoman Empire was dying, and the struggle among the powers to determine the disposition of its component parts, as they fell off one by one, gave the student of diplomatic affairs a wide scope for his investigations. The problem of the Turkish Straits, of the Baghdad railway, of Egypt and the Suez Canal — all these and many more received their due attention within the framework of an aggressive European imperialism. On the other hand, there was little attempt, partly because of the language barrier, partly because of the paucity of native scholars, and partly because of the absence or inaccessibility of primary material with which to work, to view problems of the area through Middle Eastern eyes. Yet it should be recalled that the Republic of Turkey and the Arab states were among the later nations to emerge as the Ottoman Empire disappeared, and the problems therefore deserve consideration from this point of view.

Since World War I, the projected pattern of development in the Arab world has become much more confused. The ambiguity of aim in the mandate solution of the Arab portions of the Ottoman Empire, particularly in regard to Palestine, is partly responsible; the reshuffling of power balances during and since World War II has also played its part. Also of

weight is the rise of native nationalisms, bringing independence to almost all of the countries of the Middle East and thus creating a new factor in the international relations of the area. It is no longer sufficient for Great Britain and France, let us say, to decide between themselves what they shall do about the Suez Canal or the Levant States — there are Egyptians and Syrians and Lebanese whose views demand considerable attention.

This rapidly shifting state of affairs is reflected in the postwar books that discuss in some fashion the international relations of the Middle East. Many only touch on the subject as incidental to the currently more popular aim of describing the background and recent development of a particular country; others treat of diplomatic problems limited in time and space; none thus far has dared approach them with a broad, frontal attack. There is naturally a lag between the event and its analysis by the thoughtful student because of the absence of complete data and the difficulty of assessing developments at close range. But documentary material is never complete, and in the meantime the problems of political relations in the Middle East are assuming such vital importance that it is time scholars shed themselves of some of their scruples regarding so-called "academic" standards. Some of the gaps are indeed slowly being filled, but the few sound works now available only serve to emphasize what remains to be done.

For a general historical approach to the international relations of the Middle East in convenient form we have George E. Kirk, *A*

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*Short History of the Middle East from the Rise of Islam* (Washington, 1949). At once more compressed and sketchy than Carl Brockelmann, *A History of the Islamic Peoples* (New York, 1947), it is far more readable and better balanced on the period since World War I. There is as yet no work by a Middle Easterner himself discussing the role of the Middle East, especially of the Arab world, in international affairs. George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (Philadelphia, 1939), is still the classic work on the rise of that nationalism which is today one of the major factors in the picture. From it one gains an insight into the Arab reaction to the peace settlement after World War I but little on the inter-war period. Albert Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon* (London, 1947) goes further in analyzing the Arab, or at least the Syrian and Lebanese, mentality and attitude toward the mandatory regime as it developed in practice. Neither work, however, is recent enough to touch upon the response of the Arab states to the challenge of independence—to assess how adequately they have measured up in the arena of international politics. An objective analysis of the role that the Arab states played during World War II, in view of the extensive propaganda on the subject, would provide a most illuminating and valuable study; so also a discussion of the Arabs' actions and attitudes in the United Nations, where their share of the spotlight has attested the importance of the Arab world in international affairs. And again, one would welcome an authoritative account of the origins, development, structure, and policies of the Arab League as it has thus far evolved.

Studies of the development of nationalism in each of the countries of the Middle East need to be made, although their general pattern of evolution is fairly common. In particular, the impact of the West upon the East, the interplay of the cultural forces involved, and the role of the Moslem faith should be basically considered. The work of H. A. R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago, 1947), is a convenient guide to one aspect of this development, as is Owen Lattimore, *The Situation in Asia* (Boston, 1949), although its pages on the Middle East, properly speaking, are few and sketchy indeed. Similarly, while F. S. C.

Northrop, *The Meeting of the East and West: An Inquiry Concerning World Understanding* (New York, 1946) has provided the general framework of the kind of analysis that is desirable, it touches little on the Moslem East. A work written in very popular vein which purports to give one an insight into the development of Islam in the world today, and which treats especially of the Middle East, is that of Zaki Ali, *Islam in the World* (Lahore, India, 1938). That basic studies of such matters are fundamental to any consideration of international problems is, of course, self-evident today, although governments, it would appear, have been vitally concerned with cultural problems and relations only during the postwar years. In the case of the United States, the appointment of both public affairs officers and cultural affairs officers to many posts in the Middle East is an earnest of a very fundamental interest.

If recent books ill-serve the international relations of the Arabs, the same may be said of books taking the broad view of the policies and interests of outside powers, in particular the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The Kirk volume does indeed contain useful chapters surveying especially the development of British and Soviet policies in the Middle East, and a brief chapter on "The Western Powers and the Middle East Today." In the case of the United States, E. A. Speiser, *The United States and the Near East* (Cambridge, 1947), is the only attempt to treat of fundamentals. But because of its brevity it necessarily contains serious lacunae; moreover, it raises numerous unsolved problems as to the relation between U. S. and British interests, especially in regard to Palestine. The newly-published book by Raymond F. Mikesell and Hollis B. Chenery, *Arabian Oil: America's Stake in the Middle East* (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1949), presents a case study in American foreign economic policy. It should be read in connection with Herbert Feis, *Seen from E. A.* (New York, 1947), which lays bare in fascinating detail the labor pains that attend the birth—or stillbirth—of an American "policy." American activity and policy in Iran has received certain but in no sense adequate attention in Arthur C.

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Millsbaugh, *Americans in Persia* (Washington, 1949). The story of U. S. relations with the Republic of Turkey remains to be told, in spite of the close relationship of the two countries at this time. The need might have been satisfactorily filled before long but for the untimely death of Walter L. Wright, Jr., who was engaged in the preparation of just such a volume for the American Foreign Policy library, in which E. A. Speiser's book on the Near East has already appeared.

There is still no well-balanced and detailed study of British policy and interests in the Middle East as a whole, despite M. V. Seton-Williams, *Britain and the Arab States: A Survey of Anglo-Arab Relations, 1920-1948* (London, 1948). No title at all can be mentioned as providing a connected story of the development and course of Soviet policy, its primary motivation, and the techniques employed, although such a study is a basic requirement to any real understanding of the interplay of international forces. We do have, of course, the recent work of Raymond Lacoste, *La Russie Soviétique et la Question d'Orient: La Pousée Soviétique vers les Mers Chaudes Méditerranée et Golfe Persique* (Paris, 1946), which briefly covers Soviet-Turkish relations, the question of the Straits, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, the Kurds, and Iran. However, the author was unable to make use of recent diplomatic "revelations" and he hardly touches upon the more basic questions of fundamental aims and techniques of Soviet diplomacy in the Middle East as a whole.

While documentary materials on which to base a thorough study of big power policies are still fragmentary, several collections are becoming increasingly useful as they develop continuity. Outstanding among these is the very voluminous documentation of the United Nations. A convenient guide to bibliographies of these materials may now be found in Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, *Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents* (Revised Edition, Boston, 1949), pp. 658-81. Attention should also be called to two new journals, both published by the World Peace Foundation of Boston, *Documents of International Organization*, and *International*

*Organization*, in both of which documentary material is presented. For the development of American policy in the inter-war and even the postwar period, the ever-increasing documentary volumes of the Department of State and of the World Peace Foundation series *Documents on American Foreign Policy* (Boston) are of special value. The story of American aid to Turkey is substantially documented in the various hearings and statements before Congress, and in the six *Reports to Congress on Assistance to Greece and Turkey (1947-1949)* which have been published thus far.

Of the particular international problems most in need of dispassionate and thorough study, one is tempted to pick three, because they have come so prominently into the focus of international attention: that of Palestine; that of Iranian-Russian relations; and that of Turkish-Russian relations, including the problem of the Straits.

It is clear, of course, that many of the international aspects of the Palestine problem cannot be given their proper historical setting until the archives of the Zionist Organization of America and the World Zionist Organization are opened to disinterested students. The published material available on Palestine and the serious gaps therein were set forth in J. C. Hurewitz, "Recent Books on the Palestine Problem" (*Middle East Journal*, III [1949], pp. 86-91). To the works there noted should be added F. E. Manuel, *The Realities of American-Palestine Relations* (Washington, 1949), and Hurewitz' own forthcoming *The Road to Partition*,<sup>1</sup> which details the play of international forces on Palestine from 1936 to the establishment of Israel in the spring of 1948.

Books dealing with Iran to appear in the United States since the war have all been of the survey type: William S. Haas, *Iran* (New York, 1946); Elgin Groseclose, *Introduction to Iran* (New York, 1947); and Donald N. Wilber, *Iran: Past and Present* (Princeton, N. J., 1948). Each has touched only incidentally and incompletely on the international position in which Iran finds itself. The richest available source of materials for a study of

<sup>1</sup> Tentative title.



the interplay of U. S., British, and Soviet interests there since the beginning of World War II is unquestionably the documentation of the United Nations, although it is by no means exhaustive. Indeed, the fact that both the Palestine problem and the Iran crisis of 1946 have deeply involved the United Nations suggests the need for a study of international problems in the Middle East from the view point of Lake Success, evaluating the role which the United Nations has played in their evolution.

We are rather uniquely endowed with documentary sources on Turkey's role in the international picture, particularly during the war, because of the peculiar position the country occupied between the Scylla and Charybdis of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have published captured German documents — primarily aimed at throwing the Russo-German alliance of 1939–1941 into the desired relief — which furnish a great deal of material on the position of Turkey and the Straits. The Soviet publication, *Germanskaia Politika v Turtsii, 1941–1943* (Moscow, 1946), is now available in a French translation, *La Politique Allemande, 1941–1943. Turquie. Documents Secrets du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères d'Allemagne* (Paris, 1946). The collection contains but 36 selected documents published at the very moment that the Soviet Government was actively pursuing the problem of the Straits, and should be read in conjunction with the Department of State's *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941* (Washington, 1948). Further material is to be found in the documents published by the Office of United States Chief of Counsel for prosecution of Axis Criminality, *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, Vols I–VIII (Washington, 1946), which, despite their editing, will richly reward any student who takes the trouble to consult them. Similarly, there is much material to be dug out of the publications of the Nuremberg trials.

When this documentation, which during the course of the next several years will be considerably amplified, is put together with such personal accounts as *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York, 1948); Winston Churchill,

*The Gathering Storm and Their Finest Hour* (Boston, 1948; 1949); and Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York, 1948), there emerges a very interesting and important, if as yet incomplete, story regarding Turkey's role in the war, and in particular the idea of bringing it in as an active belligerent. The reluctance of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to fall in with the plan is indicated in the Sherwood volume. It would be most interesting to have a thorough probing of the Soviet position on this point, for there are indications that the Soviet Government, too, was somewhat reluctant to have Turkey assume an active part in the conflict. A very preliminary examination of this subject has been made in Harry N. Howard, "Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey during World War II" (*Department of State Bulletin*, No. 472, July 18, 1948, pp. 63–78), but a more detailed study is certainly required.

Material is now also available for a somewhat longer-range approach to Soviet-Turkish relations, which even for an understanding of the present phase should go back at least to the turning point in 1936, the year of the signing of the Montreux Convention on the Straits. A convenient guide to this material now exists in Jane Degras, *Calendar of Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 1917–1941* (New York, 1948). Reference should also be made to L. B. Namier, *Diplomatic Prelude, 1938–1939* (New York, 1948); A. Rossi, *Deux Ans d'Alliance Germano-Soviétique* (Paris, 1949); and the semi-official Soviet version of diplomatic history, V. Potemkin, ed., *Istoriia Diplomatii* (Moscow, 1946, ff.). A brief statement of the Turkish interpretation of the problem is presented by Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak in his article, "Turkey Faces the Soviets" (*Foreign Affairs*, XXVII [1949], pp. 449–61).

As for the more particular problem of the Turkish Straits, it is at present in abeyance although the principle of a revision of the Montreux Convention was accepted by all the major powers concerned and by Turkey in 1945–1946. If the problem re-emerges, it will probably do so in a truly international rather than bilateral or even multilateral framework, and the United Nations may be called

to play a role in the problem. Such being the case, Erik Brül, *International Straits* (2 vols., London, 1947) is a basic work which, however, carries the story only to the beginning of World War II. The work of André N. Mandelstam, *La Politique Russe d'Accès à la Méditerranée au XXe Siècle* (Hague, 1934), is one of the genuinely basic works on the subject, too often neglected by interested students. James T. Shotwell and Francis Deak, *Turkey at the Straits* (New York, 1940) remains the most convenient guide to the problem, but is far too brief to explore all its ramifications. A full analysis of the Montreux Conference and resulting Convention of 1936 was prepared by D. A. Routh for Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1936* (London, 1937). A brief review of the more recent developments is provided in Harry N. Howard, *The Problem of the Turkish Straits* (Washington, 1947), but a full discussion of their significance in the war and postwar periods remains to be explored.

There are, of course, many other problems which require examination. The whole problem of Anglo-Egyptian relations, for example, is one of these; it will be recalled that the

question of treaty relationships came before the Security Council in 1947. Similarly, an analysis bringing the problem of the Suez Canal down to date would be of use. Sir Arnold T. Wilson, *The Suez Canal* (London, 1933) provides an interesting background study, along with earlier works, while André Siegfried, *Suez, Panama et les Routes Maritimes Mondiales* (Paris, 1945), attempts to put the problem within its world setting.

From a consideration of the problems now before us, one naturally turns to those likely to emerge in the future. It is into this field that serious writers fear most to tread; and yet for the economic and political planner, for the men whose job it is to maintain the initiative in international relations in order to block their diversion into chaotic paths that might lead to revolution or war, a projection into the future is the most valuable contribution a serious student can make. In particular, a volume doing for U. S. interests and policy in the Middle East as a strategic area in international affairs what William Reitzel, *The Mediterranean: Its Role in America's Foreign Policy* (New York, 1948) has done for the Mediterranean would be welcomed by all.

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## GENERAL

*In Search of a Future: Persia, Egypt, Iraq, Israel*, by Maurice Hindus. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1949. 270 pages. \$3.00.

The title of Maurice Hindus' book — *In Search of a Future* — attests to the constructive character of the author's approach. There is also sympathy in his writing, for Mr. Hindus is as anxious to uncover a solution to the ills of Middle East countries as are the more enlightened men of the area to alleviate

the sufferings and frustrations of their own peoples. When combined with Mr. Hindus' skill at vivid reporting, the result is a book which is not only readable but well worth reading.

The author writes on Iran, Egypt, and more briefly Iraq, as countries still groping for a solution to their social and economic problems; and on Israel as a Middle East community which has already found many of the answers. He argues from the thesis that the future of the area is to be found in its land, and in the well-being of its rural population. His atten-

tion is therefore turned in this direction, to the agricultural and social ills of the Middle Eastern peoples rather than to their politics and high finance. Hindus' description of rural life in the differing sections of Iran is particularly well done, for he seems to catch the spirit of the Iranian rather better than that of the Arab, which he treats with fairness but without enthusiasm or mark of appreciation. Hindus has also realized that rural economy is dictated in large part by what goes on in the capital cities, and his masterly word pictures of Tehran and Cairo set in focus the life of the dirt farmers of the provinces.

The assumption that a regeneration of the Middle East must be founded in the land and the people who work it can hardly be disputed. Mr. Hindus is equally accurate in putting his finger on the problems that face the reformer: the obscurantism of the mullahs; the dead hand of absentee landlordism; the imperfect understanding of economic truths; and the debilitating effect of malnutrition and disease, which is far more responsible for the apathy of the peasant than any inherent "laziness."

Somewhat in awe of the physical achievement of the Jewish immigrants to Palestine, Hindus looks for an answer to all the Middle East in the solutions which they have found. In doing so, however, he is fully aware of the much more difficult task facing the native Moslem populations. A priori, the Jews who come to Palestine come as pioneers, torn by violent experience from previous life-patterns, and thus mentally prepared for radical experiment. This spirit has been fostered by Jewish institutions, notably the Histadruth, or labor federation, which has exerted a dominant influence over the social development of the rural community. The native populations, on the other hand, have little desire to divest themselves of their cultural tradition; indeed, they could accomplish this only through violent revolution, with incalculable results. The solution for them must be a process of selecting what is good in their own society and building upon that, shedding the rest, much as a butterfly struggles and finally frees itself from the cocoon. The social pattern which Israel has developed is therefore ill-suited to the other countries of the Middle East; but its *physical*

achievement has demonstrated what can be accomplished. If the Israeli can do it there is no basic reason why the Arab or Irani cannot.

Because of his avoidance of things political, Mr. Hindus underrates the obstacles in the way of utilizing the Israeli experiment as a blueprint for the Arab countries. The very fact that it is the Palestine Jews who have shown the way to coax more abundant crops from the earth, have improved the productivity of livestock and exploited such subsidiary sources of income as bee keeping and cottage industry conditions the Arab against following the same lines. Mr. Hindus does point out however, that the Middle Eastern countries must find their own answers to their problems; that they are no longer willing to be led about by foreign mentors — with whom they would class the Israelis. The Moslem East, to be won to the West, must be sold the *ideas* of the West, not merely its goods and services. Likewise, if the Soviet Union can sell its ideas first, the pattern of the Middle East will evolve in its direction rather than in ours. Herein lies the importance to the world of the Middle East's search for a future.

HARVEY P. HALL

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*The Mediterranean: Its Role in America's Foreign Policy*, by William Reitzel. New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1948. 195 pages. \$2.75.

Thanks to the recent war and its aftermath, the United States has at length become a Mediterranean power, and is presently faced with the trying task of developing a Mediterranean policy consistent with the national interest. This is Reitzel's central theme, which he develops dispassionately, brilliantly, forcefully, and convincingly. One takes no serious risk in venturing the opinion that this little volume will long remain a basic guide to the study of American Mediterranean interests.

Although the concept is not new, Reitzel quite properly lays stress upon the fact that the Mediterranean for policy purposes must be considered as a region and not as the sum of its diverse parts. Geography has imposed a

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unity which the handiwork of man has not shattered, and, at the same time, has made it a region which is peculiarly sensitive to the power transformations round about it. This is a simple and elementary fact, but one which nevertheless appears to be difficult to grasp. Whenever the balance of power on the European continent has been deranged, the impact upon the Mediterranean has always been pronounced. A shift in the center of world power to Russia and to the Western Hemisphere similarly has had repercussions of great magnitude. The reason is to be found in the fact that the Mediterranean, while of vital strategic importance for causes which vary according to the times, is not in itself a center from which organized local power can operate effectively. It is devoid of many basic resources, with the notable exception of oil, and it is culturally and politically fragmented. Hence it becomes the object of external power interests, and its various peoples seek to accomplish their own immediate objectives by exploiting the opportunities created by power transformation. What happens on the Balkan littoral, or in Spain, or in Italy, or in the African colonies, or in Palestine, in response to major power alterations, is therefore immediately felt everywhere throughout the region.

Because of this peculiar situation, the United States, which is slowly groping its way about the Mediterranean without a background of Mediterranean experience, must learn that it cannot have a policy for Palestine, or for Greece, or Turkey, or Italy, or Spain which is not cast in terms of a broader, more comprehensive Mediterranean policy. For the United States, as Reitzel maintains, the Mediterranean is important not so much for economic as for strategic and political reasons. It is a region to be "used" for the fulfillment of United States world policy, which is international security and ordered peace; but to be "used," it is essential that there be tranquillity among the Mediterranean peoples and that they have reason to feel good will toward the United States. To cast our lot with one group in a political struggle against another when the price is likely to be alienation of many of those whose co-operation we shall need, scarcely appears to be good statesman-

ship. This is not to say that in the presence of a local issue a policy adapted to the local situation is to be avoided; it is to say, rather, that any "local" policy must be brought within the framework of a broader "regional" policy which, in turn, is keyed to United States world policy.

To be "used," whether for the purpose of containing an adversary or for the purpose of developing a new balanced power system on the continent, the Mediterranean region will require from the United States sympathetic and constructive statesmanship. Its economic and social problems and, above all, those arising from enormous population pressures upon restricted resources, must be faced, and measures must be employed to help alleviate them. This is not an obligation but a matter of sound policy for the United States, and it suggests that for a long time to come we shall continue to be immersed in Mediterranean affairs.

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*Arabs, Oil and History*, by Kermit Roosevelt.  
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949.  
271 pages. \$3.50.

Kermit Roosevelt is a young man possessed of charm, intelligence, wit, curiosity, and energy. He has employed all these qualities in his investigations in the Middle East, and he has applied them in committing to paper his knowledge and experience of the area. The end product is a book that is more intimate and entertaining than most of the ponderous and propagandistic volumes on the same subject that lately have appeared in such profusion. One is, of course, inclined to weigh Mr. Roosevelt's book against others recently read, and my conclusion is that it is certainly more readable than the rest, and that it has more validity than most.

Although Mr. Roosevelt is nominally an historian by trade, he does not approach his subject with undue solemnity. He has an eye for color and an ear for anecdote. The reader wonders at first where Mr. Roosevelt is leading, for his book opens with a series of essays and vignettes that seem to have no particular



relationship to each other and no great profundity of purpose. At the end, however, one realizes that Mr. Roosevelt, in his casual way, has revealed a great deal about the character and spirit of the Middle East. This kind of knowledge is important to an understanding of an area which, as Mr. Roosevelt suggests, is truly foreign. Too many Western writers in reporting back from the East use terms which give the impression that Easterners are very much like Westerners except for the color of their skins and the cut of their clothes. Mr. Roosevelt makes it clear that even the supposedly rigid doctrine of communism does not mean the same thing in an Eastern context that it does in a Western.

Being a man with great curiosity and the energy to pursue where his curiosity leads, Mr. Roosevelt gives the impression of having seen everybody and everything. His publishers inform prospective buyers that he has studied the Middle East as an historian, State Department representative, intelligence officer, and correspondent for American magazines. He obviously has made good use of opportunities afforded to him by all those roles. Even King Ibn Saud's harem does not escape his attention; being inadmissible there himself, he sent his wife to report.

Throughout Mr. Roosevelt writes with a pungency and humor that are rare in the treatment of so solemn a subject. He describes the performance of the United States in the Middle East as resembling that of "a comic juggler, a ventriloquist, a ventriloquist's dummy, a somnambulist, or a real-life missionary who suddenly finds himself plunked down before Broadway footlights playing opposite Tallulah Bankhead in *Rain*." Anyone who has observed the gyrations of American policy in the Middle East will appreciate that graphic description. Sometimes, however, Mr. Roosevelt's flippancy is jarring. It makes the book seem unnecessarily frivolous where frivolity is not intended. At times, too, Mr. Roosevelt seems to be writing a Cairo gossip column instead of a political commentary. He tells, for example, the story of the Belgian woman who was expelled from Egypt within 24 hours for offering an insult to the country. That story is a characteristic piece of

gossip in that there are several versions of it, and no one seems to know exactly what the true facts are.

With more frankness than most writers, Mr. Roosevelt relates the common talk about King Farouk of Egypt. His daring suggests that he has no interest in returning to Egypt while Farouk is on the throne. Not only in the case of King Farouk, but on other subjects as well, Mr. Roosevelt writes with a bluntness and impartiality that is notable in a man who, as he himself says, is considered to be a "friend" of the Arabs.

The author will get no thanks from the Arabs, as he is well aware, for his exposure of their weaknesses. But the Arabs should be grateful for the effort that he has made to explain them to the West, to emphasize their importance, and to persuade the United States to adopt a purposeful policy in the area. "Because of Palestine," Mr. Roosevelt writes, "we have no coherent policy for the Middle East." Mr. Roosevelt's most serious aim, as he makes clear at the end of *Arabs, Oil and History*, is to persuade the American reader of the necessity of coherence, and to suggest broadly what the aim of a United States policy might be — to defeat chaos and war, and to help the peoples of the Middle East to become healthy world citizens.

CLIFTON DANIEL  
London, England.

*Arabian Oil: America's Stake in the Middle East*, by Raymond F. Mikesell and Hollis B. Chenery. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1949. 197 pages. \$3.50.

Much has been written about the petroleum resources of the Middle East; yet their geological and physical extent, as well as their potentiality for continued expansion, are factors that still remain difficult to comprehend. For example, when one considers that there are a thousand oil wells in the United States for every well drilled in the Middle East it is difficult to appreciate that the proven reserves in the former are only two-thirds of the reserves in the latter. The American petro-

leum industry well remembers the discovery of the extensive East Texas oilfield with reserves estimated at 5 billion barrels. Yet how many of us realize that in Kuwait, on the Persian Gulf, there is one oilfield which with some two dozen wells has a proven reserve of over 11 billion barrels — nearly half the total in the entire United States?

*Arabian Oil* is introduced with a brief review of the discovery of oil in the Middle East, and of the growing interest which the United States now has in that area. The authors then go on to devote their chief attention to United States foreign petroleum policy, and to make comprehensive suggestions as to its betterment. Whether we agree with their conclusions or not, one's genuine interest is aroused, and it is from this standpoint that *Arabian Oil* makes its greatest contribution to our understanding of Middle Eastern problems.

At the present time the oil resources of Middle Eastern countries are in the process of rapid development. It is estimated that capital investments in the five years ending in 1953 will approximate 2 billion dollars. When production reaches its scheduled 2 million barrels per day in that year, the direct revenue to the governments of Arabian countries will be in excess of 150 million dollars per year. The problem thus created, more particularly in respect to the small principalities on the Persian Gulf, is one involving the proper channeling of the funds accruing from oil revenues.

Unquestionably, this responsibility rests to a large extent upon the governments of the Western countries, whose nationals are developing the oil concessions. Their advice and assistance in the potential economic advancement of these areas is a matter of great importance. This problem is touched upon briefly in *Arabian Oil*, but could have been developed to a far greater extent. To handle such a problem adequately and satisfactorily requires a high type of diplomatic judgment and technical skill. Agricultural development, transportation, health and sanitation problems are all involved. The need of assistance is immediate, and adequate local native talent is almost entirely lacking.

In the development of the petroleum resources of the Persian Gulf oilfields, Messrs.

Mikesell and Chenery advocate a comprehensive international agreement, and specifically the ratification of the Anglo-American Oil Agreement as a point from which to start. It is noteworthy that they prefer agreements which provide for the voluntary carrying out of recommendations to the establishment of a world petroleum authority. In this respect *Arabian Oil* voices the general attitude of the American petroleum industry, although the suggestion that such an agreement should be subordinated to the International Trade Organization or the Economic and Social Council would not find the same amount of sympathetic consideration.

CHARLES B. RAYNER

American Independent Oil Company  
Washington, D.C.

*Paiforce: The Official Story of the Persian and Iraq Command, 1941-1946.* London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948. 137 pages. 5 s.

Like any official history of a segment of the last war, this book is bound to disappoint some. Not even his Majesty's Stationery Office can completely cover the Paiforce (Persia and Iraq Force) area during the period 1941-46 in 137 pages. Yet in this brief account is packed the story of a part of World War II that has received little attention from the historians or strategists but nevertheless ranks among its most important holding and supply operations.

The importance of the area is emphasized early in the narrative with the words: "In April 1941 the Germans invaded Greece. The German drive for Iraq had begun." To those of us who watched German and Italian planes over Iraqi skies in May 1941, this was only too clear. To the rest of the world it was an interlude overshadowed by events elsewhere. Yet the Axis drive for domination of the Middle East came closer to success in Iraq in 1941 than at El-Alamein in 1942.

On the credit side must also be placed the style and presentation of the unknowns who ghosted this book, for it is unquestionably well written. It is also welcome to see some account other than Somerset De Chair's much heralded

*The Golden Carpet*, which purported to describe the campaign in Iraq. The chapter on "Crisis in Iraq" describes many of the events surrounding the Rashid Ali coup d'état that have not been previously published — and it must be remembered that this is an "official account."

On the debit side must be placed the obvious lack of attention to the American effort in the period described. When the official history of the American Persian Gulf Command is published, it is hoped that it will be more charitable to the British effort than the "Paiforce" account is toward the American. United States participation in the Persian Gulf operations started when General Wheeler's mission arrived in Iraq in 1941. His Chief of Staff, Col. Don Shingler, took over and worked long and hard when Wheeler went on to build the Lido road. Col. Gillies, a railroad expert, died in the crash of a Russian plane in 1942. Major Troxler labored over the Khorramshahr docks. Thousands of other Americans were in the area before the end of the year. Yet it is not until the last 18 pages of this book that we find any mention of an important U. S. effort — the taking over of the Iranian Railways by PGC under Major General Connolly.

GORDON MATTISON  
Department of State.

## AFGHANISTAN

*An American Engineer in Afghanistan*, by A. C. Jewett. Edited by Marjorie Jewett Bell. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949. 328 pages, 58 photographs. \$5.00.

A. C. Jewett was employed from 1911 to 1918 by Habibullah Khan, Amir and absolute despot of Afghanistan, to install a hydroelectric plant for the capital, Kabul. On the basis of similar installations Jewett had already made in India, he had thought that this assignment would take from one to two years, since "one cannot estimate time in the East." However, he had reckoned without knowledge of the innumerable difficulties confronting anyone trying to get something accomplished in Afghanistan, where all equipment had to be trans-

ported by camels or hauled by elephant carts along rough roads and over high mountain passes; where labor was so unskilled that even after thirty years a "mechanic" never knew "whether a nut was tightened by turning it right or left," and so unwilling that it became necessary to "average about a thrashing a day for insubordination"; where nothing could be procured without a personal order from the Amir, a process which often took several months.

Throughout his eight years in Afghanistan, Jewett wrote long, detailed letters to his small niece in the United States which described from day to day everything that could be of possible interest in his own life or in the lives of the Afghans around him. Many of these letters have now been edited by his niece and collected into one volume, with photographs taken for the most part by Jewett, and with excerpts from his diaries and journals to fill in the gaps between his letters. The result is a fascinating volume which, unlike many so-called travel books, has the great advantage of a real framework, of a beginning and an end. It is the tale of the building of the power station at Jabul-us-Siraj, and the reader finds himself following the slow construction and completion of that station as he would the development of a plot or of a character in a novel.

Jewett's ability to note details is that of a trained engineer; his style is pleasing and very readable. Possessed of a delightful sense of humor, he has filled his letters with anecdotes and incidents which make entertaining reading and serve to heighten his descriptions of the composite Afghan character. Unfortunately, no single individual in his letters — with the possible exception of the Amir — stands out as a real, three-dimensional personality. His descriptions, however, cover almost every phase of Afghan life, from the way Afghans eat with their hands to the way they irrigate their land from underground canals, from the way they keep grapes all winter by packing them in cotton to the way they repair leaks in their roofs by merely adding another layer of mud. Anyone who has visited Kabul, even recently, will be able to find somewhere within this book a detailed description of al-

most any Afghan custom or habit that he may have noticed himself, plus many more — and he will be amazed to see how very little has changed in the last thirty years. Also — unless he has come to know some of the more likeable and trustworthy Afghans from the distant corners of the country — he will wonder, as will the reader, just how much change the “new era” mentioned in the preface of this book can bring about in the lives and character of the inhabitants. It is not surprising that a note of hopelessness and futility seems to creep into Jewett’s last notes and letters; rather to be marveled at is the patience and understanding of a man who for eight long years “worked with [Afghans] and slept in their homes, dined with them Afghan fashion, doctored them, and tried to educate them.”

ROBERT L. ALLEN  
Robert College  
Istanbul, Turkey

## INDIA

*The New India*, by Sir Atul Chandra Chatterjee. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1948. 201 pages, maps. 8s 6d.

There are many indications that a promising period for both Pakistan and the Union of India is at hand; indeed, the latter state is on its way to becoming the leader and spokesman for South East Asia. It is imperative, therefore, that the average American know more about India and its peoples than he has in the past.

Here is a modest little volume, simply written, that in many respects can serve as an admirable introduction to contemporary India. The author is an eminent Indian with a distinguished record of public service. As an historian he is well known, being the joint author with W. H. Moreland of *A Short History of India*. The book under review contains brief but informative chapters on such topics of basic importance as geography, religions, social structure, languages, industries, and education. The account of Indian administration is particularly noteworthy for its clear exposition of the structure of government before independence. The problem of defense is usefully outlined in reference to such topics

as the age-old frontier problem, the relation of defense expenditures to the budget, and the amazing expansion of India’s fighting services during World War II. The chapter on population and health gets down to fundamentals: before a full life can be enjoyed by the masses in either of the two new dominions, there must be a fresh approach to such problems as population pressure, food deficits, and the low state of public health.

Unlike many works on Indian affairs, this little volume eschews controversy: the author in his long public career was inclined to be a moderate in his politics. This permits Sir Atul, in discussing the British conquest of India, to write “. . . the impulse came largely from a conviction in the minds of the British authorities that the system of law and order introduced by them would secure great moral and material benefit to the inhabitants. This belief was strengthened both by the approving attitude of their new subjects and by the misgovernment that prevailed at the time.” Such a statement would hardly jibe with the views of the average member of the Indian National Congress in recent years.

While recognizing the merit of this compact survey, it should be noted that its title, *The New India*, is misleading. The great bulk of material deals not with the “New” but with the “Old” India: the situation as it was before 1939. For the average reader trying to understand just how it was that India won its independence in 1947 and why partition took place, Sir Atul provides no explanations. Although this survey was written in the fall of 1947, just after independence was attained, enough facts were available to treat such vital matters affecting the New India as: the economic effects of partition; the emergence of Muslim nationalism under the leadership of Jinnah; the failure of the British Cabinet Mission in 1946, and its attempt to maintain the political unity of India; the problem of socio-economic reform and the possibility of the emergence of a class struggle between the Haves and the Have Nots; and the problems and dangers inherent in trying to establish Western democratic techniques in India.

T. WALTER WALLBANK  
University of Southern California



## IRAN

*Iran, Economic and Commercial Conditions*, by N. S. Roberts. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1948. 50 pages. 1s.

This volume is another in the series of *Overseas Economic Surveys* prepared for the Export Promotion Department of the Board of Trade. Mr. Roberts, the Commercial Counsellor to the British Embassy in Tehran, has had the opportunity since 1945 to become thoroughly familiar with the intricacies of foreign trade and economic conditions in Iran. He now shows unusual ability in the preparation of a clear, comprehensive, objective, and accurate summary of economic and commercial conditions.

Although the survey is intended primarily to meet the needs of British importers and exporters, it presents the lay reader with the best available factual analysis of the principal elements of Iranian economy. In the absence of accurate statistics, Mr. Roberts has been obliged to give estimates, but in those instances his judgment has been sound. His description of the practical operation of foreign trade and exchange regulations should be particularly useful to merchants. Modifications of the regulations occur from time to time, but the general trends remain as indicated.

The most interesting part of the book is Section VIII, which deals with Iran's seven-year plan for economic and social development. Mr. Roberts writes that "The need for the execution of a planned programme of economic development has for a long time been manifest, and considerable attention has been paid to this problem by Iranian economists." At the request of the Iranian Government, a preliminary survey was prepared in 1947 by the American engineering firm, Morrison-Knudsen Company, which submitted a report with recommendations. An Iranian Supreme Planning Board was then appointed to draw up an economic program with particular reference to the findings of the Morrison-Knudsen mission. The Board recommended a general program which received the approval of the Iranian Legislature on February 15, 1949. Early in 1949 the Iranian Government then engaged another American firm, Overseas Con-

sultants Incorporated, to prepare specific recommendations for the Planning Organization.

It is estimated that the program, to be spread over a seven-year period, will cost approximately \$650 million. More than one-third of the cost is to be met by royalties and other payments from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The Board has recommended that roughly one-quarter of the total expenditure be devoted to agriculture and irrigation, and a like sum to the construction of roads, railways, ports, and airdromes.

Aside from his general presentation of Iranian economy and commercial conditions, Mr. Roberts has included a brief description of the important part played by the operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, whose employees, with their families, number nearly 200,000 persons. The book also contains a valuable section devoted to social questions, including labor, wages and the cost of living, education, and health. For the guidance of visitors to Iran there is a list of public and religious holidays.

J. M. UPTON  
Department of State

## ISRAEL

*The Birth of Israel: The Drama As I Saw It*, by Jorge García-Granados. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948. 291 pages. \$3.00.

This book is the very interesting account of the personal reactions of Dr. García-Granados of Guatemala while serving as a member of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). It is evident from the title, the design and blurbs on the jacket, and from the preface that the author's sympathies are with the Zionists. And as the book is read, further proof of a warm espousal of the Zionist cause comes to light. García-Granados' book, therefore, must be judged in the light of this tendency; and in compensation the inquiring student should read some expression of a contrary opinion, such as the *Special Note by Sir Abdur Rahman, Representative of India*, in Volume II

of the UNSCOP Report, to get another view of this thorny problem which has baffled students and statesmen alike for so long.

One of the author's first observations seems highly significant: "I think the Arab Higher Committee's uncompromising attitude, its refusal to consider the possibility of any conciliatory course, was to prove a convincing argument for partition." Is it not indeed true that the Arab leaders played their cards rather badly, especially in the policy of boycotting the UN committee, and so prejudiced their case from the beginning?

But if Dr. García-Granados did not or could not learn much about the Arabs, he did learn much about the Zionists, and what he saw filled him with enthusiasm. "I visited Tel-Aviv time and again," he writes. "I fell in love with the city . . ." At Kiryat Anavim he and several companions were caught up in the enthusiasm of the Hora dance. He describes the experience thus: ". . . we, too, found ourselves in the circle, arms linked with arms, yielding ourselves to the exultant joy of that communal moment. That was my first Hora, but not my last. I was to take part in many another in Palestine." We note in contrast the unhappy discomfort felt by the author when it was necessary to meet the British socially. "At large parties," he tells us, "it was not so difficult . . . but when it came to a small dinner such as this, I always suffered an internal conflict."

With the extremist Jewish groups, however, our author did not come to terms. Although he had a very dramatic secret meeting with Menahem Beigin, head of the Irgun Zvai Leumi, the two men agreed on very little except that the British should be removed from control.

After hearing the British and Zionist cases in Palestine, the Committee repaired to Lebanon to hear the representatives of the Arab states outside of Palestine. Transjordan was not represented, and an opposition party in Lebanon somewhat friendly to the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine was uncovered; otherwise, the Arab voices were as before: Palestine must be an Arab state or there will be trouble. García-Granados left with the Committee for Geneva bearing the impression

that King Abdallah might be less uncompromising than the other Arabs.

Before attempting to find a solution, the Committee sent a sub-committee, on which García-Granados served, to visit the Jewish Displaced Persons in Europe. García-Granados gives a moving picture of their sufferings and their "mystic urge" to go to Palestine. Then follows a fascinating account of the struggle of the committee to achieve enough agreement to make a joint report rather than eleven separate reports. This was finally accomplished five minutes before the deadline — at 11:55 p.m., August 31, 1947!

The contents of the Report and its failure to win more than verbal support from the Great Powers are a matter of public record and need not be reviewed here. The importance of this book lies in the skillful presentation of the author's beliefs and feelings. He ends on a note of triumph as the State of Israel succeeds in setting itself up, backed mostly by a recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly. He is optimistic and seems to think that the success of the Zionists will ultimately bring satisfaction to the Arabs also. Whether this faith is justified only time will tell.

W. F. STINESPRING  
Duke University.

*Shalom Means Peace*, by Robert St. John.  
Doubleday and Co., 1949. 335 pages. \$2.95.

In the foreword to his book author St. John states: "The words that follow are not an attempt to pass judgment on the rights and wrongs which have been committed in Palestine. This is not the report of an expert on Arab-Zionist affairs."

St. John's book clearly demonstrates the truth of the second statement, but unfortunately does not keep the promise of the first. While proving himself indeed no expert on Palestine, he presumes the prerogatives of an expert in passing judgment — most biased and unbalanced judgment.

The publisher's blurb on the jacket proclaims St. John an expert reporter. In the book, however, St. John commits some un-

forgivable journalistic sins: he neglects to quote his sources; he has failed to check his stories. To be fair, this criticism is not valid for the entire book. It does contain a vivid and disinterested account of the *Altalena* incident — a good reporting job, as is also an interview with Menachim Beigin, leader of the terrorist Irgun. But elsewhere, for the most part, St. John's verbose emotionalism is propaganda, not reporting. He is sentimentally pro-Zionist, vitriolically anti-British, and accepts without investigation the lumping of all Arabs into traditional feudal categories. As a matter of fact, St. John accepts almost everything without investigation. He is excited to discover, for example, that *shalom* means peace. He does not discover that *salaam* also means peace, and that Arabs have been using it as a greeting for hundreds of years.

St. John found Israel no "land of silent people." Everybody he meets appears to be on a talking jag, and St. John records all of their chatter, regardless of whether it is accurate or even interesting. Sometimes he does not even bother to put his dubious assertions in quotation marks. For example, he says flatly that "it was definitely established" that the British were responsible for the Ben Yehuda Street and Palestine Post explosions, but neglects to mention by whom it was established or how. He finds a few Arabs in Nazareth to tell him that things are much better since Israel took over. However, he does not bother to find out who these Arabs are, what their political connections, why they make such statements, or what the majority of Arabs believe.

He accepts as gospel the allegations of his Israeli friends (without checking with Arab or impartial sources) that the Arabs fled Haifa, Jaffa, and other Jewish-won areas because of radio propaganda from Cairo and Beirut; that Arab Legion guns desecrated Notre Dame de France, but Israeli troops desecrated nothing. He gives a tear-jerking story of two Jewish orphans killed in an Egyptian air raid over Tel Aviv, but writes nothing whatever of the massacre of Arab children at Dayr Yassin.

To anyone who has been in Israel, some of St. John's enthusiasms are understandable. It is impossible not to admire the determination and spirit of the new nation, or to be impressed

by the fervent patriotism, even fanaticism, shining in the eyes of its youth as they march through the streets of Tel Aviv. But it is utterly contrary to the precepts of "expert reporting" to be carried away into mawkish partisanship. So impressionable and gullible has St. John shown himself that one cannot help wondering if the author might not have produced exactly the same sort of "schmalztz" from the opposite point of view had he visited Cairo, Amman, Beirut, and the Old City instead of Tel Aviv, Haifa, and the New Jerusalem.

PEGGY POOR  
New York, N.Y.

*The Palestine Economist Annual, 1948.* Jerusalem: The Palestine Economist, 1949. 102 pages. \$6.50.

This publication is the first of such annual volumes to be issued by a Jewish economic monthly. Published in English, it was originally intended to cover the year 1947, but owing to the dislocation caused by the recent war in Palestine, its publication was delayed and it now includes much material for 1948 as well. This annual thus mirrors the transitional stage through which the country was passing as the Mandate died and the State of Israel was born in May 1948. Although several of the contributors take the familiar line that the British ruined the country (just as the British argued when referring to their predecessors, the Turks), it is interesting to note that three of the articles are by former members of the Mandatory Administration: the Government Statistician, the General Manager of the Palestine Railways, and the Director of Civil Aviation. This co-operation is perhaps significant and may portend even wider co-operation between Israel and Great Britain, which, after all, is still Israel's best customer. The remaining 34 contributors are all Jewish residents of Israel, most of them leading figures in the world of Palestinian agriculture, industry, housing, trade, transport, finance, banking or insurance, which comprise the sections into which the *Annual* is divided.

For a small country like Israel, the wealth

of economic talent is amazing. Combining immense energy and courage and a positive genius for improvisation in emergencies, Palestinian Jewish economists constantly have criticized the staid and cautious 19th century economic policies of the British Mandatory Administration. Dr. Bonné, the Director of the Jewish Agency's Economic Research Institute in Jerusalem, in one of the introductory articles points out that the Mandate for Palestine was drafted before the idea of a "controlled economy" became fashionable.

The volume is one of the first comprehensive economic publications to issue from Palestine since the State of Israel took charge of its own destiny. It is thus important as an indication of the economic policies to be followed by the new state. The articles in the *Annual* are short, clear, and where necessary, extremely frank. There is, however, none of the almost masochistic self-searching in which similar Russian publications are inclined to indulge. It is a sober presentation of the facts — a survey of the economic assets and liabilities of Israel, with suggestions on how best to develop the country in the immediate future.

Israel is a tiny country and much of its economic development is still on a test tube scale; yet some of the latest facts and figures revealed in the *Annual* are of considerable interest. Politically, Israel is a strange mixture of state socialism and private enterprise. Its major export crop — citrus — is largely in the hands of private enterprise; its agricultural production for home consumption is largely from land owned by the world community — not by the State of Israel, but by the Jewish National Fund, a subsidiary of the World Zionist Organization. Of the 330 Jewish villages in Palestine at the end of 1947, 12 were destroyed in the fighting and 31 were damaged; on the other hand, 31 new villages were built. Out of these 330 Jewish villages, 235 were on Jewish National Fund Land at the end of 1947. In 1938, there were only 65,000 people living on Jewish National Fund Land; by 1948 this population had risen to 125,000.

If the predominant role of a non-state organization — the Jewish National Fund — in the development of modern agriculture in Israel is strange, the role of the Histadruth

(the General Federation of Jewish Labor) in the development of Jewish agriculture and industry is even stranger. Counting the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister, and a majority of the Israeli Cabinet among its members, the Histadruth is no ordinary trade union federation. It protects the interests of organized Jewish labor, yet is most anxious to encourage immigration and the investment of private capital from abroad. It is also a big employer in its own right, and controls some 25% to 30% of all Jewish production in the country, both agricultural and industrial. It discourages strikes and economic dislocation, and is hence a major factor of stability.

Thus Israel today has a mixed economy of a most interesting type. Dr. G. Meron (better known as Mr. Muentzner), now Director of the Economic Department of the Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs, concludes his article on Histadruth industry with the following words: "In summing up it may be stated that Histadruth as an economic factor will also in future be guided by one main consideration: the increase of the economic capacity of the country in order to secure a maximum of employment of the working population. This will be achieved only by peaceful cooperation with private capital based on a wise and objective economic policy of the Government."

The *Annual* contains excellent and informative short articles on each of the major branches of Israel's infant industrial structure — cement, chemicals, textiles, cigarettes, diamonds, etc. Most of these industries consist of a few medium-sized establishments and many small units. For example, in the first part of 1948, 2,350 textile workers were employed in 351 factories and workshops. The diamond industry is an example of the fluid conditions in Palestine. It was started when Belgium and Holland were overrun by Germany, and the United States was cut off from its normal supply of small cut diamonds for the jewelry trade. Using as raw material South African diamonds formerly destined for Belgium and Holland, by 1945 Palestine had 34 diamond cutting and polishing factories employing no less than 5,000 men. Cut diamonds formed 59% of Palestine's exports in 1946 and earned in all some 80



million badly needed dollars for that country. Yet, when Belgium and Holland were liberated and their own factories were restored, and the American demand for cut diamonds fell off in general, Palestine's diamond industry had to write off \$8 million of its capital. The same kind of thing happened in the 1930's with the Palestine citrus industry—huge profits, a great expansion, then slump, and reconstruction on a sounder basis.

The history of the economic development of the United States is one of considerable instability, with great fortunes made and lost. But the fundamental structure was sound and has weathered all economic blizzards until today. It looks as if Israel, in its own tiny way, will follow the same pattern.

EDWIN SAMUEL,  
London, England

## JORDAN

*The Story of the Arab Legion*, by Brigadier John Bagot Glubb. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948. 371 pages, 7 maps. 25 s.

This is a book about Arab soldiers by a man who loves them, and who has spent the best years of his life commanding them. The theme of the book is best set forth in the author's own words, as he describes his disappointment that during World War II the Arab Legion saw no major engagements. Glubb Pasha would have liked the Arab Legion, he says, to have such an opportunity "for the benefit of the Arabs themselves. For I believe the Arab tribesmen to be first-class military material. I am convinced that they are the same men who conquered half the world 1,300 years ago."

The book does not treat of the recent fighting in Palestine. It ends in 1946, with the proclamation of Transjordan as an independent kingdom. Probably Glubb Pasha has not changed his mind about the qualities of Arab soldiers even though none of the Arab armies engaged in Palestine, save his own Legion, gained any laurels in the campaigns of 1948. But to the objective reviewer, it seems that he gives too much credit to his men and too little to himself. That the Arab is courageous, and of martial ancestry, there can be no ques-

tion. That he is capable of being made tractable to the discipline required of modern fighting forces under the command of officers of his own race, there is as yet no proof in the record. That he can do so under European command is of course quite another matter. Glubb Pasha himself has proven this with the Legion; other proof is discoverable in the Sudan Defense Force, and in the Arab units of the French army in North Africa.

As illustrating this point, there is one outstanding incident in the author's description of the campaign in Syria in 1941. A surprise enemy attack had been checked; the enemy infantry was pinned down by the fire of the Legion's advance guard; Glubb was bringing up his reserve on the flank. A few moments more, and the whole enemy column with all its vehicles would be at his mercy. And then some of the old Arab fighters in the advance guard decided that "this was a battle. If the enemy would not come to them, they would go to him. 'Wei al mahisma?' called Rimathan, leaping to his feet. 'Where are the gallants? Where are they?'"

The whole infantry advance guard went racing down the slope in a headlong attack. The enemy infantry was broken—but the vehicles fled, and all but made good their escape. This is magnificent, no doubt. But—at least in the middle of the 20th century—it is not war.

The description of the formation of the Arab Legion, of its work as desert police, and of the campaigns in Syria and Iraq, are well written and colored throughout with the author's quiet competence, his extreme modesty, and his love of the work he was doing and the people amongst whom he was working. He writes wholly from the soldier's point of view. He does not pretend to analyze social or political problems. Kings, prime ministers, sheikhs of great tribes, and British Generals enter briefly from the wings, speak their necessary lines and depart without further remark. But there is scarcely a page of the book where some plain Arab soldier or some simple desert tribesman is not in the forefront of the tale.

The jacket of the book describes Glubb Pasha as "the most famous Englishman living

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in the Arab world today." He himself would, I am sure, reject any such suggestion. Yet it is true enough. He is already a legend. The most fantastic tales are told of him from Baghdad to Cairo, from the deserts of the Najd to the *sugs* of Aleppo. The army he has built has made the king of the weakest of the Arab states the most important personage in the Arab world today. He has been able to do this because he was willing to live among the Arabs, to seek to understand them, to earn their confidence and to return it with confidence of his own.

Glubb Pasha has written a book to prove that the Arab is a great soldier. There may be varying opinions about that. But no one who reads the book can doubt that Glubb Pasha has all unwittingly proven himself to be a great man, and a great leader of men.

GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT  
New York, N. Y.

## NORTH AFRICA

*L'Afrique Du Nord*, by Jean Despois. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949. 624 pages. 900 Fr.

North Africa is an island in the western Mediterranean, bounded on three sides by water and on the fourth by one of the world's greatest deserts. To the Pan-Arabist this region is the "Meghreb," or the "Far West" of an Arab world which includes all areas touched by successive waves of invaders from the Arab heartland. The Pan-Arabists emphasize the millions of North Africans who speak a recognizable form of Arabic, and the permanent heritage of Islam left in the wake of the Arab conquerors. Those North African nationalists who accept this concept have until recently looked to the Arab League for leadership in a struggle for independence from north-shore Mediterranean powers. The liberation of North Africa was to have been the next major campaign of the Arab League after the expected victory in Palestine.

To many European scholars, however, the Arab aspects of North African life must be weighed against the contributions of other civilizations. Inhabited largely by an indige-

nous Mediterranean people, North Africa has undergone conquest by Romans, Visigoths, Venetians, Arabs, Turks, and, most recently, French. In turn, invaders and conquerors of north-shore Mediterranean areas have stemmed from this region. Each of these conquests and excursions has left its mark on the people, culture, and economic life of this land-island, and modern North Africa is a product of this exchange.

To be considered here are not the rationalizations of nineteenth-century expansionists, but the work of such serious scholars as Robert Montagne and E. P. Gautier, contributors of many distinguished studies of Arab and Berber life. We must now add the name of Jean Despois of the University of Algiers, whose *L'Afrique du Nord* is part of a monumental study of the French Union. One of a projected group on French White Africa, it covers only the area north of the Sahara, and is to be followed by a volume on the Sahara. Containing large sections on history, anthropology, cultural development, legal and governmental structure, it is basically an economic geography, presenting the most detailed information of this character available in one volume. It brings together in a more useful form, and with recent data, material not found previously in such detail except in the Colonial and Maritime Encyclopedia published in 1940 (revised 1947).

In presenting a complete picture of North Africa, Despois places in perspective the largely Berber character of the region. Two-thirds of the Moroccans and one-half of the Algerians still speak Berber, many of them to the exclusion of any other language. Even their religion, supposed to be one of the major ties to the Middle Eastern Arab, has taken on special Berber characteristics.

The Berbers have always been the "mavericks" of Islam; every political or religious revolt against control from the Middle East has received strong Berber support in North Africa. The Berbers in the mountains are still distinct from and quite hostile to the Arabs and Arabized Berbers in the coastal cities and lowlands. Berber religious laws still rule a large part of the North African population in spite of the objections of the

more nationalistic city Arabs who consider French recognition of Berber custom a divisive political weapon.

Despois also emphasizes the growing importance of groups who are neither die-hard imperialists nor extreme nationalists. The economic interdependency between both shores of the Mediterranean has created vested interests among certain Moslems. The relative increase in Europeans who are beginning to think as North Africans is creating a group possessing much more in common with the Moslem merchant classes. The growing importance of European North Africans is illustrated by figures from the Tunisian census, which show a decline in Metropolitan origin from 61% in 1891 to 28% in 1936.

In presenting these aspects of North African life, this volume makes a substantial contribution to the understanding of North Africa, even though its emphasis will not be accepted by those who still believe, in spite of recent experiences in freed colonial areas, that all problems can be solved by chasing out the "imperialist exploiters."

MAXWELL HARWAY  
Silver Spring, Md.

*North African Prelude: The First 7,000 Years*, by Galbraith Welch. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1949. 624 pages. \$6.00

This is a remarkable and fascinating book, one which, considering the scope of the subject, succeeds admirably in relating the history of a vast and ancient land. *North African Prelude* covers a tremendous area, both geographically and historically, encompassing in space that portion of the African continent lying north of the line Dakar-Djibouti, and in time from the earliest recorded history of ancient Egypt to the landing of Allied troops in 1942—some seventy centuries.

Miss Welch's most valuable contribution is the compilation of a comprehensive history of North Africa. As she points out, no other book in French or English fills this astonishing historical gap. The formidable goal which

Miss Welch has established for herself is not only achieved, but seems to have been a labor of love. The author writes with enthusiasm, wonderment, and excitement about the great pageant which she describes, a pageant characterized as "romantic, gorgeous, bloody and blood-curdling, exalted and tender, fantastic, comical and lustful."

This human drama, told in a series of episodes in a chatty, informal style, is most certainly all of these. Perhaps the most vivid and lasting impression one gets of North Africa's troubled centuries is the evidence of man's inhumanity to man. In Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and the Sudan, the romantic, the brilliant, the brave, and the courageous appear as fleeting prologues to the next era of violence, incest, and danger. Greed for gold and the fanaticism of religion marked the continuous rise and fall of dynasties. Through the years, from the earliest days of Egypt to the present discussions regarding the fate of the former Italian colonies, North African political life has been a rowdy hurly-burly, and North African peoples have lived no more easily "than so many fish bubbling in a kettle of fat."

It should be emphasized that *North African Prelude* is descriptive rather than analytical in character, but this does not imply that the work is superficial, since Miss Welch is paramountly interested in what happened rather than in why it happened. The book does appear to have a few technical deficiencies which, if corrected in later editions, will make for easier reading. Miss Welch exercises extreme paucity in her use of dates and the reader is often confused as to the particular century being described. In the same vein, a more liberal use of maps would be desirable.

DUDLEY C. BOSTWICK  
Department of State

## TURKEY

*The Foreign Relations of Turkey, 1481-1512*, by Sydney Nettleton Fisher. (Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol. XXX, No. 1). Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1948. 125 pages, bibliography. \$1.50 paper; \$2.50 cloth.

The reign of Bayezid II usually receives little notice in any account of the first ten Ottoman sultans, of whom Bayezid was the eighth. Professor Fisher helps to remedy this neglect with a scholarly monograph on Turkey's relations in this period with the contemporary world of Italian city-states, growing national monarchies of the West, eastern European kingdoms, the Holy Roman Empire, the Papacy, Egypt, Persia, and the Knights of St. John on Rhodes.

Three brief chapters recount the Ottoman rise, Bayezid's succession, and his initial struggle within Turkey to maintain power against his brother Jem. The weight of the monograph then bears on three phases of Bayezid's foreign relations: his problem of avoiding war with potential combinations which might use Jem as a spearhead; the war against Venice of 1499-1503; and the intermittent struggle with Persia after 1500.

Bayezid's foreign policy had to be cautious and essentially defensive until Jem's death in 1495. For over a decade Jem was abroad, in the custody of the Knights of St. John, the King of France, or the Pope. Because of Jem's potential appeal to elements within Turkey, there was particular danger from any European coalition which might make use of him. The interesting prospect of a Christian crusade led by a Moslem never materialized, however, and after Jem's death Bayezid could be more aggressive, as his soldiery demanded.

In the war with Venice Bayezid achieved strategic gains in the eastern Mediterranean which ensured Turkish control there, made possible greater economic advantage, and helped Sultan Selim's subsequent conquest of Egypt. The war with Ismail of Persia was a defense of the eastern regions of Turkey, threatened by Persian force and the strong appeal of Shiite heresy within the Ottoman dominions.

The whole of Professor Fisher's work is a concise and factual narration of a complex set of foreign relations, based on meticulous correlation of his source material. In spots this conciseness is a disadvantage, as where a mass of proper names and a close sequence of incidents make for difficult reading. One wishes the author had allowed himself the luxury,

which in places is almost a necessity, of further elaboration and generalization. Some of this material appears in the copious footnotes, and might well have been included in the text. In the chapter on Jem the conciseness has led to a somewhat topical treatment in which the chronology is hard to follow. One wishes, too, that the author had expanded his various brief allusions on the importance of trade to Turkey, or included more on the interesting career of the sea-captain Kemal, on whom von Burski has written a small monograph. In general, Professor Fisher has cleaved very close to his subject, including only enough on such topics as the position of the *ghazis* and the Sufi heresy to clarify vital points in Bayezid's foreign policy. More information on domestic politics as related to foreign affairs, and on the economic and strategic significance of the various campaigns and conquests, would have been welcome. A map in conjunction with the text would also have been of great service.

Turkish chroniclers and historians have been exploited to some extent, but Professor Fisher places his main reliance on the substantial accounts of various Italians who knew Turkey, and especially on the Venetian reports. With these limits in mind, this careful piece of research will be indispensable for those interested in Ottoman history or in the European politics of the period.

RODERIC H. DAVISON

George Washington University

*Turkey: Economic and Commercial Conditions in Turkey*, by E. R. Lingeman. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1948. 228 pages. 4s.

Mr. Lingeman's book is one of the *Overseas Economic Surveys* currently being published by the Export Promotion Department of the British Board of Trade. Dated September 1947, it includes chapters on Finance, Foreign Trade, Agriculture, Industry, Mining, Communications, Public Works, Foreign Capital and Future Developments, and Social Questions. The addition of thirty-nine useful statistical appendices obviously based on Turkish Government sources is valuable because of



the convenience of having the information assembled in one place. In his foreword, however, the author warns the reader as to the dubious reliability of most Turkish statistics, stating that he intends the data to present only a general picture.

The information is, in general, objectively and correctly reported, although on the subject of finances this reviewer at times experienced some difficulty in following the details of the situation. The more specialized student will regret that Mr. Lingeman fails to give specific sources for his statistics, and that he has not accorded his data more thorough appraisal and interpretation: what he does offer is designed particularly for the British exporter. In his general survey, the author does indeed discuss significant background material. Unfortunately, since the writing of the report events have somewhat changed the encouraging picture which he presents, especially regarding surplus of exports over imports and the budget situation.

The most important interpretive section of the book is to be found in the chapter on Foreign Capital and Future Development. Here Mr. Lingeman attacks the question of the prospects for participation of foreign capital in Turkey's future economic development, a question that is critical to Turkey's future and its relations with the United States. Taking the statements that Max Thornburg gave to the newspaper *Vatan* at the termination of his visit to Turkey in the summer of 1947 as a basis for his own remarks, Mr. Lingeman gives a sensible appraisal of the paths that Turkey's future economic development should take, particularly in regard to what he believes the government's role should be. His views on this subject are middle of the road, favoring neither complete *étatisme* nor complete expulsion of the government from economic enterprise. He indicates the need for a sharp dividing line between *étatisme* and private enterprise, with the government attacking "fundamental long-term problems of agriculture, transport, and social service, instead of allowing themselves to be continually mesmerized by the spectacular and driving urge to show quick results." This view, together with an expression of the necessity of inducing private foreign

capital to come to Turkey and work with local capital in the development of the country, hits at the very core of the problems evident in Turkey's current and future economic position.

It is interesting to note that Mr. Lingeman has included in his report a short statement of the role of private enterprise in the industrial field. This is an aspect of the Turkish economy which is often ignored, writers usually giving an account of only the more striking state-owned establishments. Mr. Lingeman does well to point out that private enterprise in Turkey is extensive, but is in the form of a great number of small undertakings.

In general, the report fills a genuine need in providing economic data and a ready handbook on the current Turkish economic scene. It has been welcomed by British, Americans, and Turks alike, for it represents the first detailed study of economic conditions in postwar Turkey available to the general public

ROBERT W. KERWIN  
Istanbul, Turkey

## BOOKS ALSO NOTED

### General

*The Jewish Yearbook of International Law*, ed. by N. Feinberg and J. Stoyanovsky. Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, 1949. 304 pages. \$8. First volume of an annual publication devoted to various aspects of international law relating to the Jewish people.

*Mandates, Dependencies, and Trusteeships*, by H. Duncan Hill. Washington: Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, 1948. 429 pages. \$5.00. A study of the systems created after World War I to deal with ex-enemy territory, and the basis of trusteeships. Includes background material important to students of Middle East politics.

### Arab World

*Egyptian Service, 1902-1946*, by Sir Thomas Russell Pasha. London: John Murray, 1949. 294 pages. 18s. Autobiography of the Cairo chief of police under 32 Egyptian Governments during 44 years of service, who achieved fame for his formation of the nucleus of the Sudanese Camel Corps Police and his crusade against the drug traffic.

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*History of the Arabs*, by Philip K. Hitti. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949. 767 pages. \$9. Fourth edition of this standard study of Arab history from pre-Islamic days to the beginning of the Ottoman Empire, with revisions and additions written after recent visits made to almost all of the Arab lands.

*How Greek Science Passed to the Arabs*, by De Lacy O'Leary. London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1949. 196 pages. 15s. Interesting for the account of the important but obscure role played by Syrian and other mediaries in passing on the Greek heritage of science to the Arabs.

*Libat Falastin (The Palestine Lesson)*, by Musa al-'Alami. Beirut, 1949. 91 pages. \$1.00. A discussion of the reasons for the Arab defeat in Palestine, throwing a large proportion of the blame on the Arab states themselves.

*Ma'na al-Nakbah (The Significance of Catastrophe)*, by Costi K. Zurayk. Beirut, 1948. 88 pages. \$1.00. An analysis of the causes of Arab defeat in Palestine, apportioning the blame between the maneuvers of the Great Powers and the lack of unity and purposefulness of the Arab states.

#### India and Pakistan

*Glimpses of Gandhiji*, by R. R. Diwaker. Foreword by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1949. 90 pages. Rs. 3. An account of the author's personal association with Gandhi.

*Halfway to Freedom*, by Margaret Bourke-White. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949. 245 pages. \$3.50. Photographs and text telling the story of the rebirth of the old India into two new developing states.

*Indien und Pakistan*, by Dr. Heinz Fischer-Wollpert. Oberusel: Verlag Europa-Archiv. 1948. 102 pages.

*Lead Kindly Light*, by Vincent Sheean. New York: Random House, 1949. 374 pages. \$3.75. Summary of Gandhi's life and aims and a discussion of his philosophy in relation to world conditions.

*Shadows of Hyper-Inflation*, by S. K. Muranjan. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1949. 59 pages. Rs. 2. Discussion of economic dangers threatening India.

*Social Insurance and India*, by Manohar R. Idgunji. Foreword by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. Bombay: Thacker and Co., 1948. 364 pages. Rs. 12/8.

*A Study of Economic Plans For India*, by D. S. Nag. Foreword by Dr. Rajendra Prasad. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1949. 177 pages. Rs. 5/8.

*Swaraj for the Masses*, by J. C. Kumarappa. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1948. 104 pages.

*University Addresses*, by C. Rajagopalachari. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1949. 112 pages. Rs. 3/8.

*Women, Family, and Socialism*, by D. Y. Deshpande. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1948. 65 pages. Rs. 1/8.

#### Iran

*Iran*, by Fritz Steppat. Oberusel: Verlag Europa-Archiv. 1948. 79 pages.

*Russia and the West in Iran*, by George Lenczowski. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1949. 401 pages. \$4.50.

#### Israel

*Leave It to the People*, by Quentin Reynolds. New York: Random House, 1949. 341 pages. \$3.50. Almost half of the book is devoted to conversations with Israelis and descriptions of various aspects of life in Israel. The rest of the book is concerned with the author's experiences in Europe.

#### North Africa

*La Crise Algérienne*, by Paul-Émile Sarrasin. Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1949. 244 pages. 300 Fr. Includes good appendix and important list of documents.

#### Palestine

*Encyclopedia of Palestine*, by Isaiah Press. Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, 1948. Volume I: Introduction, Articles: Jbdar-Gath-Rimmon. \$9.50. Volume II: Articles: Dalata-Jerusalem, and supplementaries to volumes one and two. \$3.50.

*Palestine Ancient and Modern*, by Winifred Needler. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1949. 113 pages. \$2.00. "A handbook and guide to the Palestinian collection of the Royal Ontario Museum."

*The Realities of American-Palestine Relations*, by Frank E. Manuel. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1949. 378 pages. \$5.00. Story and criticism of U.S. interest and activity in Palestine since the early 19th century. Based in large part on unpublished material.

*The Zionist Idea*, by Joseph Heller. New York: Schocken Books, Inc., 1949. 246 pages. \$3.00. A sympathetic, comprehensive history of the philosophy and activities of the Zionist movement by a noted Jewish historian and essayist. Bibliography.

#### Turkey

*Economic Development of Turkey*, by Max Thornburg, George Spry, and George Soule. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1949. 324 pages. \$3.50. An "appraisal of Turkey's economic resources and plans for development and the possibilities offered for constructive foreign aid and investment."

#### Petroleum

*Oil and Foreign Policy*, by Michael Brooks. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1949. 143 pages. 5s.

#### Religion and Ethics

*Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam*, by W. Montgomery Watt. London: Luzac and Co., 1948. 181 pages. 15s.

*Mohanmala: A Gandhian Rosary*, compiled by R. K. Prabhu. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1949. Rs. 3.

*Tears and Laughter*, by Kahlil Gibran. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1949. 127 pages. \$2.75. New revised and enlarged edition, translated from the Arabic by Anthony Rizcallah Ferris. Edited by Martin L. Wolf.

*The Code of Maimonides: Book Thirteen, the Book of Civil Laws*. Translated from the Hebrew by Jacob J. Rabinowitz. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. 345 pages. \$5.00. Yale Judaica Series, Vol. II.

#### Linguistics

*Written and Spoken Persian*, by E. M. N. Hawker. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., Inc., 1949. 196 pages. \$1.60.

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# BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Prepared by Sidney Glazer, Near East Section, Library of Congress

*With contributions from:* Elizabeth Bacon, Richard Ettinghausen, Abdollah Faryar, Sidney Glazer, Harold W. Glidden, Harvey P. Hall, George C. Miles, Leon Nemoy, M. Perlmann, William D. Preston, C. Rabin, Dorothy Shepherd, and Andreas Tietze.

**Note:** It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East roughly since the rise of Islam. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of excellent bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Moslem Spain, the Arab world, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of Soviet Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East, Byzantium, Zionism and Palestine<sup>1</sup> are excluded; also, since the January 1949 issue India and Pakistan have not been included within the scope of the Bibliography. According to present plans the South Asia Section of the Library of Congress will soon produce independently a bibliography of South Asia in which India and Pakistan will receive full treatment.

<sup>1</sup> Palestine, the Jews of Palestine, Zionism, and Israel are omitted only because of the existence of a current, cumulative bibliography devoted to this field, i.e. *Zionism and Palestine*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library in New York.

For list of abbreviations, see page 372.

## GEOGRAPHY

(General, description, travel, and exploration, natural history, geology)

- 2693 BAILEY, EDWARD BATTERSBY. "Notes on the geology of the Elburz Mountains, northeast of Tehran, Iran." *Quart. J. of Geological Soc. of London* 104 (Ag 31 '48) 1-42. The author discusses the geological features of the region, including geological maps.
- 2694 CHARBONNEAU, C. R. "Les ports du Maroc." *Tropiques* No. 300 (Je '48) 50-5. The author gives a description, including an aerial photograph, of the harbor of Casablanca and its facilities, with a brief account of the relative importance of French Morocco's secondary harbors such as Port-Lyautey, Rabat-Salé, Fedhala, Azemmour, Safi, Mogador, and Agadir.
- 2695 FRYE, RICHARD N. "A new Arabic geographical manuscript." *J. Near East Stud.* 8 (Ap '49) 91-7. The *Akām al-Marjān* of Ishāq b. Husayn, who lived in Spain in the eleventh century, contains the text and translation of the sections dealing with the lands of the Turks, the Toghuzghuzz, Yājūj and Mājūj, and China.
- 2696 GANJI, MOHAMMAD HASSAN. "Drought in Qāyenāt." (in Persian) *Yādgar* (Tehran) 5 (S '48) 41-50. An account of the geographic and climatic conditions of Qāyenāt, Eastern Iran, and what has happened to this place as a result of several years of drought.
- 2697 WARD, G. E. "A description of Gilan and Baku in 1874." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Ja '49) 82-7. Excerpt from a travel diary.
- 2698 WILSON, LEONARD S. "Lessons from the experiences of the Map Information Section, OSS." *Geog. Rev.* 39 (Ap '49) 298-310. Includes information on map collection in the Middle East.

See also: 2714, 2745, 2746, 2748, 2774



## HISTORY AND POLITICS

(Ancient, medieval, modern)

- 2699 "Free press—Egyptian style." *New Times* (Moscow) 8 (F 16 '49) 30-1. An "analysis" of American and British information and news services in the guise of a letter supposedly written by an Egyptian journalist.
- 2700 "The governments of Iran from the beginning of the constitutional movement up to date." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* (Tehran) 1 (M '48) 17-22. The article describes the third and fourth cabinets after the Constitution was granted and the events leading to the fall of the various governments.
- 2701 "The Persian Gulf—a romance." *Round Table* 154 (Mr '49) 131-7. The importance of the Gulf grows greater as the need for fuel expands, the world contracts, and the Soviet menace intensifies. Its stability can be assured by a grouping with a permanent organization first between the Atlantic powers and then among the Asiatic states themselves. Turkey might be particularly effective here.
- 2702 BAYUR, HIKMET. "Correspondence between Tipu, Sultan of Mysore, and the Ottoman Sultans Abdul Hamid I and Selim III." (in Turkish) *Belleten* (Istanbul) 13 (Jl '48) 617-54. The letters, reproduced from the Ottoman archives, concern, among other things, Tipu's attempts to enlist Ottoman assistance against the British, his request for administrative rights in Basrah, and negotiations bearing upon Napoleon's invasion of Egypt.
- 2703 BEE, JOHN M. "Communism and the Arab League." *Gt. Brit. and East.* 45 (F '49) 35-6. Considers the maintenance of the Arab League vital in the struggle against communism, but fails to explain why.
- 2704 BELENITSKI, A. M. "On social relations in Iran under the Hulguids." (in Russian) *Sovetskoe Vostokovedeniie* 5 (1949) 111-28. The positions of various classes under the yoke of Mongol taxation.
- 2705 COMTOIS, JEAN. "L'USSR et l'Islam." *Politique Etrangère* (Paris) 13 (D '48) 457-72. This important article points out that Soviet policy in Central Asia, in spite of several weaknesses, has proved very successful in winning the Moslems largely because of the improvement effected in economic and social conditions. After a cogent analysis of Soviet propaganda in the Arab world and the negative response of Arab leadership to date, the author concludes that without swift and thorough reform of the economic and social structure, Lenin's prediction of communism gaining the Occident through the Orient may well be realized.
- 2706 DAHMÂN, SHAYKH MUHAMMAD AHMAD. "The earthquake of August 25, 1759." (in Arabic) *al-Mashriq* (Beirut) 42 (Je—S '48) 333-47. Account based on three documents of this catastrophe which almost completely obliterated Damascus and surrounding territory.
- 2707 DEMEERSEMAN, A. "Tunisie '49" *Ibla* (Tunis) 12 (1<sup>st</sup> trim.) 1-23. A broad-gauged discussion of the problems and aspirations of present-day Tunisia.
- 2708 JAFRI, FAREED S. "Modern Iran." *Asiatic Rev.* 45 (Ap '49) 627-32. A brief historical sketch of events since 1906, ending with a plea for closer relations with Pakistan.
- 2709 KANUNNIKOV, A. "Bloody terror in Iraq." *New Times* (Moscow) 9 (F 23, '49) 11-4. The Iraqi masses are up in arms against the colonial regime. The British imperialists have ordered their puppets to crush this popular resistance by a reign of terror.
- 2710 AL-KHÂLIDÎ, AHMAD SÂMIH. "On the history of Arabic institutions." (in Arabic) *al-Abhâth* (Beirut) 11 (Mr '49) 43-60. The evolution of scientific and social institutions from early Islam down to the end of the Ottoman regime.
- 2711 KRYMSKY, V. "Marshallized Turkey." *New Times* (Moscow) 7 (F 9 '49) 14-7. In the past two and a half years the Turkish Government has returned to the policy of capitulations pursued by the sultans and so bitterly hated by the people. Naturally this policy is being met by a growing popular movement of protest.
- 2712 MACRO, ERIC. "Yemen: a brief survey." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Ja '49) 42-53. A brief description of the country, with an account of political events following the death of Imam Yahya and of European penetration of this isolated country.
- 2713 MIKLUHO-MAKLAI, N. D. "On the first volume of Muḥ Kāzīm's work." (in Russian) *Sovetskoe Vostokovedeniie* 5 (1949) 129-36. Bartold described volumes 2 and 3 of Kāzīm's work on Nadir Shah. Now v. 1 is described from a Moscow ms. of this capital source.
- 2714 AL-MUNAJJID, ṢALĀḤ AL-DĪN. "The village of Sabinah al-Sharqiyah." (in Arabic) *al-Mashriq* (Beirut) 42 (Je-S '48) 348-52. Reproduction of the *waqfiyah* or religious instrumentality whereby a certain Rujayhī b. Sābiq, the original owner of this village, dedicated it as a religious foundation. The dedication deed sets out the topography of the village very accurately.
- 2715 NAVAÏ, ABDOL HOSSEIN. "A chapter from the history of the Iranian revolution." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* (Tehran) 1

- (Jl '48) 27-33. The writer quotes from the memoirs of Mizra Saleh Khan Vazir Akram describing in detail one of the incidents of the fighting conducted by Mohammad Ali Shah against the Majlis.
- 1716 OSIPOV, G. "The Palestine doings of Charles Clayton." *New Times* (Moscow) 52 (D 22, '48) 8-12. Responsibility for almost every major event and movement in the Arab world since World War I is attributed in this "biographical study" to the "British intelligence sphinx" known as Brig. Clayton.
- 1717 PAHLAVI, PRINCESS SHAMS. "The last days of the late Shāh-in-Shāh." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* v. 1 no. 1 (Mr '48) 6-8. The first of a series of articles, memoirs of the Princess Shams Pahlavi, describing the resignation of her father after the Allied invasion of Iran in 1941 and his departure from Tehran.
- 1718 PAHLAVI, PRINCESS SHAMS. "The last days of the late Shāh-in-Shāh." (in Persian) *Ettela'at*. 1 (My '48) 6-9. Description of the island of Mauritius where the King and his family were taken by the British in 1941.
- 1719 PATAL, RAPHAEL. "A popular 'Life of Nadir'." *Edoth* (Jerusalem) 111 (Ap-Je '48) 1-20. Translation of an interesting oral account of a folk life of Nadir Shah (1688-1747). Includes an appendix containing notes written by Lawrence Lockhard, author of an authoritative study of this famous Iranian king.
- 1720 PAYNE, WILLIAM. "Middle East must be strong." *Gt. Brit. and East*. 45 (Mr '49) 31-2. With China under the Communists the Middle East will again begin to loom large in the Soviet's calculations as they use it for a "pincer movement of ideas" to be launched against other regions in the Far East.
- 1721 PETRUSHKESKI, I. P. "Urban patriciate in the Hulaguid State." (in Russian) *Sovetskoie Vostokovedeniie* 5 (1948) 85-110. The basic social structure of Iran's cities was not changed by the Mongol conquest. Turkic and Mongol feudal lords remained outside city life which was ruled by an Iranian patriciate influential in the rural districts too. This is one reason for the lack of municipal development of the western type.
- 1722 ROWLETT, MARY. "Progress in Egypt." *Contemp. Rev.* (London) No. 996 (D '48) 339-43. The author notes considerable evidence, particularly in the growth of the spirit of sacrifice and service.
- 1723 SADAK, NECMEDDIN. "Turkey faces the Soviets." *Foreign Affairs* 27 (Ap '49) 449-61. Surveys the development of Russian policy toward Turkey and concludes that it has not changed since the time of the Tsars. The United States has understood the Turkish reaction and assessed it correctly, despite the very limited relations it has had with Turkey in the past.
- 2724 SARDĀR AS'AD, ALI QULI and SAMSĀM-US-SALTĀNEH. "Letter by the Bakhtiari chiefs to the foreign diplomats in Tehran." (in Persian) *Yādegār* (Tehran) 5 (S '48) 6-8. Text of a historic letter written by two Bakhtiari chiefs to representatives of foreign powers in Tehran and addressed to the Austrian Minister informing them that patriotic forces were moving on to Tehran to ask the Shah to restore the Constitution and asking the said powers to be neutral and not interfere by bringing foreign troops into the country.
- 2725 SĀSĀNI, KHĀN MALEK. "The Bahrein Islands." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* (Tehran) 1 (Mr '48) 22-4. Quotes several political documents showing that the islands of Bahrein belong to Iran. The British Minister asked the Iranian Foreign Minister in 1870 to lease the islands to Great Britain.
- 2726 SEMIONOV, A. A. "A treatise on the ranks and duties of office-holders in medieval Bokhara." (in Russian) *Sovetskoie Vostokovedeniie* (Moscow) 5 (1948) 137-53. Annotated translation of an 18th century list.
- 2727 SMOGORZEWSKI, K. M. "New Turkey's first twenty-five years." *Contemp. Rev.* (London) No. 996 (D '48) 326-30. Concludes that the 1950 elections are likely to be fair.
- 2728 STAFFORD, LAWRENCE. "Washington very close-lipped over Tapline." *Oil Forum* (New York) 111 (F '49) 83-5. Reviews some of the reasons for the Administrations' delay in allocating the steel to build the pipe.
- 2729 TAOUTEL, FERDINAND. "Historic documents on Aleppo." (in Arabic) *al-Mashriq* (Beirut) 42 (Ap-Je '48) 215-41. The author spent 1937-47 in Aleppo examining documents and manuscripts relating to the Maronite, Armenian, and Catholic communities, and to the Christian Brotherhood. He also consulted the archives of the British Consulate and reviews here the persecution of the Christians during the latter part of the 18th century. To be continued.
- 2730 TAQI-ZADEH, HASSAN. "Iranian democracy." *Ettela'at* (Tehran) 1 (Jl '48) 4-5, 39. Describes the concept of government in Iran from ancient times and discusses the creation of democratic government in

- the country. He criticizes the way democracy is conducted and gives his views on the requirements of a true working democracy in Iran.
- 2731 TIKHONOV, D. "The revolt of 1864 in East Turkestan." (in Russian) *Sovetskoie Vostokovedeniie* 5 (1948) 155-72. A Moslem revolt against Chinese rule.
- 2732 TWEEDY, OWEN. "The Middle East—a longer view." *Asiatic Rev.* 45 (Ap '49) 610-16. Only through personal sacrifice on the part of the present privileged classes, believes the author, can industrial, agricultural, and social unrest, with its tragic consequences, be averted.
- 2733 YAKUBOVSKI, A. Y. "The revolt of Muganna', the movement of 'White Robes.'" (in Russian) *Sovetskoie Vostokovedeniie* 5 (1948) 35-54. Collects the data on the movement of Soghdian peasants who, disillusioned with Abbasid rule, revolted in the seventies of the 8th century A.D.
- 2734 YAKUBOVSKY, A. Y. "Share-cropping tenancy in Iraq in the 8th century." (in Russian) *Sovetskoie Vostokovedeniie*. (Moscow) 4 (1947) 171-84. Translations of a section of Abu Yusuf's K. al-Kharāj, together with a series of comments showing that early Abbasid society was based on slave labor and an increasing number of landless peasants.
- 2735 YĀSEMI, RICHARD. "Nomud Vānomud." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* (Tehran) 1 (S '48) 32-42. The story of Mir Mohammed Hossein Khorasani who left Iran for India and there claimed that he was a prophet, gathering a number of people around him as disciples.
- 2736 ZAHAR, CHARLES. "Nomination, attributions et pouvoirs des directeurs généraux de la municipalité d'Alexandrie." *L'Egypte Contemp.* (Cairo) 39 (Ja-F '48) 45, 251. A serious historical review of the major administrative processes of the second largest city in Egypt.
- 2737 ZAYYĀT, HABĪB. "Allegations of the Abbasid historians in describing the gluttony of the Omayyads." (in Arabic) *al-Mashriq* (Beirut) 42 (Ap-Je '48) 161-8. The author charges the Abbasids, after their victory over the Omayyads, with embarking upon a deliberate policy of defaming such men as Mu'āwiyah, Ziyād b. Abihī, and Sulaymān b. 'Abd al-Malik by depicting their sole purpose in life as eating and drinking.
- 2738 ZAYYĀT, HABĪB. "The monasteries of Damascus and environs in Islam." (in Arabic) *al-Mashriq* (Beirut) 42 (Ap '48) 328-32. The author deprecates the lack of bibliographic data on these monasteries subsequent to the Moslem occupation and during the first phase of the Omayyad caliphate. The only sources of information now available are the haphazard references in poetry, owing to the fact that the important Assyrian language manuscripts were destroyed when the Saidnaya Monastery library was burned in the 19th century. The article lists numerous place names, giving their original Roman or Assyrian designations alongside the modern Arabic ones.
- 2739 ZURAYK, COSTI K. "The essence of Arab civilization." *Middle East J.* 3 (Ap '49) 125-39. Analyzes the essential characteristics of Arab civilization as the spiritual force of Islam, the universality of outlook, the belief in the unity of truth. Modern Arabs must rediscover these values if they hope to revivify Arab civilization.
- See also: 2697, 2753, 2759, 2760, 2761, 2762, 2764, 2771, 2804, 2841

## ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(General, finance, commerce, agriculture, natural resources, labor, transportation, and communications.)

- 2740 "Development in Turkey—a survey of twenty-five years progress." *Asiatic Rev.* 45 (Ap '49) 617-21. Statistics on railway and port construction, land routes, water works, and general building.
- 2741 "Five countries to co-operate in vast dam schemes for the Blue and White Niles." *Gt. Brit. and East* 45 (Ap '49) 35-6. It now appears possible that what have been recognized as the last two major Nile projects may shortly be begun. They constitute one of the most far-reaching plans ever executed in the Middle East, permitting the economic development of immense areas.
- 2742 "Future of Middle East development clarified by Red Line settlement." *World Petroleum* 19 (D '48) 46-8. Of major importance is the liberalization of the Red Line Agreement of 1928, thus permitting Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) and Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. to purchase stock interests in Arabian American Oil Co. A few weeks previously Arabian American renounced its concessionary privileges in the neutral zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, thus opening the door to exploration in that area by other oil companies. Also Arabian American claims that its concession in Saudi Arabia extends to submerged coastal lands within the jurisdiction of that country were upheld. Saudi-Arabian production for the last ten years is listed.

- 2743 "Mid-East becoming hub of international oil." *World Petroleum* 19 (S '48) 54-7. Despite interruptions due to the war and later to political disturbances and inability to obtain prompt delivery of equipment, development of the oil resources of the Middle East is making steady progress. The article discusses progress in Iran, Iraq, Arabia, Transjordan, a section of Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. The article also discusses past production and what the possibilities are for an increase in the future.
- 2744 "Mid-East concession grievances are serious." *Oil Forum* 111 (F '49) 77-9. Failure to reach amicable compromise on the complaints of the Iraqi and Iranian governments regarding the terms of some existing oil concessions may bring serious results. The main targets are companies under British control.
- 2745 "Railway development in Iraq." *Railway Gazette* 89 (D 10, '48) 657. This article provides an outline of the Iraq State Railways' program of new works. This includes: (1) a bridge over the Tigris at Baghdad to replace the existing train ferry and enable all standard-gauge traffic, both passenger and freight, to be concentrated at Baghdad West; (2) a modern station to accommodate passenger traffic there and house the central administration of the system; (3) a new bridge over the Euphrates on the Karbala branch line; (4) a 100-mile extension of the Baghdad-Kirkuk meter-gauge line from Kirkuk via Erbil to Mosul, involving the construction of another large bridge over the Lesser Zab River. Considerable progress has already been made in all these undertakings, and the main contracts for the three bridges and for the station have been let to a British firm, Holloway Brothers.
- 2746 "They strike oil by air." *Gt. Brit. and East.* 45 (Ap '49) 37. Seven British technicians are flying daily over many of Iran's uncharted mountains and deserts taking hundreds of photographs to be built into a mosaic covering 10,000 sq. miles of country.
- 2747 "Tigris bridge at Baghdad, Iraqi State Railways." *Railway Gazette*, 89 (D 10, '48) 664. A brief description of the new bridge over the Tigris at Baghdad designed to replace the existing ferry train.
- 2748 ASHBEL, D. "Frequency and distribution of dew in Palestine." *Geographical Rev.* 39 (Ap '49) 291-7. A study of dew as a major factor in the water balance of the vegetation of Palestine. Charts.
- 2749 ASHÛR, 'IṢLĀM. "Metayage in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine." (in Arabic) *al-Abhāth* (Beirut) 2 (Mr '49) 61-72. Concludes a study of land tenure, sharecropping, and feudal survivals.
- 2750 BAUER, C. J. "Middle East oil and world markets." *Mining and Metallurgy* 29 (Ag '48) 436-42. Analysis of the oil industry with respect to crude oil and oil product supplies and demands. Trends seem to indicate that the Eastern Hemisphere will still depend on the West for refinery products in 1951. Mr. Bauer breaks down the production of the countries of the Middle East and describes refinery and pipeline facilities in existence and those under construction.
- 2751 DEMEERSEMAN, A. "Le problème du travail en Tunisie." *Ibla* (Tunis) 11 (3° & 4° trims.) 237-81. A careful study of the basic economic and social aspects, together with some suggestions for a solution.
- 2752 DINAR, M. "Trends in Turkish economy." *Gt. Brit. and East.* 45 (F '49) 33-4. A valuable interpretation of Turkey's trend toward free enterprise. Representatives both of the Government and of the opposition have advocated the transfer to private enterprise of State-controlled undertakings because there is "confidence in private enterprise to get things done."
- 2753 DODGE, BAYARD. "Arab progress inspired by independence." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Ja '49) 9-10. An account of specific technological and social advances which have been made in the various Arab countries since they achieved political independence.
- 2754 DOWSON, V. H. W. "The date and the Arab." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Ja '49) 34-41. On the importance of the date palm in the desert countries of the Arab world.
- 2755 FRANCK, DOROTHEA SEELYE and PETER G. "The Middle East economy in 1948." *Middle East J.* 3 (Ap '49) 201-10. Survey of trends broken down into production, foreign trade, budget and prices, and economic development.
- 2756 FRY, H. I. "Egypt's new important oil field." *Oil Forum* 111 (F '49) 86. A description of Asl field, located about 90 miles south of Suez on the Sinai peninsula, owned by Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.
- 2757 HILL, C. V. (and others). "Motor gasoline from Middle East crude." *World Petroleum* 19 (O '48) 52-5, 76. For many years crude oil production from the Middle East has been assuming an increasing importance owing to the large reserves available and the rate at which production is being expanded. Thus, for the year of 1947 the total production in this area was 15% more than that of the total US production.



- Various refining schemes are discussed and charts are included showing yields and properties of certain gasolines, and average process data for up-grading.
- 2758 HURST, H. E. "Major irrigation projects on the Nile." *Civil Eng. and Public Works Rev.* 43 (S '48) 450-2. The author gives a short description of the projects which are being discussed technically at the present time in Egypt, the Sudan, and Uganda. The author attempts to show how the projects form a part of a scheme for the full development of Nile irrigation.
- 2759 LISLE, B. ORCHARD. "U.S. Arab opened Syria to independent oil interests." *Oil Forum* 3 (Mr '49) 110-3. An "eye-witness" account of the negotiations for an oil concession in Syria by a Syro-American, J. W. MenHall. This concession embodies a number of novel features and is worth attention because the operator is an independent whose capital is not identified with a large banking establishment.
- 2760 LONGRIGG, STEPHEN. "The liquid gold of Arabia." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Ja '49) 20-33. Description of the economic condition of peninsular Arabia before the discovery of oil; a brief history of the exploration and exploitation of oil resources; and a consideration of the effects of oil development on the people of Arabia.
- 2761 MERLEN, R. H. A. "Afghanistan's relations with Pakistan improved." *Gt. Brit. and East* 45 (Mr '49) 34. Brief review of Afghanistan's economic position and a summary of Moscow short-wave attacks, launched despite frontier and trade agreements recently concluded.
- 2762 PLATT, WARREN C. "Peoples of many countries will benefit from oil's vast Middle East development." *Natl. Petroleum News* 40 (N '48) 19-28. The author reports that modern cities are rising from desert sand as oil company ventures bring higher living standards. The whole operation is called "Kuwait" and the principal town bears that name. The author gives some facts about the geographic location, the work already completed, and the work contemplated.
- 2763 TASHMAN, CEVAT EYUB. "Drilling for oil in Turkey, 1887-1948." *Oil Forum* 3 (F '49) 72-6. The author is the chief petroleum adviser for the Turkish Government Mineral Research Organization.
- 2764 TURAN, OSMAN. "Land law among the Seljuq Turks." (in Turkish) *Belleten* (Istanbul) 12 (Jl '48) 549-74. A documented discussion of the types of land tenure including crown lands, private lands and military fiefs in Seljuq Anatolia, with particular reference to the survival of these institutions among the Ottomans.
- 2765 WATSON, ALFRED. "The Middle East and India." *Gt. Brit. and East* 45 (F '49) 38. Trade with Iran has been steadily increasing, the balance being heavily in Iran's favor.
- 2766 WEINRYB, BERNARD D. "The Negev." *Pal. Affairs* (New York) 4 (Mr '49) 32-4. The reason for the decline of the Negev from a densely populated region into a desert is not to be sought in a change in climate but, according to Major C. S. Jarvis, in "the fall of the Roman Empire and the Arab invasion."

## SOCIAL CONDITIONS

(General, education, population, and ethnology, medicine and public health, religion, law.)

- 2767 "Une assemblée de village en pays Kabyle." *Ibla* (Tunis) 2 (3° & 4° trims.) 283-99. Translation of a Berber text, interesting from the linguistic and ethnological points of view.
- 2768 ALIABADI, DR. AHMAD. "Education in Iran now and in the future." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Ja '49) 62-6. A general discussion of educational problems by the Director-General of Cultural Relations and Higher Education in Iran.
- 2769 BALLEET, J. "Couture." *Ibla* (Tunis) 11 (3e & 4e trims.) 373-6. Includes a number of general observations on Tunisian women, particularly those living on farms.
- 2770 BERGMAN, JUDAH. "Jews and Moslems in their popular beliefs." *Edoth* (Jerusalem) 3 (Ap-Je '48) 35-65. The resemblances are far greater than the differences. "It is a very remarkable trait in the character of the people of Egypt and other countries of the East that Muslims, Christians, and Jews adopt each other's superstitions while they abhor the more rational doctrines of each other's faith." (Lane)
- 2771 DEMIRTAS, FARUK. "The Kayi clan in Anatolia in the Ottoman period." (in Turkish) *Belleten* (Istanbul) 12 (Jl '48) 575-615. A study of the spread of the Kayi, a clan of the Oguz, based largely on toponymical evidence culled from official archives.
- 2772 HAMMERSHAIMB, E. "The religious and political development of Muhammad." (Pt. 1) *Muslim World* 39 (Ap '49) 126-35. Presents some thoughts about the character and personality of Mohammed after noting the views of European scholars.
- 2773 HAYDEN, LYLE J. "Living standards in rural Iran." *Middle East J.* 3 (Ap '49) 140-50. Describes a Near East Foundation rural experiment in a village not far

- from Tehran. Economic conditions were analyzed and tests were run on methods of raising the standard of living without upsetting the general social pattern of the community. Emphasis was placed on the development of local self-reliance.
- 2774 LEWIS, NORMAN N. "Malaria, irrigation, and soil erosion in Central Syria." *Geog. Rev.* 39 (Ap '49) 278-90. An exposition of the factors involved in malaria control in the Selemiya region of Central Syria, together with a brief history of the occupancy of this region. Maps and photograph.
- 2775 MARTY, GERMAINE. "Les Algériens à Tunis." *Ibla* (Tunis) 11 (3° & 4° trims. '48) 301-34. An extremely interesting analysis of the various groups of Algerians resident in Tunis.
- 2776 MARTY, GERMAINE. "Les Marocains à Tunis." *Ibla* (Tunis) 12 (1° trim.) 25-32. Like most of the other ethnic groups resident in Tunis, the Moroccans have been living there for a long time, although the great increase dates from 1881, when they were extensively "imported" by Europeans to serve as guards of one kind or another.
- 2777 MOKRI, MOHAMMAD. "The Kurdish tribes—the Sanjabi Clan." (in Persian) *Yādegār* (Tehran) 5 (S '48) 25-40. Continuing the series on the Kurdish tribes, this article deals with the various branches of the Sanjabi clan, together with a brief account of some of their chieftains. Illus.
- 2778 NYKL, A. R. "A shepherd's amulet." *J. Amer. Orient. Soc.* 69 (Ja-Mr '49) 34-5. Photograph, transliteration, and translation of a *barka* amulet, of interest to students of Near Eastern folklore.
- 2779 OGEL, BAHAEDDIN. "The original Töles Clan." (in Turkish with resumé in French) *Belleten* (Istanbul) 12 (O '48) 795-833. A study based on Chinese sources, including Shih-chi, of the primary clans of the Turkish Töles tribe Ugur, Ting-ling and Kao-ch'ë.
- 2780 PERLMANN, M. "Women and feminism in Egypt." *Pal. Affairs* 4 (Mr '49) 36-9. A brief sketch of the slow progress toward equality being made by Egypt's nearly ten million women.
- 2781 SIMON-TOV, Yafa and RAHEL RAHAMINI. "Girl's games in the Marrano community of Meshhed." *Edoth* (Jerusalem) 3 (Ap-Je '48) 56-61. Description of games played by Persian girls, Jewish and Moslem alike. As a matter of fact, many of them in only superficially different form, are also common in the United States.
- 2782 TANNOS, AFIF I. "The village in the national life of Lebanon." *Middle East J.* 3 (Ap '49) 151-63. Despite the reputation the Lebanese have as traders, the backbone of Lebanon's economy is to be found in its rural communities. Unlike the situation elsewhere the Arab world, these communities possess a strong village spirit which must be reckoned with in any plan for rural development.
- 2783 THOMSON, WILLIAM. "The Qur'ān and Islam." *Muslim World* 39 (Ap '49) 136-44. Mohammed believed that the Quran was divinely revealed. Hence it has affected orthodox Moslem thought more profoundly than the Bible did the course of Christian doctrine. "Islam is much more Quranic than Christianity ever was Biblical."
- 2784 WATSON, A. DOROTHY. "Women of the western Sahara desert." *Muslim World* 39 (Ap '49) 97-101. A description of the homes, women, and children of the northern oases.
- 2785 WYSHAM, WILLIAM N. "Hope for religious freedom in Islam." *Muslim World* 39 (Ap '49) 92-6. The prospect for full religious liberty throughout Islamic areas is unfavorable except in Iran, where considerable progress has been made toward the beginnings of an indigenous Christian church.
- See also: 2714, 2751, 2753, 2760, 2787, 2799

## SCIENCE

- 2786 "The new 'wonder drug' for the Sudan." *Gt. Brit. and East* 65 (Mr '49) 23. After four years of intensive research British chemists produced antrycide, a drug which should free the tse-tse-ridden areas of the southern Sudan from cattle diseases.
- 2787 MINAW, FARIS. "Radio-geophysical prospecting for desert underground water and the utilization of Egyptian deserts." *L'Egypte Contemp.* (Cairo) 39 (Ja-F '48) 1-9. The discovery of water by this method might lead to a solution of the great Egyptian problem, i.e. the overcrowding of the population in the present habitable parts of the country.

See also: 2748

## ART

(Archeology, architecture, epigraphy, numismatics, minor arts, painting and music, manuscripts and papyri)

- 2788 ALBRIGHT, W. F. "A decade of Middle Eastern archeology, 1939-1948." *Pal. Affairs*. 4 (F '49) 22-5. A general survey of the major archeological finds in Palestine and Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt.

- 2789 AUGST, BEDRICH. "A Persian coin of the 'Gallows Birds' dynasty." *Numis. Rev.* 4 (Ap-O '47) 91-2. Discussion of an unpublished coin of the Serbedarid dynasty struck at Sabzawār, 770 A.H. (Illust.)
- 2790 AYDIN, SAYILI. "A short investigation at Tire." (in Turkish and English) *Belleten* (Istanbul) 12 (Jl '48) 683-9. Reports of an observatory at the Anatolian town of Tire are not substantiated; but a visit has brought to light two interesting inscriptions, one of 774 A.H. relating to an aqueduct, the other of 739 A.H. connected with the mosque and *sawiya* of Bahādur al-Baytār.
- 2791 AYDIN, SAYILI. "The Wajidiyya madrasa of Kutahya." (in Turkish and English) *Belleten* (Istanbul) 12 (Jl '48) 655-77. There is some evidence that the building may have been the scene of actual astronomical observations by the scientist 'Abd al-Wājid (d. 1434 A.D.) who for many years was *mudarris* at the madrasa.
- 2792 BIAVATI, EROS. "'Bacini' di Pisa." *Faenza* 34 (1948) 85-6. Reproduces and discusses four out of fifty *bacini*, or pottery bowls, inserted as decoration in the walls of the church of St. Piero a Grado near Pisa; they are painted in green and dark brown over a yellowish glaze, one also in yellow. The author calls them Byzantine-Arabic, 11th-13th century. 1 text figure and 1 plate.
- 2793 BLAIR, DOROTHY. "An exhibition of East Asiatic glass." *Artibus Asiae* (Ascona) 12 (1948) 195-205. Discussion of an exhibition in the Toledo Museum of Art which showed mostly Chinese glass. The theory is propounded that an enamelled glass bottle of Syrian type found in Mongolia was perhaps made by descendants or pupils of Damascus glass makers deported by Timur.
- 2794 BYKOV, A. A. "An Abbasid Memorial dirham of the beginning of the 9th century." (in Russian) *Sovetskoie Vostokovedeniie* (Moscow) 4 (1947) 83-90. The coin was minted in 195 H. (810-811 A.D.) in honor of Zubaydah, the wife of Hārūn al-Rashid.
- 2795 ERDMANN, KURT. "Eine Seldschukische Silberschale." *Jahrbuch der Hamburger Kunstsammlungen* 1 (1948) 35-43. Discusses a Seljuk silver bowl, Persia, 11th century, in the Museum für Kunst und Gewerbe (Hamburg), and related pieces and possible antecedents. 2 plates and 5 text illust.
- 2796 FAWCETT, CHARLES. "17th century dollar symbols in the Levant." *Numis. Chronicle* 7 (1947) 186-9. An inquiry into the use of the dollar sign in accounts of the Levant Company's factory at Aleppo. The reference was to Spanish and Dutch dollars.
- 2797 FIELD, HENRY. "The University of California African expedition: II. Sudan and Kenya." *Amer. Anthropologist* 51 (Ja-Mr '49) 72-84. Preliminary report on an archeological and anthropological survey of the Sudan and Kenya.
- 2798 FRYE, RICHARD N. "Two Timurid monuments in Herat." *Artibus Asiae* (Ascona) 11 (1948) 206-13. Discusses the *masjid-i-jāmi'* and shrine of Khawāja 'Abdallāh Anṣārī and the various tomb stones there. With plan of the mosque and 17 illustrations, which are unfortunately too small.
- 2799 GOLVIN, M. L. "Tisseuses at tissages décorés d'el-Djem et de Djebeniana." *Ibla* 12 (1<sup>er</sup> trim. '49) 33-56. In addition to a description of numerous technical details, there are observations on various aspects of the life lead by Tunisian artisans. Copiously illustrated with photographs, sketches, and diagrams.
- 2800 KRACHKOVSKAYA, V. A. "The historical importance of South-Arabian architectural monuments." (in Russian) *Sovetskoie Vostokovedeniie* (Moscow) 4 (1947) 105-28. Traces the types of square and rectangular structures, and compares them with similar monuments throughout the ancient Near East. Analysis of building terminology tends to confirm Hamdānī's data (in his *Iklil*).
- 2801 KRAUS, ERNST. "New or recent issues." *Numismatist* 62 (Ja '49) 57-9. Recent coin issues of Muscat, Oman, and Turkey.
- 2802 KRAUS, ERNST. "New or recent issues." *Numismatist* 62 (Ap '49) 214-5. Recent issues of Bahawalpur, Hyderabad, Kutch, Turkey, and Syria.
- 2803 KRAUS, ERNST. "New or recent issues." *Numismatist* 62 (F '49) 115-6. Recent coin issues of Iran and Kutch.
- 2804 MILES, GEORGE C. "Early Islamic inscriptions near Ta'if in the Hijāz." *J. Near East Stud.* 8 (O '48) 236-42. Features an inscription of the first Umayyad caliph Mu'āwiyah, possibly the earliest dated historical inscription of the Moslem Arabs. Certain of the consonants are distinctly printed, a fact of great significance in dating the earliest Koranic parchments.
- 2805 MOKHBER, MOHAMMAD ALI. "Historical monuments of Fars." (in Persian) *Yādegār* (Tehran) 5 (S '48) 9-24. Article accompanied by a map giving the description and location of the remains of ancient buildings and monuments in the province of Fars in Iran.
- 2806 AL-MUNAJJID, ṢALĀḤ AL-DĪN. "Re-

- corded historical monuments of Damascus." (in Arabic) *al-Mashriq* (Beirut) 42 (Ap-Je '48) 242-88. The author, who is director of the Syrian Department of Antiquities, briefly describes the principal monuments from Roman times to the end of the Ayyubids. Illust. and bibliog. (to be cont.)
- 2807 RABINO, H. L. "Persian coin said to have been struck at Bahrain." *Numis. Chronicle* 7 (1947) 90. A dispatch in the British Public Record Office mentions a gold coin supposedly struck at Bahrain in 1817 by the Shah of Persia. If this propaganda piece ever existed, no specimen of it has been seen.
- 2808 SHEPHERD, DOROTHY G. "A Persian velvet of the Shah Tahmasp period." *Bull. of Cleveland Mus. of Art.* 34 (Ap '49) 46-53. Part of a war tent alleged to have belonged to Sultan Sulayman I (1520-66); the design shown Iskander killing a dragon. With 1 plate and 1 figure.
- ### LANGUAGE
- 2810 AFRĀM, MĀR IGNATIUS. "Syriac words in Arabic dictionaries." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmi al-'Arabi* (Damascus) 23 (Ap '48) 161-82. Contains an introduction and the beginning of an alphabetic listing.
- 2811 BEN ALI, A. and A. LOUIS. "Ech-chikh Cheh'ima, le poète-musicien du village." *Ibla* (Tunis) 11 (3° & 4° trims. '48) 336-43. Another in the series of *scènes de vie sahélienne*. Tunisian-Arabic text, translation, notes.
- 2812 BEN ALI, A. and A. LOUIS. "Père Frej, le nègre du village." *Ibla* (Tunis) 12 (1° trim. '49) 57-76. Same comment as above. Includes also a phonetic transcription and glossary.
- 2813 BOLDYREV, A. N. "Badakhshan folklore." (in Russian) *Sovetskoe Vostokovedeniie* (Moscow) 5 (1948) 275-295. Materials on the Persian-Afghan dialect.
- 2814 al-HIMSĪ, NA'ĪM. "The numeral in Arabic." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmi al-'Arabi* (Damascus) 23 (Ja-Ap '48) 87-104, 259-70. Concludes a detailed study of the various idiomatic usages and points of grammar in connection with numerals.
- 2815 JAMME, A. "Classification descriptive generale des inscriptions sud-arabes." *Ibla* (Tunis) 11 (3° & 4° trims. '48) 401ff.
- 2816 KURD 'ALĪ, MUHAMMAD. "Curiosities in the development of the colloquial." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmi al-'Arabi* (Damascus) 23 (Ap '48) 301-8. A lecture on the rise of Arabic dialects.
- 2817 al-MAGHRABI, 'ABD AL-QADIR. "Our language academies." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmi al-'Arabi* (Damascus) 23 (Ap '48) 308-15. Surveys the various learned bodies dealing with the Arabic language in Egypt and Syria.
- 2818 MAQDISĪ, ANĪS. "Al-Khafāji's method in philology." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmi al-'Arabi* (Damascus) 23 (Ap '48) 230-8. Notes on the views of this 18th century grammarian.
- 2819 MAQDISĪ, ANĪS. "On Arabic lexicons." (in Arabic) *al-Abhāth* (Beirut) 2 (Mr '49) 35-42. A short history of lexicon writing.
- 2820 PELLEGRIN, A. "Les noms de lieux empruntés au règne animal. Notes de toponymie africaine." *Ibla* (Tunis) 12 (1° trim.) 77-80. A study of these names confirms the extent of the Arabization of North Africa. Many zoological species, dead and extant, are herein reflected.
- 2821 PELLEGRIN, A. "Les noms de lieux empruntés au règne végétal. Contribution à l'étude de la toponymie Nord-Africaine." *Ibla* (Tunis) 11 (3° & 4° trim.) 365-71. This nomenclature arises from the initiative of peasants and shepherds who are in direct contact with nature.
- 2822 RIDĀ, AHMAD. "Colloquial and literary idiom." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmi al-'Arabi* (Damascus) 23 (Ja-Ap '48) 105-13, 239-50. Parts of an alphabetic list of notes on colloquial usage and its derivation.
- 2823 ROSENFELD, A. Z. "The auxiliary function of the verb *dāstān* in contemporary Persian." (in Russian) *Sovetskoe Vostokovedeniie* (Moscow) (1948) 305-10. This colloquial usage is now beginning to appear in print.
- 2824 al-SHIHĀBĪ, MUSTAFĀ. "Observations on a dictionary." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilmi al-'Arabi* (Damascus) 23 (Ap '48) 219-29. The author published a dictionary of agricultural terms in 1943 and quotes here the criticism of the late Father al-Karmali.
- 2825 SMIZNOVA, O. I. "Composite verbs with *istodan* and *mondan* in Tadjik, and their historical roots." (in Russian) *Sovetskoe Vostokovedeniie* (Moscow) 5 (1948) 297-304.
- 2826 TROITSKAIA, A. L. "Abdoltili." (in Russian) *Sovetskoe Vostokovedeniie* (Moscow) 5 (1948) 251-74. The secret language of actors and musicians in Central Asia.

See also: 2767, 2778, 2800, 2804, 2830, 2833



## LITERATURE

- 2827 BERTELS, E. E. "Literature in Persian in Central Asia." (in Russian) *Sovetskoe Vostokovedeniie* (Moscow) 5 (1948) 199-228. Persian literature was created by various ethnic groups from the Caucasus to India. Some of these groups do not speak Persian and have developed under the Soviets new literature in their living spoken tongues. Yet without taking into account Persian literature it is impossible to trace the literary development of such peoples as the Uzbeks.
- 2828 BERTELS, E. E. "The problem of tradition in the heroic epos of the Turkic peoples." (in Russian) *Sovetskoe Vostokovedeniie* (Moscow) (1947) 73-9. Traces the uses of certain metaphors through many centuries (likening human qualities with animal behavior). Stresses the value of Arabic literary sources for the study of Turkic pre-history.
- 2829 BORISOV, A. Y. "Addenda to the list of Ibn ar-Rāwandi's works." (in Russian) *Sovetskoe Vostokovedeniie* (Moscow) 4 (1947) 81-2. An anonymous Mu'tazili author mentions two additional works of the iconoclast: the *K. al-Khāfir* and *K. al-Ma'rifah*.
- 2830 BOROKOV, A. K. "Studies in the history of the Uzbek language." (in Russian) *Sovetskoe Vostokovedeniie* 5 (1948) 229-50. Defining the language of Ahmad Yasevi; a study both in literary history and linguistics.
- 2831 FARRŪKH, 'UMAR. "Ibn Hazm's Epistemology." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilma al-'Arabi* (Damascus) 23 (Ap '48) 201-18. Ibn Hazm based his theory of knowledge on the data of the senses.
- 2832 IQBĀL, 'ABBĀS. "The plague of prejudice and lack of taste." (in Persian) *Yādegār* (Tehran) 5 (S '48) 1-5. Having been asked by two groups of students to mediate between them on their differences of opinion concerning the value of the poetry of Hafiz and Sa'adi, the writer attacks those who are unable to understand the significance and meaning of the works of these famous poets and who then try to discredit them.
- 2833 KAHLE, PAUL E. "The Arabic readers of the Koran." *J. Near East Stud.* 8 (Ap '49) 65-72. Some additional evidence to support Voller's theory that the Koran was read by the prophet in a largely non-classical language, one that differs clearly from the classical Arabic in which the Koran is normally read. The classical language was developed in the century after the Prophet on the basis of Bedouin poetry by the early grammarians and Koran readers, and to this language the consonantal text of the Koran was adopted.
- 2834 KURD, 'ALĪ, MUHAMMAD. "The ancestor's legacy." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilma al-'Arabi* (Damascus) 23 (Ap '48) 183-200. Short studies of literary personages with source documentation.
- 2835 LANG, D. M. "Sa'di and the age of reason in France." *Asiatic Rev.* 45 (Ap '49) 633-8. Lists a number of references to the Persian poet by prominent 18th century French writers and traces the sources of their knowledge of his works.
- 2836 SCHROEDER, ERIC. "Verse translation and Hafiz." *J. Near East Stud.* 8 (O '48) 209-22. Some reflections on the art of translating poetry, being a review of A. J. Arberry's *Fifty Poems of Hafiz*.
- 2837 YĀZIJĪ, KAMĀL. "Nature in Arabic Poetry." (in Arabic) *al-Abhāth* (Beirut) 2 (Mr '49) 73-82. A propos of von Grunbaum's article on "Response to nature in Arabic poetry" (JNES 1945). The artificiality of the *qasidah* and the purpose of the poet relegate nature to a tertiary role in poetry.
- 2838 al-TABBĀKH, MUHAMMAD RAGHĪB. "Ibn al-Adim's work on the history of Aleppo." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilma al-'Arabi* 23 (Ap '48) 251-8. Surveys manuscripts of this 14th century work.

See also: 2719, 2840

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- 2840 DĀGHER, YŪSUF AS'AD. "Art of the theater." (in Arabic) *al-Mashriq* (Beirut) 42 (Je-S '48) 434-60. A bibliography of plays presented in the Arabic language, originals and translations, from 1848-1948. To be continued.
- 2841 HALPERN, MANFRED. "Recent books on Moslem-French relations." *Middle East J.* 3 (Ap '49) 211-5. Emphasizes the premises upon which research, particularly that done by Frenchmen, has been based. Specific reference to some two dozen works dealing with the topic.
- 2842 HOWARD, HARRY N. "Some recent works on the Near East." *J. Mod. Hist.* 21 (Mr '49) 35-43. An evaluation of a number of books, chiefly in English, dealing with the Arab world, Zionism, Iran, and Turkey.
- 2843 LOWENTHAL, RUDOLF. "Works on the Far East and Central Asia published in

the U.S.S.R." *Far East. Quart.* 8 (F '49) 172-83. Contains material on Central Asia, pp. 173-174 and 182-183.

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- 2844 "Hakim-ul-Molk." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* (Tehran) 1 (Mr '48) 10-7. A short biography of Ibrahim Hakimi, Hakim-ul-Molk, former Prime Minister of Iran, describing his education, political career, his part in the constitutional movement of Iran, and his re-entry into politics after the departure of Reza Shah Pahlavi.
- 2845 GORDLEVSKY, V. A. "I. Y. Kratchkovsky." (in Russian) *Sovetskoie Vostokovedeniie* (Moscow) 4 (1947) 13-8. Text of an address delivered in Dec. 1944 on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Arabist's academic activity.
- 2846 AL-HUSAYNĪ, ISHĀQ MŪSĀ. "Muḥ Is'af al-Nashāshibi." (in Arabic) *Maj. al-Majma' al-'Ilma al-'Arabi* (Damascus) 23 (Ap '48) 294-300. Obituary of the eminent Arabic scholar of Palestine.
- 2847 QAZVINI, MOHAMMAD. "Modern obituaries." (in Persian) *Yādegār* (Tehran) 5 (S. '48) 51-72. Continuation of the series, giving a brief account of the life and contributions of well-known men of the Middle East.
- 2848 YAKUBOVSKI, A. Y. "P. P. Ivanov as an historian of Middle Asia." (in Russian) *Sovetskoie Vostokovedeniie* (Moscow) 5 (1948) 313-320. Ivanov was a specialist in the history of Turkestan between the 16th and 19th centuries.

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- 2849 *The Middle East, 1948*. Royal Central Asian J. 36 (Ja '49) 96. For each of the 13 countries covered, includes "particulars of educational institutions, bibliographies, lists of commercial and industrial organizations and the like, and of newspapers." . . . The volume ends with "Who's Who in the Middle East."
- 2850 *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into disturbances in Aden in December 1947*. Royal Cent. Asian J. 36 (Ja. '49) 95-6. (Eric Macro). "The report proper describes events leading up to and the immediate cause of the disturbances . . . After a detailed description of events during the disturbances, recommendations in regard to the prevention of a similar disturbance and the measures to be taken are set forth."
- 2851 ABD EL-ĀL, IBRAHIM. *Le Litani*. al-Mashriq (Beirut) (Je-S '48) 475-7. (A. Poidebard). Deals with a hydraulic sur-

vey of this important Lebanese river and its irrigation and power potentialities.

- 2852 AIDIN, NOUHIE. *Iran then and now*. Muslim World 39 (Ap '49) 151. (J. Christy Wilson). Deals chiefly with the history of missionary work.
- 2853 BALSAN, FRANÇOIS. *The sheep and the Chevrolet*. Royal Cent. Asian J. 36 (Ja '49) 94-5. "An account of a motor tour in Kurdistan . . . in 1939. The record is irritating and misses most of the important angles."
- 2854 BENAZET, HENRI. *L'Afrique française en danger*. Middle East J. 3 (Ap '49) 220-1. (Manfred Halpern). An honest search for ways to reconcile native claims with the requirements of French sovereignty.
- 2855 BERQUE, A. *Les intellectuels algériens*. Ibla (Tunis) 11 (3° & 4° trims. '48) 383.
- 2856 BLAKE, G. S. and GOLDSCHMIDT, H. J. *Geology and water resources of Palestine*. Geog. Rev. 39 (Ap '49) 338-9. (Peveril Meigs). ". . . a valuable compendium of information on ground water and its accessibility through wells and springs. Stream water is not covered."
- 2857 BOWEN, J. C. E. *Poems from the Persian*. Royal Cent. Asian J. 36 (Ja '49) 93-4. (C. A. Greenwood). Translation from the works of 12 poets from Firdawsī to Jami and to the modern Qulzum. "The choice of poems . . . is excellent, there is little of bulbuls, roses, and moon-faced beauties, but there is much that reveals the fresh thoughts of the great masters of the Persian tongue."
- 2858 BRUNSCHVIG, ROBERT. *La Berbérie orientale sous les Hafsides*. J. Near East Stud. 8 (O '48) 278-9. (N. Abbott). "Affords an exhaustive and comprehensive study of North African affairs from the early 13th to the early 16th century." Ibla (Tunis) 11 (3° & 4° trim. '48) 377-80. (A. Pellegrin).
- 2859 BROCKELMANN, C. *History of the Islamic Peoples*. Commentary 7 (Mr '49) 300-1. (Mordecai Kosover).
- 2860 BRÜEL, ERIK. *International Straits*. Geog. Rev. 39 (Ja '49) 71-2. (Stephen B. Jones). Vol. 2 consists of detailed studies of four straits, one of them the Turkish Straits. "This volume will be of value to anyone making political, historical, or geographical studies in the region in which these straits lie."
- 2861 CAILLÉ, JACQUES. *Une mission de Leon Roches à Rabat en 1945*. Rev. de Geog. Marocaine, Nos. 1, 2, 3 (1948) 115-6. (F. Gendre).
- 2862 CALMETTE, J. *Le Moyen Age*. Ibla (Tunis) 11 (3° & 4° trims. '48) 380-1. (A. Pellegrin).

- 2863 CASTLE, WILFRED T. F. *Syrian pageant: the history of Syria and Palestine, 1000 B.C. to 1945 A.D.* Gt. Brit. and East 65 (Ja '49) 49. "A notable addition to historical works on the Middle East."
- 2864 COINDREAU, R. *Les Corsaires de Salé. Ibla* (Tunis) 11 (3\* & 4\* trims. '48) 383-4.
- 2865 DAGHER, JOSEPH. *Manuel pratique de bibliographie . . . à l'usage des pays du Proche-Orient.* J. Near East Stud. 8 (O '48) 276. (G. E. von Grunebaum).
- 2866 DAHAN, SAMI, ed. *Le Diwan of Abu Firas al-Hamdani* J. Near East Stud. 8 (O '48) 275-6. (G. E. von Grunebaum). "This publication . . . not only supersedes all previous efforts, but presents Arabic scholarship with a model of editorial effort."
- 2867 DHINA, AMAR. *L'arabe classique sans difficulté.* Ibla (Tunis) 12 (1" trim. '49) 92.
- 2868 DORMAN, HARRY GAYLORD. *Toward understanding Islam* Middle East J. 3 (Ap '49) 225-6. (Edward J. Jurji). "The main thesis of the book carries the implication of a syncretistic solution of the Islamic-Christian controversy."
- 2869 DUDA, HERBERT W. *Vom Khalifat zur Republik.* Middle East J. 3 (Ap '49) 225. (L. V. Thomas). Too brief to present adequately or readably the last century of Turkish history; nevertheless welcome for its objectivity and liberal tone.
- 2870 FAROUGHY, A. *Introducing Yemen.* Muslim World 39 (Ap '49) 160-2. (Harold Glidden).
- 2871 GIBB, H. A. R. *Modern trends in Islam.* J. Near East Stud. 7 (Ja '48) 61-2. (W. L. Wright).
- 2872 GRANDQVIST, HILMA. *Birth and childhood among the Arabs.* Middle East J. 3 (Ap '49) 217-8. "A record of careful, detailed field work on the overt practices, rituals, phraseology connected with infancy, childhood and youth."
- 2873 HOLMA, H. *Mohamet, prophète des arabes.* al-Mashriq (Beirut) 42 (Je-S '48) 477-8. (E. Lator). A psychological approach to the personality of Mohammed.
- 2874 HOURANI, ALBERT. *Minorities in the Arab world.* Commentary 7 (Mr '49) 301. (Mordecai Kosover).
- 2875 HUSSEIN, TAHA. *The stream of days.* Middle East J. 3 (Ap '49) 219-20. (M. M. Mosharrafa). Reminiscences of the author's boyhood in Cairo. Constitutes Part II of *al-Ayyām* (*The Days*).
- 2876 HYDE, WALTER WOODBURN. *Ancient Greek mariners.* Geog. Rev. 39 (Ja '49) 171. (Aubrey Diller). "The contributions of the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Carthaginians and Romans are also included, and the problems of the African continent and the Nile are brought down to their solution in modern times . . . readable and informative but superficial and inaccurate."
- 2877 KIRK, GEORGE E. *A short history of the Middle East.* Internat. Affairs 25 (Ap '49) 233. (R. W. Bullard).
- 2878 EL-KOUOUB, OUT. *Zanouba.* Ibla (Tunis) 11 (3\* & 4\* trims. '48) 381-2. (Farida). "Let us be grateful to the author for having removed somewhat the veil from family life in Islam."
- 2879 LESLAU, WOLF. *Gafat Documents: Records of a south Ethiopic language.* J. Amer. Orient. Soc. 69 (Ja-Mr '49) 36-41. (H. S. Polatsky).
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- 2882 MAUGHAM, ROBIN. *North African note book.* Internat. Affairs 25 (Ap '49) 234. (S. H. Longrigg).
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- 2888 SA'ID, GENERAL NURI. *Lectures on the military operations of the Arab army in the Hejaz and Syria, 1916-18.* Royal Cent. Asian J. 36 (Ja '49) 95. ". . . consists almost entirely of a description of various operations."

- 2889 SCHLOESSINGER, M. and GOITEIN, S. D. F. *Ansāb al-Ashraf of al-Balādhur Muslim World* 39 (Ap '49) 155-8. (Ilse Lichtenstader). "No one working in the field of Arabic history can, in the future, afford to disregard the *Ansāb*."
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- 2896 TRIMINGHAM, J. SPENCER. *Sudan Colloquial Arabic*. J. Amer. Orient. Soc. 69 (Ja-Mr '49) 42-3. (Charles A. Ferguson). "As a source book for the professional linguist it is valuable . . . but it would need a thorough revision of its phonetic terminology and a recasting of its sentence material in order to be a really good tool for the person who wants to learn Sudan and colloquial Arabic."
- 2897 VON GRUNEBaum, G. and ABEL, T. M. *Ta'lim al-Muta'allim Tariq at-Ta'allum Muslim World* 39 (Ap '49) 147-8. (E. E. Calverly).
- 2898 WARRINER, DOREEN. *Land and poverty in the Middle East*. Geog. Rev. 39 (Ap '49) 340-1. (Franklin S. Harris). "The book is packed with interesting facts about the land, the population, and the problems of rural life in Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, the Lebanon, and Iraq. Each of these countries is treated separately and its chief economic and social problems considered."
- 2899 WILBER, DONALD N. *Iran: past and present*. Middle East J. 3 (Ap '49) 220. (T. Cuyler Young). Particularly valuable for the author's personal familiarity with Iran; his access to current sources, including many in Persian; and devotion to fact rather than to interpretation.
- 2900 YELLIN, A. and BILLIG, L. *An Arabic reader*. J. Near East Stud. 8 (O '48) 275. (G. E. Von Grunebaum).
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See also: 2836



## ABBREVIATIONS

*English*  
 Acad., Academy  
 Amer., American  
 Bull., Bulletin  
 Cent., Central  
 Contemp., Contemporary  
 Dept., Department  
 East., Eastern  
 Geog., Geographical  
 Gt. Brit., Great Britain  
 Hist., Historical  
 Illust., Illustrated  
 Inst., Institute  
 Internat., International  
 J., Journal

Mag., Magazine  
 Mod., Modern  
 Mus., Museum  
 Natl., National  
 Numis., Numismatic  
 Orient., Oriental  
 Pal., Palestine  
 Philol., Philological  
 Polit., Political  
 Quart., Quarterly  
 Res., Research  
 Rev., Review  
 Soc., Society  
 Stud., Studies  
 Trans., Transactions

*Arabic*  
 K., Kitāb  
 Maj., Majallah, Majallat  
*Italian*  
 Mod., Moderno  
*Russian*  
 Akad., Akademii  
 Fil., Filosofi  
 Ist., Istorii  
 Izvest., Izvestiya  
 Lit., Literaturi  
 Otdel., Otdeleniye  
 Ser., Seriya  
 Yaz., Yazika

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